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ixEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1992 a peace accord was signed in Mozambique. Since then, many positive changes have
taken place. Hostilities have largely stopped and the long process of national reconstruction
has begun. Many of the more than 5 million people displaced by war have resumed
agricultural production. Political institutions are being examined and various reforms
discussed. Democratic national elections are scheduled to take place in 1994.*
At the same time, aspects of this dramatic transformation are negative, possibly
economically and politically destabilizing, and may undermine the advances made in the last
year. Despite existing laws and general good intentions, the Government of Mozambique is
allowing, and occasionally facilitating, a massive land grab.
In many areas of the country, prime land is being distributed by the state to new and
returning private national and foreign interests. This is making good land scarce for small-
and medium-sized landholders. In Mozambique, land is not an abundant resource, free from
competition or conflict. In all areas of the country, for all types of producers, land tenure
security is weak. The formal (statutory) land tenure system does not grant strong rights to
landholders. This leads to unproductive land speculation and underinvestment as well as to
poor resource use and ecological degradation. The formal system of land access in
Mozambique is not transparent and competitive nor is it seen as legitimate by a large percent
of the rural population. The land tenure system is creating a new class of postwar displaced
and is causing tension between government and civil society as well as among the different
classes of Mozambican society. This can only lead to conflict.
In the last few years the state has been granting land concessions to private national and
foreign commercial enterprises. Some land is also being granted to former colonial interests,
while very little is being given to smallholders. Concessions are also being granted to joint
venture enterprises and members of the government, and the government is proposing to
award land to demobilized soldiers.
* As this paper was going to press, Mozambique completed its first democratic elections (27-29 October
1994). On the eve of the first day of balloting, RENAMO declared it was boycotting the elections due to
"election fraud and irregularities. " On the second day of voting, after much negotiationwith international donors,
the UN, and governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa, RENAMO reversed its position. In the three days
following elections, RENAMO has claimed that it will "protest and reject" the vote when it is tallied and demand
yet unspecified compensation. While it appears clear that the ruling FRELIMO party will win the presidential
poll and at least 50 percent of the National Assembly seats, it is not apparent how the two sides will respond
to the vote once all ballots are counted. The specter of Angola's elections hangs over Mozambique.
xiConcessions are being granted at the central, provincial, and district levels of government
by different ministries, including agriculture, mineral resources, and tourism. Concessions
are being given for agricultural land, mineral exploration, hunting reserves, grazing, forestry
and timber, and tourism zones at a rate that has increased substantially over the last two
years. This trend shows no sign of abating.
We estimate, based upon confirmed data and unconfirmed reports, that as of June 1994
approximately 40.7 million hectares of land have been granted in concessions or "sold" to
private commercial enterprises. This figure represents 50 percent of the country's total land
area, including mountains, swamps, rivers, and other nonproductive areas. It represents 113
percent of the country's total arable land. This figure, 40.7 million hectares, may not
accurately reflect total land area bestowed by government to private interests. First, we have
only partial data from a few districts in five provinces and have excluded the more extreme
unconfirmed reports of concessions covering millions of hectares. We also know that
RENAMO is awarding hunting, and possibly agricultural, concessions in its areas of political
control; however, we have thus far been unable to gather any concrete data about these
grants. As a result the area could be substantially larger. Second, we know that some of these
concessions overlap, which may reduce the total area held by private interests. Both points
are discussed more fully below.
Three principal problems exist in Mozambique's land tenure system. First, the formal
land-tenure system is weak and ineffective, permitting both legal and extralegal land grabbing
without securing land rights for the new landholders. Second, the formal judicial,
administrative, and political structures are weak and ineffective. The state is unwilling or
unable to effectively administer the land laws which do exist. And third, the formal land-
tenure system, with its accompanying laws, does not reflect the economic, social, and
political realities in rural Mozambique.
Despite growing public concern over the magnitude of these concessions and increasing
numbers of land conflicts, both of which have been reported frequently in the Mozambican
media, government has largely avoided the subjects of land tenure and land administration.
Officials often state that there are no land or land tenure problems in Mozambique and that
the current land-tenure system is adequate. They argue that there is plenty of land for
everyone. At the same time, they insist that there are few cases of overcrowding and, where
land shortages do exist, they will be resolved when all the displaced people move back to
their "areas of origin." The government insists that it has the capacity to administer land,
including the distribution of land and land rights, as well as the capability to resolve conflicts.
Government officials often justify concessions to larger commercial interests, rather than
smallholders, by arguing that these larger farms are more efficient. They state that
smallholders lack "sufficient capacity" to exploit the better, more strategically located lands.
This argument has frequently been used to justify displacing smallholders in favor of
nonnative commercial interests. Indeed, there is a continuing bias in government against
smallholders, smallholder production, and even small commercial interests. The bias is also
directed against customary rules and processes, local tradition and customary authority. This
xiiundermines the government's efforts to achieve legitimacy while weakening local systems of
governance, ultimately inhibiting democratization.
The government does not have the resources to adequately administer land in Mozam-
bique. It cannot administer the formal land-tenure system as it is now constituted. There are
conflicts over land distribution among central, provincial, and district levels of government
as well as among different ministries. For example, different levels of government are
granting concessions for the same land to different individuals or enterprises, while the
different ministries are granting concessions for the same land to different people for different
purposes (agriculture, mining, hunting, etc.). There are several layers of overlapping claims
to the same land in many areas of the country. This is complicating an already confusing legal
landscape established under the colonial government. After independence the government
further compounded the problem by "intervening"
' some properties and nationalizing others.
In addition, all land was theoretically nationalized and all previous rights were extinguished.
The various land laws and the constitution contradict one another and are vague on
fundamental questions. For example, the Constitution and Land Law of 1979 nationalized all
land, abolished private land rights, and reduced freehold rights to leasehold rights. However,
the law also states that any property not intervened, nationalized, or abandoned would remain
the property of the original legally recognized owner. Now, twenty years after independence,
people are returning to Mozambique to reactivate titles, claiming that they were never
abandoned. Reports from several locations in the country confirm that many individuals have
been successful in reactivating rights to their old holdings.
In addition to problems with land administration, the government has difficulties with land
distribution. Government presumes it knows which lands are "free for distribution." This is
not always the case. Central, provincial, and district governments often do not know where
free land is located largely because there is no system for recording this information. Because
of long-standing antagonisms there is little cooperation between government officials and local
customary authorities who might help government to administer selected lands in the country.
The question of whether government should distribute land, particularly without the
participation and consent of local communities, has not been addressed at all.
An ominous problem has recently emerged involving the government and RENAMO over
who has the right to distribute land. It has been reported that RENAMO has made, or
promised, land concessions in areas under its political control. At the same time, RENAMO
has accused the government of giving away the country's national wealth through land
concessions.
Land access for smallholders, including returning refugees, displaced families, and local
natives, is proving to be much more complicated than envisioned by government officials
* Farms that were "intervened" were taken over by the government after independence. The legal status of
intervention is not clear, but in Mozambique it is considered one step less than nationalization. In an attempt to
clarify legal status before alienation, government has recently attempted to nationalize many farms that were
intervened after independence. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Myers and Tanner (1992); West and Myers
(1993); and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).before the peace accord was signed. Smallholders are not moving away from the congested
areas en masse. Smallholders are motivated by the same factors that affect larger commercial
interests. They want access to the same strategically located lands, infrastructure, markets,
and transportation. Smallholders are also motivated by security concerns. Many of them do
not believe the war is over and are therefore afraid to return or move to rural areas. They
often prefer to remain in the more congested areas, borrowing or leasing land or working as
tenant laborers. Some smallholders are not sure where they should go since they have been
displaced so many times. In some areas, smallholders have been displaced from their land and
have no place to go. The landless population is growing in some localities as the government
continues to grant concessions. The reintegration of the refugee and displaced populations will
not be accomplished quickly or smoothly. This process will be disruptive and will probably
take several years.
Although government has already initiated a discussion of decentralizing administration,
this process needs to move forward.8.* There is a strong need for comprehensive discussions
of land policy reform, natural resource management, and decentralized access and control
over natural resources and other forms of property. These discussions should address
fundamental questions, including what type of property rights will be permitted in postwar
Mozambique. Mozambique needs the investment that is essential for postwar reconstruction.
Investment must be encouraged if Mozambique is to move away from being donor-dependent
and achieve greater food security; this investment must be legitimate and productive and its
processes and mechanisms must be seen as transparent by all Mozambicans.
A. Recommendations for government
1. Central government should suspend the granting of land concessions until the land law
is revised or clarified.
2. At the earliest opportunity after elections, government should open a public discussion
concerning land law and property rights in Mozambique. The land law should be
assessed, then revised or replaced.
3. A revised land law should legalize land transactions, including those that are already
taking place. Privatization of land markets may well give women and other land users
with secondary rights greater opportunities to gain control of property and hold
resources. But this should be studied carefully, since this type of regime, particularly if
combined with individualization and/or registration, may lead to the concentration of all
rights in the (male) heads of household or lineage heads, stripping women and others of
their secondary user rights.
* After this paper was written, the National Assembly passed an important piece of legislation, the
Decentralization of Municipalities Law. This law apparently distributes greater powers to
"municipalities" in
each district. The law is vague on certain points; for example, it appears that municipalities have not been given
the power to tax and determine where resources are invested. An analysis of this law is forthcoming in a paper
by Harry West and Gregory Myers.
xiv4. A revised land law should create secure, negotiable, private rights. As part of this
revision, government may consider registering property rights in selected areas of the
country, particularly those that are of the most economically strategic importance.
5. Provincial governments should strive to devolve land management to the district and
locality level.
6. District and locality governments should incorporate local communities and their leaders
in the process of land management. Open forums should be created in which representa-
tives of the government and local community members can exchange ideas regarding
their needs and objectives.
7. All levels of government should strive to recognize local community political structures
and their leaders and involve them in the management of land and natural resources and
the resolution of conflicts.
8. The land tax code should be reassessed, revised as necessary, and enforced. Commercial
landholders should pay land taxes that reflect the market value of their lands. This would
help to discourage some types of land speculation.
9. Government should avoid entering into joint ventures, which continue to place demands
on state resources without substantial returns to the treasury, and should seriously
consider privatization of its existing joint-venture enterprises.
10. Government should invest more resources and vest greater authority in the Ad Hoc Land
Commission to study land issues and make recommendations. Its terms of reference
should be expanded and it should report directly to the Council of Ministers or the
National Assembly.
11. Government should continue its review of the judiciary, and ways should be found that
allow interaction between statutory and customary legal regimes. As part of this process,
government should review the inheritance laws and determine if there are ways to modify
them to create more secure rights for women and others with secondary land rights.
12. Government should begin to keep records of land concessions and other government land
transactions.
13. Government and civil society should consider the creation of civil body that has the
power to review land grants and concessions and, where they overlap, determine which
have precedence. This body should be empowered to determine who should be paid
compensation—and how much they should be paid—for land rights that were lost yet
legally acquired.
B. Recommendations for RENAMO
14. RENAMO should stop making land concessions in areas under its control.
xv15. RENAMO should allow the free movement of people and goods throughout the areas
under its control.
C. Recommendations for civil society
16. Civil society should insist that government and RENAMO stop making land concessions.
17. Civil society should open its own dialogue regarding land and property rights in
Mozambique. Government should be encouraged to participate in this dialogue.
18. Civil society should insist that all land concessions be subject to judicial review.
19. Local communities, with the assistance of locality and district government, should
discuss the creation of local land-management boards or other institutions that will
empower them to defend their land rights and negotiate the exchange of rights with
nonlocal interests.
20. The Universidade Eduardo Mondlane should initiate research into questions relating to
property and land rights, customary authorities and political institutions, and the role of
civil society in the democratization process.
D. Recommendations for donors and NGOs
21. Donors should encourage the government to stop making land concessions. International
assistance should be tied to this action.
22. Donors should help create an environment in which government and civil society can
communicate and negotiate over land law and tenure reform.
23. Donors should continue to fund programs that build national technical capacity and skills,
particularly with regard to dispute resolution and resource administration, and programs
that generate information leading to a more informed public debate about land and
property relations in Mozambique.
24. Donors should encourage civil society to pursue the above noted recommendations.
xviSECURITY, CONFLICT, AND REINTEGRATION
IN MOZAMBIQUE: CASE STUDIES OF
LAND ACCESS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD
by
Gregory W. Myers, Julieta Eliseu,
and Erasmo Nhachungue
The war is not over, FRELIMO and RENAMO are
only taking a holiday.
Peasants in Tete Province,
September 1993.
I have this picture in mind of a great land-rush, with
people waiting at the border ready to rush forward.8 to
claim their land. South Africans and Zimbabweans
are lined up at the borders and waiting.
Representative of international assistance
organization, August 1993.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over a year ago, in October 1992, the Peace Accord was signed in Mozambique. Many
positive changes have taken place since then. With a few exceptions, hostilities have ceased
between government (FRELIMO) and RENAMO forces. United Nations detachments have
arrived and are supervising the process of demobilization. Although a date for elections has
been postponed several times, the pertinent law has been passed by the National Assembly
and multiparty national elections are scheduled for October 1994. Political parties have
formed and registered and are discussing some socioeconomic and political issues. Some
roads used for commercial transport have been cleared of land mines, and plans to clear and
rehabilitate other strategic routes have moved forward.8. Markets in rural areas have begun to
reemerge, and transport enterprises have started to move goods between cities and between
urban areas and rural districts. These developments have coincided with two consecutive
years of good rainfall in many areas of the country. Significantly, many individuals displaced
by war, drought, or government policy have resumed agricultural production. Hundreds of
thousands of Mozambicans have left refugee camps, accommodation centers for the displaced,
communal villages, and other locations to which they had been displaced. Indeed, the
countryside in postwar Mozambique is in a state of intense transformation.2
Nevertheless, mistakes are being made by government and civil society' that will have
a lasting adverse affect on economic growth and political stability. Despite numerous land-
related problems reported in the daily press,
2 by rural Mozambican's,' private investors,
nongovernmental
4 and other civil organizations operating in rural areas, the government has
been largely silent on the issue of land tenure reform. A recent report prepared jointly by the
government and the United Nations on the transition from emergency assistance to
reconstruction fails even to mention land issues (Mozambique and United Nations 1993). In
a recent meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Ministry of Agriculture—designed to
develop agricultural strategies for the next five years—the government announced that it was
unwilling to discuss the issue.' The new political parties have also neglected the issue.
On the other hand, some recommendations regarding land-policy reform that have been
proposed are too simplistic, uninformed, and fail to reflect the present political reality in
Mozambique. For example, it was recommend that chiefs "resume" political responsibility
for their communities and control over natural resources within their jurisdictions.' While
this is a positive step forward.8, it will not by itself resolve the current problems of land access
and tenure security in Mozambique. Others have suggested that there are no problems with
the current land laws and that reform is unnecessary; they suggest that the problem lies in the
administration of the law.' Still others have blamed traditional authorities and customary
laws.'
1. In this paper, the term "civil society" is used broadly in reference to social, economic, political, cultural,
and religious organizations outside the "formal" and "customary" governmental structures. This includes
educational, trade, and credit organizations not directly tied to government. The concept of civil society in Africa
has been discussed more fully elsewhere; see, for example, Bratton (1989); Hyden and Bratton (1992);
LeMarchand (1992); Migdal (1988); and Molutsi (1991).
2. See, for example, Noticias (10 April 1993, 3 May 1993, 9 December 1993); MediaFax (3 May 1993, 30
September 1993, and 27 October 1993); Domingo (13 March 1994); and Savana (20 May 1994). In the period
between January and June 1994, there have also been numerous reports of land disputes and other land-related
issues broadcast on Radio Mozambique and the two national television stations.
3. See Weiss and Myers (1994), particularly comments by Srs. Timotio, Macuacua, Tembe, Jambo, Mugavo,
and Muchanga.
4. National and expatriate staff working for several nongovernmental organizations reported numerous cases
of land grabbing and disputes at the local level. These organizations include CARE-Mozambique, Food for the
Hungry International, World Lutheran Federation, OXFAM, World Vision, and the Mozambican NGO
KULIMA. In addition, staff from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees have described land
conflicts and disputes to the LTCIMOA research team. Mozambican church groups, the National General Union
for Cooperatives, and other local social organizations have also recounted land-related problems.
Representatives of the National General Union for Cooperatives reported "very serious problems with high-
ranking government officials in Maputo Province over land," saying that government officials were refusing to
resolve disputes involving smallholder farmers. They suggested that some of these officials were responsible for
some of the worst land disputes. A representative of KULIMA recently stated that large joint-venture enterprises
were taking land from smallholder farmers with government complicity (see Weiss and Myers 1994).
5. Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo, 25-29 March 1994.
6. See, for example, Lundin (1992a, 1992b, 1993); Irae Lundin, personal communication, November 1993.
7. Joao Carrilho, personal communication, September 1994; and televised interview, Maputo, August 1994.
See Weiss and Myers (1994).
8. See the debate presented in Weiss and Myers (1994).3
As evidence in this report will show, there is indeed a need to initiate a comprehensive
discussion on land policy reform, natural resource management, and decentralized control
over resources. This discussion must address fundamental questions about what types of land
rights will exist or, more specifically, what types of property rights will be permitted; who
will have the power to distribute land rights; and how and by whom land disputes will be
settled. For example: Will property rights be freehold, private leasehold, or state leasehold?
Will individuals be permitted to buy and sell land or land rights? Will the law recognize
community, lineage, family, and individual land rights? Will the state, customary authorities,
or some "democratically" selected body distribute land and land rights? Will state or
customary law be used to resolve disputes? Will local chiefs, state officials, locally selected
leaders, or a combination of these parties hear disputes?
At the heart of these questions lie even more profound issues relating to the role and
nature of the state and other political institutions, the relationships of these institutions with
the citizens, and the form and nature of governance in Mozambique. In this report we will
raise several concerns with regard to land that we hope will help policymakers in
Mozambique define the parameters of this discussion.
This paper reports the, results of a year-long study focusing on land access in Mozambique
in the postwar period. As researchers we wanted to understand how smallholders and larger
commercialized interests gained and maintained access to land, and how formerly displaced
people gained or reacquired land. We were interested in the way smallholders (reintegrating
refugees, displaced families, and others), larger commercial interests, and joint-venture
enterprises used the formal or customary legal system to acquire and hold their land. We also
sought to understand the relationships between larger commercial interests and smallholders,
and between these two groups and the state with regard to land. We were particularly
interested in the way authority (both formal and customary) exercises control over land and
natural resources and how this authority is perceived by all landholders.
This report is organized into six sections. The following section presents a brief
discussion of research objectives, concepts, and methodology. In the third section we
summarize the land tenure systems—formal and customary—and the processes of land access
and acquisition at a general level in Mozambique. The formal land-tenure system, land
administration, and land laws are reviewed and their limitations discussed. We consider land
availability and scarcity and state-granted land concessions. Data are presented to illuminate
the location and origin of these concessions. Customary land law and methods of access are
examined and the limitations of this tenure system are noted. We summarize what we have
learned about the reintegrating populations and how they are gaining access to land. Finally,
we discuss land conflicts in Mozambique. The overall objective of this section is to present
a global picture of how people are manipulating the land tenure systems to gain access to land
and how these systems are either guaranteeing or denying security of rights. This section will
create a framework within which to understand the cases studied.
In the fourth section we discuss the findings from four case studies and their implications
for economic development and political stability as well as for the transformation of the state
and the evolution of government, or more possibly the devolution of political control over4
resources to the local level in Mozambique. In both the third and fourth sections we present
maps, diagrams, tables, and graphs to illustrate and support our discussion. A synthesis of
the findings and our conclusions are presented in section five, and policy recommendations
are suggested in section six.
The authors wish to state that officials of the Government of Mozambique were generally
responsive to our questions and supportive of the goals of this research. Even when evidence
indicated governmental mistakes, many state officials were willing to contribute to our
understanding of the issues.
The field research for this study was carried out after the signing of the cease-fire.
However, since a climate of war still prevailed in many areas of the country, the study was
carried out in the context of war and a population traumatized by its devastating conse-
quences. Many people interviewed were convinced that the war would resume and were
insecure about their present and future situations; consequently, some were understandably
reluctant to openly discuss issues as politically sensitive as those related to land access.
Nevertheless, we found many respondents forthcoming and sincere.
The authors wish to state that the observations, analyses, and conclusions presented here
are tentative, and that there is a great need for further investigation of land tenure, land
access, and land-dispute resolution in Mozambique. It is our hope that this paper will
stimulate a further dialogue on land rights in Mozambique, an issue that is emerging as
central to the redefinition of the state and the system of governance in the postwar period.
We accept responsibility for any errors or omissions in this paper.5
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study began in November 1992, shortly after the signing of the peace accord on 4
October 1992; it is part of a larger collaborative project between the Land Tenure Center
(LTC) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). The inquiry, which began in 1991, focuses
in part on land policy reform. It is funded through USAID/Mozambique's Private Sector
Support Technical Assistance Project.
Case studies were conducted in several areas of the country (map 1)
9 as part of this
investigation. Although many sites have been visited in the last year, this paper reports on
four cases in the provinces of Gaza (Chokwe and Chibuto districts), Sofala (Nhamatanda
District), Manica (Vanduzi District), and Tete (Angonia District). All together, we
interviewed more than 425 people at these sites. This study also includes data drawn from
other sites visited in Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, and Nampula provinces as well as
data collected in an earlier study in 1992 on state-farm divestiture in Mozambique (map 3). 10
Additional material for this report was drawn from a variety of sources in the private sector
and donor community and at the central, provincial, and district levels of government.
In this project we were interested in gathering broad, historical pictures of land tenure,
land access, and local control or authority over land and natural resources in a variety of
settings. We were particularly interested in the transformation that these systems or
institutions had undergone during the war as well as transformations experienced as a result
of the economic and political changes of the last year. A secondary objective was to develop
a baseline description of land tenure relationships that are emerging in the postwar period.
In this paper we use the term "customary" to denote political, legal, and cultural
institutions that are used by Mozambicans at the local level. These "systems"—products of
the tension and collaboration within rural society and between rural society and a wider
social, political, and economic order—give meaning to, shape, and regulate peoples' lives.
They have meaning because they are historically rooted and because they have been
transformed as rural Mozambicans have experienced new economic opportunities and political
constraints. These systems create political and economic opportunities for actors, who
manipulate local rules and customs to their advantage. The process of use and manipulation
of customary rules transforms customary institutions, which in turn create new opportunities
and constraints for individuals, families, and communities."
9. Maps 1-6 appear at the end of section 3.
10. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Myers (1994b); West and Myers (1993); Myers and Tanner (1992);
and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993). In these earlier studies on state-farm divestiture we interviewed more than
200 people in 4 provinces (Gaza, Sofala, Manica, and Cabo Delgado).
11. See West and Myers (1992).6
In this debate, there is often a serious misunderstanding about the difference between
customary institutions and rules and customary authority (i.e., chiefs, kings, and the like).
This misunderstanding frequently leads people to conclude, incorrectly, that a discussion
about decentralized control over natural resources implies a return to "antiquity" and the rule
of "chiefs"—as they have often been mythically characterized in the precolonial period—as
the absolute managers of land and other natural resources. This misunderstanding,
unfortunately, has influenced the debate over the management of land in Mozambique.
Several participants representing different levels of "official" government at the recent Second
National Land Conference in Mozambique (Weiss and Myers 1994) expressed alarm at the
idea of empowering local communities, using locally defined rules and procedures, to control
land within their community's jurisdiction. Some participants thought that this would be a
reversion to tribalism and inhibit the fair and open distribution of land. Others stated that it
would be undemocratic.
12 This position—that local authorities and customary rules are
undemocratic—is not a new one. Shortly after independence FRELIMO took the position that
customary institutions, authorities, and rules were backward, representing feudalistic society,
and launched a campaign against them. This campaign had a dramatic effect on social
relations in many rural communities, promoting conflicts and schisms within these
neighborhoods.
13
We use the terms "smallholders" and "larger commercial farmers" (or interests) to denote
two broad economic categories of farmers. We use this terminology in place of the
FRELIMO party/government-created wordings, "family sector" and "private sector," which
are artificial and do not accurately reflect relations of production in Mozambique. By
government definition, the private sector is made up of farmers who theoretically employ
wage labor, have access to credit, and produce for the market. Private sector farmers are seen
as having "greater capacity" to exploit resources (land, capital, and labor) than the family
sector. The family sector is defined by government to include farmers who do not employ
wage labor (but exploit only family labor), have little access to capital, and do not produce
for the market. They are seen as subsistence producers. Again, these categorizations do not
reflect reality.
Many private-sector farmers have little access to capital, employ family rather than wage
labor, and consume much of what they produce. At the same time, most family-sector
farmers produce for the market and hire labor to augment the family work force. Many
family-sector farmers have access to capital through the market and remittances from off-farm
employment. The categorizations also are destructive because they are used to control or
divert resources to a select group of individuals; this will become more clear in the discussion
of the case study below.
14 The important points to note are that these categories are not
discreet, but highly porus, and that they are used to control and influence the distribution of
12. Weiss and Myers (1994), especially the comments of Sr. Cadmiel Mutemba, governor of Tete Province;
Sr. Francisco Pateguana, governor of Inhambane Province; and Sr. Lemos Chalulo, district director of
agriculture, Manica Province.
13. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); West and Myers (1992); Geffray (1990); Hanlon (1990); and
Sidaway (1992).
14. See also Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); and Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).7
wealth in Mozambique. Admittedly, the terms smallholder and larger commercial interests
require further articulation, which is largely beyond the scope of this paper.
15
There is little social science research in Mozambique that focuses on gender, particularly
women smallholder farmers and their economic relationships within the household. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to review this nascent literature.
16 We recognize that our own
study does not strongly address this set of issues. Nevertheless, we know that a majority of
farmers in Mozambique are women (Casimiro 1994; Weiss and Myers 1994), and when we
discuss smallholder production we are in fact speaking about female producers. When we
conducted interviews we always tried to speak to the women on the farm in a location away
from other family members. Unfortunately, when men were present, women were sometimes
reluctant to speak openly. At the same time, we frequently encountered men who asked their
wives to give their opinions in response to our questions. Where it is important, we have
noted gender-specific responses in our discussion. Ultimately, while competition and struggle
do occur within the household in Mozambique, we do not believe that it is the site of a "battle
zone" between men and women; rather, the household represents a cooperative organization
in which each member struggles to better his/her own life and the welfare of the family.
A case study methodology was employed in this investigation. Information and data for
study were gathered in two phases. First, we reviewed the formal land laws, regulations, and
administrative structures for land acquisition and conflict resolution. We gathered data on land
concessions, population movements, and capital investment in land resources at the central,
provincial, and district levels of government. We interviewed policymakers and administrators
at all three levels as well as academics and other individuals (from private and government
sectors and the donor community) who have a professional interest in or responsibility for
land administration and land policy reform in Mozambique. A comprehensive literature
review was conducted in Maputo before the field investigations were carried out.
The material gathered in the first phase of this research helped us to identify potential
field-research sites to be studied in the second phase. The sites were selected to display a
variety of socio-cultural and economic characteristics. These factors included the following:
15. We also acknowledge that there are other misconceptions regarding smallholders and commercial interests.
For example, it is often assumed that when we speak of smallholders we are talking about black (indigenous)
Mozambicans. Conversely, it is often assumed that commercial interests, particularly during the colonial era and
in the period of structural adjustment, are white and foreign (usually Portuguese). Both positions are erroneous.
There are many white and mixed-race Mozambicans, born in-country, who consider themselves indigenous or
native to Mozambique. Some of these individuals have small holdings and would be considered "smallholders"
as defined above. There are also white Mozambicans who abandoned the country at independence and now wish
to return. At the end of the day, the question becomes: "Who is a Mozambican?" The issue is beyond the scope
of this paper, but from the outset we explicitly state our sensitivity to this highly complex and politically charged
problem. We are cognizant of Mozambique's history, particularly class and racial relations. However, because
of the complexity and development of these relations, we make no assumptions in the postwar period regarding
race and class. To the point: Smallholders may be black or white, just as commercial interests may be black or
white or Mozambican or foreign.
16. Davison (1987, 1988); Arnfred (1988); Berg and Gundersen (1991); Boucher et al. (1993); Isaacman and
Stephen (1980); Urdang (1989); Liberman (1993); Pehrsson (1993); and Casimiro (1994, 1986). See Weiss and
Myers (1994); and Ken Wilson, personal communication, January 1994.8
1. geographic location—sites were selected in all three regions of the country (northern,
central, and southern) and in areas in the interior and on the frontier;
2. physical security—although security constraints were taken for the well-being of the
research team, we endeavored to investigate areas that had been both relatively secure and
relatively less secure during the war;
3. climate—sites were selected in rain-fed and irrigated areas;
4. economic investment—sites were chosen from areas that have historically experienced
economic investment (e.g., irrigated areas and lands near commercialized centers,
infrastructure, or transport routes) as well as areas that are relatively poor by comparison;
and
5. culture and ethnic diversity—field sites were chosen to reflect differences in local cultural
and political institutional arrangements (e.g., patrilineal or matrilineal kinship structures).
The research protocol was modified from site to site depending on the issues encountered.
The field team constantly evaluated incoming data and, when necessary, modified or added
new queries to accommodate unanticipated information. A consistent research strategy was
followed at each site. The team first interviewed provincial and district officials, including
locality-level extension agents. Data were obtained on population movements, agricultural
investment by both smallholders and larger commercialized interests, land acquisitions and
concessions, and local and indigenous (or customary) power structures. In addition, the team
often tried to interview representatives of the NGOs operating in the area of the field sites.
We attempted to obtain the official position with regard to land access in the identified area.
Maps were developed on-site from available DINAGECA (Direccão Nacional de Geografia
e Cadastro)" maps or from visual identification, and within the research sites officials were
asked to identify specific locales that were experiencing higher levels of reintegration,
investment, or land conflict.
The team then interviewed selected local people, focusing on smallholders (including
indigenous populations, reintegrating refugees, and displaced families) and larger commercial
interests. The local people interviewed were also asked to identify on the maps the lands and
areas that they believed to be experiencing notable levels of reintegration, investment, or land
conflict. A concerted effort was made to interview women farmers at each field site, and
often a woman member of the research team would identify and interview female community
members in the absence of their male counterparts or other male community members. This
was done once it was discovered that women farmers and landholders were usually more
forthcoming when men were not present.
Where possible the research team presented officials and private sector individuals with
the views of the local population and asked for their reactions as well as crosschecking
"official" information with the local population. In several instances discrepancies between
these views led to another round of field research. At least one week was spent at each site,
and in all four cases field locales were visited more than once. Where possible information
17. National Geography and Cadastre Unit with the Ministry of Agriculture; it is responsible, among other
duties, for land demarcation and issuance of land titles.9
gathered was also compared to material collected two years earlier during the investigation
of state-farm divestiture.
One limitation of the methodology of the study relates to the timing of investigation. Field
research was conducted over the course of one year; all sites were not visited at the same
time. Consequently, fluctuations in the process of land access or level of investment or
conflict may not have been discovered. Observed differences may be a result of inherent
economic, political, or cultural differences among the locations, or they may be part of a
larger pattern of development of the area over time in the postwar period made apparent in
particular sites only because of the timing of researchers' visits. Comparisons among the sites
should be made only on a general level. For this reason we have included four different cases
in this study in order to present a broad picture of land access and evolving tenure relations
in the immediate postwar period.
A second limitation of the study is that we have little or no baseline information regarding
land access, land tenure, and customary authorities in Mozambique from the prewar era.' S
It is therefore difficult to judge what transformations have taken place in local customary
arrangements as a result of war, drought, government policy, and so forth. In many instances
we have relied on the oral histories of the respondents to indicate what changes have occurred
in the cultures, rules, and authorities and what these changes mean for the residents. Oral
histories are an important methodological tool, but questions asked and responses given are
open to interpretation by both respondent and investigator.
18. See Alexander (1994).11
III. AN OVERVIEW OF LAND ACCESS
IN POSTWAR MOZAMBIQUE
People gain access to land in Mozambique either through the formal or statutory system or
through informal or customary systems. In this section we summarize what we have learned
about formal and customary land tenure and the limitations of these systems. We note the
types of rights people are acquiring. We also address the question of land availability or
scarcity and discuss the impact of state-granted land concessions on land access and disputes
in Mozambique. Finally, we illustrate how contradictions between formal and customary
systems of land tenure are leading to land conflicts throughout the country.
A. ACCESS UNDER STATUTORY LAND LAW
1. LAND LAW
The constitution and subsequent legislation enacted in Mozambique after independence
in 1975 were greatly influenced by the experiences and laws of neighboring countries. The
leaders of newly independent Mozambique were particularly motivated by developments in
Tanzania as well as in other Lusophone African countries. Many of Mozambique's policies
with regard to production systems and property rights were modeled after those articulated
in Tanzania; therefore, it is not surprising that Mozambique nationalized land shortly after
independence.
19
The constitution and two subsequent pieces of legislation articulated and defined land law
and the formal land tenure system. ARTICLE 8 of the Constitution of the People's Republic
of Mozambique (1975) states: "The land and the natural resources located in the soil and
subsoil, in territorial waters and on Mozambique's continental shelf, are owned by the state.
The state shall decide the conditions for their exploitation and use."' The 1975 Constitution
further declares that all land in the country belongs to the people through the state. It is clear
that a central intention of this law was to liberate (i.e., nationalize) land from foreign interests
that had, in many instances, stolen land and resources from the people of Mozambique; in
this respect its goals may be considered laudable. However, a second intention of the law was
to strip "large" landowners of their resources and to give land "back" to the Mozambican
people. It is at this point that the intention of the law becomes problematic. Many middle-
class nationals, both black and white, lost legally acquired resources. As a result, foreign as
19. For a discussion of the early political evolution of FRELIMO, see Isaacman and Isaacman (1983);
Machel (1974, 1975); Mondlane (1969); Munslow (1983); Egero (1990); Saul (1973, 1985); Vail and White
(1980); and First (1983).
20. See also ART. 35 of the 1975 Constitution.12
well as domestic capital fled the country, leading to economic and political crisis. This crisis
is discussed elsewhere.
21
As we demonstrate below, even if the goal was to give or redistribute land to the people
of Mozambique, this occurred very infrequently. In fact, the people of Mozambique,
including smallholders, were often stripped of land and resources or their tenure rights were
greatly reduced by the state. It is likely that this contributed to the economic crisis following
independence and fueled the subsequent civil war.
22 Essentially, this law and subsequent land
and property legislation gave the state—rather than the people—control over land and natural
resources. The principles articulated in the 1975 Constitution with regard to land were
repeated in the 1990 Constitution. The new Constitution made no major changes to the legal
status of land; however, it did recognize and protect "rights acquired by inheritance or
occupation."" However, as we see below, this admirable principle has not been systematical-
ly applied.
24 The new Constitution also theoretically permits leasehold relationships between
private persons, but this too is unclear.
25
The second major piece of legislation to affect land tenure was the 1979 Land Law (6/79).
In this law the state formally nationalized all land in the country. All previous forms of title
are extinguished and reduced to state leasehold. ARTICLE 1 states: "In the People's Republic
of Mozambique land is state property and the state establishes the conditions for its use and
exploitation. In the People's Republic of Mozambique, land cannot be sold or in any way
alienated, rented, mortgaged, or pawned." However, existing infrastructure and other
unexhausted improvements on the land can be alienated.
This law, while not conferring strong rights on landholders, clearly states their
obligations.
26 Each landholder is to use the land "rationally," carry out activities without
affecting the interest of the state or others, preserve and increase the fertility of the soil and
21. See Hanlon (1990); Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); Hall (1990); Vines (1991); Urdang (1986); and
Sheldon (1991).
22. See Cahen (1987); Geffray (1990); Hanlon (1990); Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and Drumtra
(1993).
23. Rights acquired by inheritance or occupation were, in principle, granted under earlier legislation (Land
Law of 1979, and Land Regulations of 1987). It has been suggested that these rights were not clearly defined
or stated in the earlier legislation; consequently, the authors of the new Constitution felt it necessary to reiterate
them.
24. Although security of tenure is theoretically guaranteed for the family sector (smallholder) farmers by
occupation, the Land Law is not clear with regard to what constitutes occupation. This lack of clarity leads to
"legal" land evictions and land grabbing. This is discussed below.
25. See Garvey (1994); and Joao Carrilho (former director of Ad Hoc Land Commission, Ministry of
Agriculture, Maputo), personal communication, April 1992. The 1975 Constitution specifically prohibits the
lease of land by private individuals. It states that land may not be sold, transferred, leased, mortgaged, or
pledged. The 1990 Constitution contains the same prohibition and the same phrasing, except for the word
"lease." It is not clear if the new law permits the leasing of land. Carrilho has suggested that the 1990
Constitution contained a typographical error and that the word "leased" should also appear as one of the
prohibitions.
26. See ART. 6 of the 1979 Land Law.13
avoid erosion, and prevent land contamination. Land not used according to these obligations,
even if "secured" by a lease, may be confiscated by the state. The law recognizes the
existence of customary land use without conferring any special rights on it. If land is
confiscated, the law states that the former rights-holder is entitled to unspecified compensa-
tion.
27 However, the law also states in ARTICLE 35 that landholders who have their rights
revoked will not be compensated for the loss of any investments, including infrastructure,
construction, or other improvements. These two provisions of the law create a significant
disincentive to investment.
The 1979 Land Law itself is vague in many provisions, and it appears that its framers
intended this to be so until more specific regulations could be developed. Between 1979 and
1992, a number of presidential and ministerial decrees—and several laws—were enacted that
have made minor modifications to land law.
28
The third significant piece of legislation to affect land tenure, the Land Law Regulations
(Decree 16/87), was not enacted until September 1987, eight years after the Land Law was
established. This decree was much more specific than the Land Law, reflecting economic and
political changes that had occurred in Mozambique in the intervening years. For example, the
preamble to the decree asserts that one objective of the law is to decentralize authority over
conceded land. This reflects recommendations of the Fourth Party Congress in 1983 that
control of some state functions be transferred to the provincial level. Indeed, the regulations
specify responsibilities or competencies to be exercised by the council of ministers, ministers,
provincial governors, and locality executive councils with regard to land and other natural
resources; however, other provisions of the decree—and later laws and decrees—had the
opposite impact, which was to centralize control over land and natural resources.
29
Consequently, contradictions within this law, between this law and other laws, and between
the laws and government's stated objectives have led to confusion.
3o
The regulations stipulate that security of land tenure for private sector farmers is
guaranteed by registration of title, and that security for family sector farmers is guaranteed
by occupation. Two types of document are available: Certificate of Family Occupation, and
Title of Use and Exploitation. Land titles are in the form of leases, granted for a maximum
of fifty years under the Land Law Regulations. Private sector farmers are required to apply
for a title, while family sector farmers need not acquire a certificate. Regardless of the
security implied, the regulations also (in conjunction with the 1979 Land Law) authorize the
state to seize or confiscate land for a variety of reasons.
31
27. See ARTS. 34-36 of the 1979 Land Law.
28. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
29. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Martins (1994); and Garvey (1994).
30. See Boucher et al. (1993, 1994); Roth et al. (1994); Weiss and Myers (1994); Myers, West, and Eliseu
(1993); Martins (1994); and Garvey (1994).
31. The Land Law Regulations state that anyone who has had land taken by the state, including land
redistributed to other family sector farmers, private sector farmers, or state officials, is entitled to compensation
(ARTS. 49-52). In practice, this rarely occurs.14
Another important part of the Land Law Regulations relates to land held during the
colonial period. The law states that any land held (by lease, freehold, or other means) prior
to 25 June 1975 (independence), which was not nationalized, confiscated, declared vacant,
or "intervened" by the state, may be "validated. "
32 In other words, rights to those holdings
may be reactivated. This applied to land held by either nationals or nonnationals. The law
stipulates that individuals had three years from 9 September 1987 in which to reactivate their
titles. This was an extraordinary principle, for it not only opened the door for returning
colonial interests to reclaim assets—whether acquired and exploited legally or extralegally-
but also generated enormous confusion over ownership rights for much of the most valuable
land in the country.
33 As discussed below, this has complicated land access for indigenous
Mozambicans, including reintegrating displaced populations. It has also inhibited tenure
security, and thus investment, for all producers. It has been suggested by officials in
Mozambique that although this "window of opportunity" has expired, former colonial land
and property holders are still returning to reclaim assets under this provision.
As noted above, other laws, decrees, and ministerial diplomas have been enacted or
issued since the Land Law Regulations of 1987. These laws have had minimal effects on the
tenure system and land administration.' Laws passed in 1991 and 1992 largely address the
alienation (or privatization) and distribution of property held by the state sector.
35 Although
these laws, discussed more fully elsewhere, refer to nonlanded property, they have been used
(unofficially) by some ministries and provincial governments as the basis for privatizing and
alienating land within their jurisdictions or spheres of influence.
36 These laws could be used
as the foundation or precedent for the creation of a new, more privatized, land-tenure system
in the future.
2. FORMAL LAND ADMINISTRATION
The process for acquisition of rural land, for either commercial or smallholder farmers,
suffers because the law is unclear about what constitutes occupation. The procedure also
suffers from confusion over the categories of "family sector" and "private sector" and from
the ad hoc application of the law.
37 In general, commercial (private sector) interests exploit
the formal legal system, while smallholder (family sector) farmers rely on the customary
systems of land tenure to gain access to land and secure their rights. Each category exploits
the weaknesses of the other.
According to district and provincial officials interviewed, smallholders who are in need
of land should communicate with the local customary officials and other landowning families
32. See ART. 79 of the Land Law Regulations.
33. See Bruce (1989, 1990).
34. It remains to be seen what the impacts will be of the new Decentralization of Municipalities Law (1994).
35. See Laws 3/91, 5/91, 13/91, 14/91, 15/91, 17/91, 27/91, 28/91, 30/91, 31/91, and 6/92.
36. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and Garvey (1994).
37. Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Garvey (1994); Martins (1994); Weiss and Myers (1994); and Carrilho
et al. (1990).15
in the area (this is discussed more fully below). If smallholder farmers are unable to acquire
land in this way, they are encouraged to approach the local executive council." The
executive council, made up of government appointees, is supposed to work with district-level
extension officers, who in turn consult local individuals of "high standing" in the community.
Generally, government officials do not grant land to smallholders; however, if state-appointed
officials do assist smallholder farmers, they generally assign land that previously belonged
to private colonial farmers or that had been identified by the authorities as unoccupied.
Government officials state that once land is acquired by smallholders, the process stops,
without the issuance of a title or registration, because further action is unnecessary to secure
tenure rights. According to them, occupation is sufficient to secure use rights.
39 This is said
by officials to be part of the formal system for acquiring and securing land by smallholder
farmers. The process described by officials suffers from three critical inconsistencies: First,
it implies that local (customary) authorities have an officially recognized role to play in the
acquisition and distribution of land, and that they are consistently consulted with regard to
land access for smallholders; second, it suggests that the rights of smallholders are secure
based simply upon occupation; and third, it presumes that no tension exists between local
communities and customary authorities, among competing customary authorities, or between
local communities and government officials. All of these assumptions are problematic and are
discussed further in the subsection on customary law.
The official process by which commercial and private-sector farmers acquire and secure
land-use rights differs from that for smallholders. According to the 1979 Land Law and 1987
Land Law Regulations, any party acquiring land for commercial agricultural purposes must
register the holding through the formal tenure system and pay an appropriate land tax.
Different levels of government are supposed to participate in the process depending on the
amount of land requested. Again, in principle, an individual who needs land approaches the
local population (or local land chief, regulo, or other recognized representative) and asks for
land. The interested individual then contacts the district or provincial office of DINAGECA
to begin the process of registration. Once an application is submitted, the provincial office
of DINAGECA investigates the application to determine if the land is suitable and available
for use. Provisional right to occupy the land is granted if a favorable report is received from
the district office. The land is then surveyed by DINAGECA and a usage permit is issued.
In theory, the entire procedure from application to receipt of title and registration should take
about four months—and officials claim that the time is often half of this. In actuality, many
applications require a year or more to be processed. The registration process and its many
38. District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Chokwe, Gaza Province, personal communication, April 1992;
District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1993; and
Joao Carrilho, personal communication, April 1992.
39. District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Chokwe, Gaza Province, personal communication, April 1992;
District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1993; Chief,
Provincial Services of DINAGECA, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; Chief, District
Services of DINAGECA, Nhamantanda, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; and Chief,
Provincial Services of DINAGECA, Manica Province, personal communication, August 1992.16
problems are discussed in greater detail elsewhere.
40 In practice, however, it is apparent that
private sector applicants rarely consult with local customary officials, and that land is granted
to them without confirmation of its vacancy. In addition, many applicants apparently bypass
district authorities and secure rights to land without their approval or participation in the
process.
The official process of land acquisition and registration is illustrated in diagrams 1 and
2. The process is cumbersome, time consuming, opaque, and open to abuse. Research has
revealed that there are many opportunities in the system to avoid accountability and bypass
rules and officials involved. There is a significant difference between the way the system is
supposed to work and the way it actually works.
41 For example, in theory, an individual
who wants land must contact the locality (post)
42 officials and verify that land is available
and unoccupied. In fact, however, individuals and companies often go directly to the locality
administrator or to the provincial authorities, bypassing local agricultural (and DINAGECA)
officials and the attendant verification process. At the same time, research revealed that many
applications for land and land concessions do not complete the formal concession and
registration process, but rather stop at either of two points in the process. These points, noted
on diagram 1 as "interruption points," are where the process breaks down.
The process stops at an interruption point for a number of reasons. In some cases the
breakdown occurs because the applicant does not have the financial resources to complete the
transaction. Another possibility relates to inability of government to carry out its duties. If
the office does not have adequate resources or manpower, the application may become mired
in the system. A third possibility relates to the objectives of the applicant. Some applicants
do not want to complete the process. Many individuals interviewed who had acquired
concessions said that they were not registering or did not intend to complete the registration
process until they were more sure about a number of issues, including their rights to the land,
security and the peace accord, and a reform of the property laws.
The government does not have the capacity to administer the formal land-tenure system
as it is now constituted. In many locations throughout the country, provincial and district
officials claimed that they did not have the resources to fulfill even the most minimal
requirements of the distribution process. They complained that they did not have the vehicles
or manpower to determine whether land was already occupied before granting concessions,
40. See Bruce (1990); Roth, Boucher, and Francisco (1994); Myers (1993a); Myers, West, and Eliseu
(1993); Martins (1994); Garvey (1994); Roth et al. (1994); Boucher et al. (1994); Ferrão (1994); Weiss and
Myers (1994); and Joao Carrilho, personal communications, April 1992 and December 1993.
41. Ibid.
42. Government is divided into several levels, four of which are discussed in this report: central, provincial,
district, and locality or post.1.7
DIAGRAM 1
Schematic Diagram of Formal Land







Land acquisition process may end here.




Interruption Point: Land acquisition process may


























* Reportedly, governors and ministries grant concessions in excess of their statutory limits.
Note: This chart depicts the formal land acquisition process. It is not intended to reflect whether land is
acquired legally or extralegally.
A Registration Point
B Official Approval Point18
DIAGRAM 2
Schematic Diagram of Formal DINAGECA Registration Process
(22 Steps)
(1) Documents Checked. --> (2) File Created. -+ (3) Information and Registration.
(
5
) Exploitation of Land Proposal. <'-- (
4
) Intention to Register Posted.
(6) Announcement and Publication of Intention. (7) Sign Off.
(10) Site Verified as Available. E--- (9) Land Demarcated. 4- (8) File sent to DINAGECA.
(11) Technical File Created. (12) File Verified.
(13) Technical Information Recorded in the Cadastre Atlas <
and Forwarded to the Administration Services.
(14) Application Approval. (15) File Card Created.
-k
(16) Registration of Title With Registrar.
(19) Sign Off. <-- (18) Title Issued. (17) Title Created.
(20) Department of Finances Informed.
(21) Title Received Upon Receipt of Document Proving
Payment of Fees to the Department of Finances.
(22) Duplicate Title Sent to DINAGECA.
Note: The final step in the process, whether the concession is granted at the central or provincial level,
is registered by DINAGECA.
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and that they often relied on the word of the applicant that the land was free for distribu-
tion.
43 Other officials complained that their decisions were often overridden by higher-level
authorities who did not have adequate information about their localities or districts. In both
Sofala and Gaza provinces, for example, district officials complained that provincial
authorities had distributed land to nonlocal interests without their participation or consent,
leading to confusion and competition over the land between the new interests and the local
landholders. In both instances district officials were pressed by local populations to secure
new lands for their use. Provincial-level officials have also commented that they lack
resources to administer the 1979 Land Law and 1987 Land Law Regulations. In all provinces
where we conducted case studies, government officials at the provincial offices of
DINAGECA stated that they have very little capacity to maintain a registry, and that they
lack the resources to monitor concessions granted by other ministries or by provincial offices
of DINAGECA.
44
One of the problems with the current land policy is the presumption that the government
knows which lands are free for distribution to either reintegrating populations, displaced
people, demobilized troops, returning colonial concerns, or new private interests. Research
indicates that government does not have a clear idea of where these "free lands" are located,
nor does it have a functioning system for discovering, marking, and recording this
information. Locality or district-level officials sometimes approach customary authorities for
details. This is a constructive process that should be encouraged but, as noted further below,
occurs infrequently—and even when it does, local land rights are often not respected.
In addition, a new, perhaps more ominous problem is the potential conflict between
RENAMO and the government over who has the right to distribute land and who has the right
to distribute land in which part of the country. Some informants report that RENAMO has
been granting concessions for agricultural and hunting lands in areas under its control (see
maps 4 and 5). It has also been asserted that RENAMO gives preference to any returning
colonial interests. If these allegations prove true, they raise grave and unsettling political and
legal questions. At the same time, RENAMO has been highly critical of what it believes is
a land give-away program sponsored by the government.
3. LAND AVAILABILITY AND SCARCITY
Government officials at the central, provincial, and district levels of government have
stated that there is plenty of land available, and that they encourage private foreign and
43. District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Chokwe, Gaza Province, personal communication, April 1992;
District Agricultural Officer (DDA), Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1993; Chief,
Provincial Services of DINAGECA, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; Chief, District
Services of DINAGECA, Nhamantanda, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; and Chief,
Provincial Services of DINAGECA, Manica Province, personal communication, August 1992. See also Weiss
and Myers (1994); and Garvey (1994). This point, however, was hotly debated at the Second National Land
Conference. For example, the governor of Inhambane, Sr. Francisco Pateguana, stated that he personally visits
every location where a concession is pending and checks to see that the land is vacant before it is approved
(personal communication, May 1994).
44. Ibid.; see also Ferriio (1994).20
domestic interests to invest in their districts or provinces.
45 The argument that there is plenty
of land for everyone is often based on the misuse of data about population and land area. It
also derives from a misunderstanding of the land tenure systems (both formal and customary)
and the way in which they affect land availability.
The appearance of abundance is complicated by the existence of vast, seemingly
unoccupied areas in some parts of the country. This appearance belies the actual availability
of land. In many of these areas the "open" land is, in fact, held under the customary system
of tenure.
46 Other potentially productive land is vacant because smallholders fear or expect
the return of former colonial-era landholders. Still other areas are vacant because the land is
good only for grazing or is unsuitable for agriculture.
Mozambique has a little fewer than 80 million hectares of land and a total population of
approximately 16.5 million people (UNHCR 1993). According to these figures, every man,
woman, and child should have access to 4.84 hectares of land. However, it is estimated that
only 18 million hectares are suitable for agriculture.
47 Even using this figure, some argue
that every Mozambican should still be entitled to at least 1 hectare of land. However, this is
still a simplification of land availability in Mozambique and suggests an incomplete under-
standing of customary land-tenure regimes.
Part of the competition for land occurs because there is a limited amount of land that is
readily accessible and in proximity to other economic opportunities. Commercial and
smallholder farmers are attracted to the same areas—those that have physical infrastructure
(roads, wells, etc.), markets, transportation, and relatively good security. Few individuals
interviewed stated that they wanted to move to isolated rural areas far from infrastructure,
markets, transportation, security, and other amenities.
We do not suggest that land shortages exist in all areas of the country. In some regions
of Mozambique land is plentiful—or shortages are less acute—than in areas of high population
concentration and investment. In still other locations, land is relatively abundant but
inaccessible or located in areas that are economically inviable or useless. While commercial
investment in the agricultural sector is important and should be encouraged, the fact remains
that there are land shortages in many areas of the country. These shortages are, to some
extent, created and exacerbated by the formal land-tenure system.
Although we lack definitive demographic data, the rural population appears to be
concentrated in several areas, many of which are within 5 kilometers of the coast (map 2).
Most of these sites are also areas of great capital investment. They include the most
productive agricultural land in the country, including land situated along the Beira corridor,
land in the Zambezi Valley, land along the Limpopo River, agricultural land in Maputo
45. See, for example, Domingo (1993); Provincial Director of Agriculture, Tete Province, personal
communication, March 1993.
46. It may not all be farmed at the same time, for some is held in fallow and other parts are held for future
family expansion. At the same time, fallow land may be used for grazing or other agricultural purposes.
47. Ad Hoc Land Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo (1992); World Bank 1990.21
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Province, land in the Green Zones, land near or around the former state farms (maps 1 and
3), and other agricultural land near urban areas. In addition, land close to the borders with
Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Swaziland—as well as coastal land—is of great
commercial value. These areas represent millions of hectares. They were the site of
significant investment during the colonial period; many continued to be the site of state
investment after independence. The same areas are now being sought by new commercial
interests, both foreign and domestic, for agriculture, grazing, mineral exploration, hunting,
and tourism (see below).
Our case studies reveal that, for most Mozambicans, land is not an abundant resource,
free from competition and conflict. Much of the population, which is concentrated in several
key areas, does not have access to a sufficient amount of land, and the rights to land people
do hold are not secure. Land scarcity leads to competition, which in turn leads to conflict.
4. STATE LAND CONCESSIONS
a. Agricultural concessions
In the last few years, and particularly since the end of 1992, the state has been granting
large land concessions to private foreign and domestic commercial interests. While some of
these concessions are being granted to former colonial interests, few are being made to
smallholders.
48 The state has also been granting large land concessions to joint-venture
enterprises (e.g., LOMACO, SODAM, SEMOC, and SAMO)
49 and to members of the
government. In addition, the government is proposing to grant land concessions to
demobilized troops. Concessions are being given at the central, provincial, and district levels
of government and by different ministries, including agriculture, mineral resources, and
tourism. Concessions are being granted for agricultural land, mineral resource exploration,
hunting reserves (see map 4), grazing, forestry and timber, and tourism at a rate that has
increased substantially over the last two years. This trend shows no sign of leveling off or
diminishing. Tables 1-3, graphs 1-3, and diagrams 3-9 illustrate the nature of concessions
at the central and provincial levels of government.
We also know that RENAMO is granting hunting and possibly agricultural concessions
in its areas of political control. We have little concrete information about RENAMO's
position on land policy or its other land-related activities. In September 1993, official
representatives of RENAMO in Maputo informed our investigators that they would give first
48. We know of only three locations in the country where smallholders have been able to participate in the
process of acquiring land rights, and even then they competed as "second class" citizens. These sites are in
Chokwe (Gaza Province), Buzi (Sofala Province), and Marracuene (Maputo Province). In one other scheme in
Manica Province, the Italian development agency, Italian Cooperation, has worked with the provincial
government to create "reserve areas" for smallholder producers (see Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
49. LOMACO is a joint-venture enterprise owned by Lonrho (UK) and the government of Mozambique;
SODAM is a government joint venture with JFS (Joao Ferreira dos Santos); and SAMO is a joint enterprise
owned by the government and Entreposto. JFS is also a private enterprise. SEMOC, discussed below, is also
a joint-venture enterprise.23
priority for land concessions to returning Portuguese colonial interests.
50 Private interests
interviewed in Maputo acknowledged that RENAMO was selling off hunting concessions and
local smallholders were being told to vacate their lands. This issue clearly requires further
investigation.
There is no agency or department within government that is tracking or recording all the
concessions being made by the ministries or the provinces. Although DINAGECA is supposed
to record land titles and registration, there is in fact no department within the Ministry of
Agriculture that is tracking all of the different concessions being granted by that single
ministry (e.g., agricultural, grazing, hunting, and forestry). It is also clear that the central
government is largely unaware of the concessions that are being granted at the provincial
level. The data we have gathered over the last year are compiled from several sources.
Annual and cumulative numbers for concessions granted by the Ministry of Agriculture
from 1986 to 1993, as listed in the Boletim da República, are illustrated in graph 1,
"Agricultural land concessions: Reported by the Ministry of Agriculture." Since 1986 agricul-
tural land grants of more than 68,000 hectares have been recorded in the Boletim, more than
70 percent occurring since 1990. These are figures for land concessions that have completed
the formal registration process with DINAGECA and the Ministry of Agriculture and have
been cataloged by the Boletim da República. The fact that these land transactions have been
officially recorded does not indicate whether the land was acquired legally or extralegally.
As noted above, there are many more concessions in the process of formal registration that
have yet to appear in the Boletim da República because the DINAGECA registration process
is exceedingly slows'
Agricultural concessions by province for the period 1986 to May 1993, as recorded in the
Boletim, are illustrated in graph 2, "Agricultural land concessions by province: Reported by
the Ministry of Agriculture." Although this graph shows only the data available in the Boletim
(68,000 hectares), it is still useful because it reflects the relationship among the provinces
with regard to formal registration. It may also indicate a new contentious relationship between
the provinces and the central government with regard to land concessions.
Government officials in different provinces claimed that the provincial departments of
DINAGECA had to pay a fee for each concession in order to complete the official registration
process in Maputo and have it recorded in the Boletim.
52 However, DINAGECA officials
in Maputo claimed that provincial governments were not charged a processing fee.
53 It is
also possible that the governments in some provinces, such as Manica and Nampula, are
50. At a meeting of the Mozambican Working Group (sponsored by USAID, ODC, and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies) in Washington, D.C., on 30 March 1994, representatives for RENAMO
would not deny that the organization is granting land concessions in areas where it maintains political control.
51. Farmers and officials have reported that the registration process can take anywhere from two months
to two years. See also Boucher et al. (1993); Boucher et al. (1994); and Roth et al. (1994).
52. For example, Chief, Provincial Office of DINAGECA, Nampula Province, personal communication,
August 1993.
53. Virgilio Ferrão, DINAGECA, Maputo, personal communication, September 1993.24
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choosing not to participate in the formal registration system. It has been suggested that they
are doing this because they do not want the central-level government to administer land
(including concessions) in their provinces. It is clear that some of the provinces are
attempting to assert more autonomy from the central government. This may become more
pronounced as Mozambique moves toward elections.'
In addition to those concessions reported in the Boletim, DINAGECA in Maputo also cites
several agricultural concessions granted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). These
concessions total more than 724,000 hectares. It is unclear why they are not cited in the
Boletim. In all, the available data suggest that the MOA has officially granted concessions
totaling at least 792,000 hectares.
55
The research project has also attempted to compile data on agricultural land concessions
made at the provincial and district levels. This has been a difficult task since the data are
often unavailable or disputed. District-level government officials frequently mentioned data
on land concessions that were "approved" or in the process of being approved; but when we
attempted to verify these statistics with provincial authorities, we were often told that they
were incorrect or had not been reported. We were able to gather data from selected districts
in Nampula, Gaza, Manica, Maputo, and Inhambane provinces. These data serve as important
indicators of which provinces are making land concessions and the magnitude of the
concessions being made. Although the largest concessions, covering the greatest area, are
being made at the central level, a substantial number of agricultural concessions covering
large areas are being made at the provincial level. Graph 3 illustrates this phenomenon.
According to the Boletim and DINAGECA in Maputo,
56 only 6,981 hectares of
agricultural land have been granted in Gaza Province. But for about the same period of time,
the province contends that it has granted more than 170,000 hectares. In 1986, the Boletim
and DINAGECA listed agricultural land concessions totaling approximately 13,145 hectares
in the province of Nampula,
57 while the province reports that it granted nearly 75,000
hectares for just 7 of its 18 districts for the period 1990 to 1993.
58 The Boletim cites no
concessions for Manica Province; however, DINAGECA cites agricultural concessions
totaling 46,957 hectares. The province itself indicates that it granted 126,259 hectares of
agricultural land in concessions in the period 1988 to 1993. In Maputo, the Provincial Office
of Agriculture counts land concessions totaling nearly 200,000 hectares, while the central
54. This is also an indication of the government's attempt, following the 4th Party Congress, to decentralize
certain administrative functions. Normally we would consider this a positive move; however, the central govern-
ment is often unaware of what is happening at the provincial level and frequently grants competitive concessions.
In addition, this lack of communication means that central government is less able to demand compliance with
any tax, investment, environmental, or other national law that affects the overall welfare of the country.
55. See DINAGECA (1993). This document is unclear, but it suggests that the MOA has approved
approximately 100 concessions that have not been reported in the Boletim. It is possible that some of these
concessions are for residential or industrial property; however, the number of nonagricultural concessions is
thought to be small.
56. See DINAGECA (1993).
57. The last year in which land concessions for Nampula are reported in the Boletim da República is 1986.
58. These districts include Ribaue, Malema, Mecuburi, Lalaua, Angoche, Monapo, and Nampula.27
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government in the Boletim and DINAGECA refer to concessions of approximately 655,000
hectares.
59
Data from selected districts in five provinces suggests that at the provincial level, 606,000
hectares have officially been granted for agriculture, grazing, and forestry in the same period
(see graph 3 and table 3).
60 We repeat that the data available for agricultural concessions
reflect only those official and legal concessions that have entered or completed the registration
or concession process. In each province investigated, officials stated that the concessions
reported represented only a fraction of actual concessions. For example, in Manica Province
officials stated that the concessions granted at that level, 126,259 hectares, represented less
than one-half of the total concessions made. In fact, a number of private farmers in many
locations said that they had received land concessions at the provincial level, but had not yet
begun or completed any type of land registration.
61 Consequently, the amount of land
conceded in the provinces probably far exceeds the recorded figures.
Although we do not yet have data for the remaining five provinces or for all districts in
the five provinces where we have collected data, the differences in publicly reported
concessions between the provinces (606,000 hectares) and those listed in the Boletim (68,000
hectares) are indicative of a major and consequential problem. A much larger area of the
country is being granted to private foreign and domestic interests at the central level, but a
substantial number of concessions, which are not being recorded in Maputo, are being granted
at the provincial level. Central government is largely "unaware" of these concessions.
Concessions made by the MOA to date far exceed the 68,000 hectares cited in the Boletim
da República and the 724,000 hectares claimed by DINAGECA, Maputo.
62 Indications are
that the MOA has granted concessions in excess of 3.48 million hectares for agriculture,
hunting, and joint-venture enterprises.
63 These data are presented in table 1 and illustrated
in graph 3.
59. As is the case for concessions granted at the central level, the fact that these land transactions have been
recorded at the provincial level does not indicate whether the land was acquired legally or extralegally.
60. Again, we emphasize that we have data for only some of the districts in five of the ten provinces.
Further, the data for the provinces indicate that most of the concessions at this level were made during the period
from 1991 to 1993.
61. See Alexander (1994); also, Jocelyn Alexander, personal communication, December 1993.
62. Concessions may not need to be registered and reported in the Boletim da República to be official.
Jenifer Garvey says that although titles must be published somewhere in an official gazette to be legal, they often
go unreported (personal communication, November 1993).
63. In this report, land granted to joint ventures is classified as land for "direct" and "indirect" production.
Land classified as direct production is controlled and planted directly by the joint-venture enterprise, while land
classified as indirect production is planted by the smallholder sector. The joint-venture enterprise is usually able
to control the use of this land, since it is granted monopolistic control of markets for the commodities produced.
The areas of indirect production, also know as "areas of influence," are often very large in comparison to land
held under direct production. For example, in Cabo Delgado Province the joint venture LOMACO has
approximately 39,000 hectares of direct production land and monopolistic control (i.e., indirect production) of
approximately 1.449 million hectares. In this report we consider indirect production land as a category of land
concession.29
The total figure, 3,481,000 hectares, includes those agricultural concessions enumerated
in the Boletim (68,259 hectares); agricultural concessions reported by DINAGECA, Maputo
(723,741 hectares); hunting concessions (597,000 hectares); and concessions made to joint-
venture enterprises for direct production (92,000 hectares) and indirect production (2,000,000
hectares). It does not include land granted for the other types of concessions being given by
other ministries or by the provinces, and it does not include land concessions in process.
Again, more than 90 percent of the recorded concessions have been granted since 1991.
Table 1 Land concessions granted and reported by the Ministry of
Agriculture, 1986-1993







Agricultural indirect production 2,000,000
Total area 3,481,000
* Minimum estimate. As reported in Boletim da República, 68,000 hectares;
as recorded by DINAGECA in Maputo, 724,000 hectares.
N/D = No data.
Our research suggests that many of the agricultural concessions are being acquired for
purposes of speculation. Private commercial farmers who acquired land as a concession said
either that they were not exploiting the land or that they were exploiting only a portion of it.
In some cases, these farmers stated that they lacked the resources to utilize the land and that
they would do so when they had access to enough financial capital. Others said that they were
waiting until they were sure that the war would not resume or until they were sure that they
would have secure title. Still others declared that they had no intention of investing and would
sell the land (as parcels) when it became more valuable. Some of these "farmers" also stated
that they would push off local smallholders who were on their new lands, while others said
they might allow smallholders to remain if they would agree to work as farm labor.' It is
impossible to estimate the potential adverse impact that this process will have on agricultural
production.
Many of the recipients of agricultural concessions appear to be unsure of their land tenure
status. For example, some recipients in Gaza Province stated that they were not sure if the
64. Interviews with land concession recipients in Sofala and Manica provinces, July and August 1993. This
event has been reported elsewhere; see Garvey (1994).30
government would ask them to vacate their lands for redistribution (Tanner, Myers, and Oad
1993), while others said that they thought they might be asked to give up the land after
elections.' Some are more secure than others because of political connections or wealth.
Regardless of their status, however, recipients of concessions enjoy a greater level of security
than smallholders anywhere in the country.
Somewhere between these two categories—concession recipient and smallholder—lies a
hidden minority of Mozambicans, both black and white, who lost land and other property
after independence. Many of these people fled the country, but others chose to remain—and
many of those who chose to remain are attempting to reacquire lost property with varying
degrees of success. In some instances, these individuals are in competition with new domestic
or foreign interests for their own confiscated land and property. In the current political,
economic, and legal environment, there are few mechanisms to represent their interests. This
may prove to be an unfortunate development, since this class of local entrepreneurs seems
more likely to invest than those who are currently acquiring and holding land for specula-
tion. '
b. Mining and other concessions
In addition to concessions for agriculture, the government is granting land for mineral
resource exploration. The information collected by the research project reflects only those
mineral concessions granted at the central level of government. Data from the Ministry of
Mineral Resources indicate that the Directorate of Mines has granted approximately 11
million hectares of land for mining concessions since 1991 (see table 2); however, sources
within the ministry claim that this figure underrepresents the mineral concessions granted at
the central level.
It is clear from our research that the provincial governments are also granting land for
mineral exploration. We have limited information indicating the size or number of these
concessions, but unconfirmed cases have been recorded in several provinces, including
Niassa, Nampula, and Zambezia. These cases suggest that at least 1 million hectares
countrywide have been granted in concessions by the provincial governments in the last two
years (see table 3, p. 33).
Some of the mineral rights concessions grant exclusive rights over the land, others grant
nonexclusive rights, and still others grant simple exploratory rights. We do not know what
percent of this land is agricultural land, but one case study in Nampula Province (not
discussed in this paper) revealed that the mining concessions frequently overlap with
smallholder agricultural land. Although mineral concessions do not always grant exclusive
use, it is possible that the recipients may demand that smallholders vacate the area of their
65. Interviews with smallholders and private sector farmers in Chilembene, Chokwe District, November
1993.
66. This conflict between the state and the middle class in Mozambique is the subject of a forthcoming paper
(Myers 1994c).31
Table 2 Distribution of mining concessions, by province, 1993











Multiple provincial concessions 8,000,000
Total area 11,193,792
Source: Reported by Ministry of Natural Resources, Maputo, 1993.
concessions. This possibility is supported by field observations and by unconfirmed
allegations of government officials in Maputo.
In addition to land concessions for agriculture, grazing, hunting reserves, and mineral
exploration, the central and provincial governments are granting concessions for tourism as
well as forestry and timber exploration. These concessions have been partially investigated
and unconfirmed cases have been reported. For example, one Zimbabwean claimed "buying"
5 miles of coastline to establish a tourist industry in Inhambane Province. There are numerous
instances of similar acquisitions along the coastline and on the Mozambican islands. In a
rather remarkable case it has been disclosed that the religious organization Heaven on Earth
received rights to 20 million hectares.
67 Several cases were mentioned with regard to
forestry, including one concession in Cabo Delgado Province for more than 1 million
hectares, and another concession in Manica Province in excess of 50,000 hectares.
Two additional types of land transfer are relevant to this discussion. Research conducted
on the state farm sector between 1991 and 1992 revealed that, by 1992, much of the land in
the sector had been "acquired" (legally or extralegally) by commercial interests and
67. See MediaFax, 24 January 1994; New York Times, 10 February 1994; Savana, 20 May 1994. These
concessions cover several blocks, which are scattered throughout the country. It has been revealed that the
Government of Mozambique and Heaven on Earth have signed a document granting 20 million hectares to the
enterprise. This certificate was signed by the Minister of Finance, Sr. Comiche. (Although government officials
declare that this concession was declined, sources in Cabo Delgado Province state that Heaven on Earth has
begun operations.)32
government officials or granted in concessions." Only in a few cases was state farm land
granted to smallholders.' The area of the state farm sector in 1991 was estimated at
approximately 600,000 hectares.
70
It is unknown how much privatization of state farm land has been recorded at the
provincial or central levels of government. That is, it is unclear whether any of these
concessions are part of the totals listed in the Boletim. However, given the uncertain legal
status of these farms,
71 we hypothesize that few of these transactions have been recorded.
They will probably remain unregistered until the legal questions surrounding the state farms
are resolved. Consequently, state farms represent yet another category of land transfers to the
private sector that remain undocumented.
The last type of land acquisition is the reactivation of former colonial-era titles, which
most likely encompass hundreds of thousands of hectares. The Maputo office of DINAGECA
maintains that there are approximately 60,000 potentially valid land titles from the colonial
era.
72 Many of these titles may legally be reactivated, though we know little about these
claims. At the same time, there are numerous private agricultural enterprises in Mozambique
such as Entreposto, Mozambique Industrial, and TextAfrica, which have been operating since
the colonial period. There are scant available data on the activities of—or land controlled
by—these enterprises, but it is believed that they jointly hold several hundred thousand
hectares.
A summary of confirmed data and cited cases for all land concessions granted at the
provincial and central levels of government suggests that rights to at least 40 million hectares
have been conceded. Most of this land was granted between 1991 and 1993. These data are
summarized in table 3. Again, the totals do not include data for a number of districts and
provinces and for several sectors, nor do they incorporate concessions that are "in process"
and unrecorded.
68. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
69. See Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); and Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
As stated in note 48, we know of only three locations in the country where smallholders have been able to
participate as a group in a government land-distribution scheme—former state farms in Chokwe (Gaza Province),
Buzi (Sofala Province), and Marracuene (Maputo Province). We have recorded a few concessions made to
individual smallholders and to groups of smallholders, all on a temporary basis. These cases are discussed
below.
70. It was asserted in the late 1980s, before the state farm sector collapsed, that the sector covered millions
of hectares. One scheme alone in Cabo Delgado Province encompassed more than 400,000 hectares. The
difference between this earlier figure of several million hectares and the 587,000 hectares reported in 1991 is
explained as the difference between the land claimed by the sector and the land actually farmed. The difference
is important because it suggests a significantly larger area that may be identified as desirable by private or
returning commercial interests. This land was probably surveyed and registered during the colonial period.
71. As reported in Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993), most of the farms divested land before their legal status
was clarified. In many cases the farms had not been nationalized by the state but only "intervened." It is
questionable, therefore, if the state had the right to divest these lands. It is very probable and likely that these
divestitures may be challenged in court as the previous owners return to Mozambique and reassert rights.
72. Virgilio Ferric), DINAGECA/Maputo, personal communication, August 1993. This contrasts with the
few thousand titles reportedly issued since independence (see Garvey 1994).33
Table 3 Distribution of land concessions and other rights by sector*
1. Land concessions, 1986—1994









Hunting' 597,000 N/D 250,000
f
Mining° 11,194,000 N/D 1,000,000
8
Tourism N/D N/D 350,000
Forestry N/D N/D 1,500,00(Y
Other concessions (unspecified) 20,000,000 
Subtotal 34,675,000 606,000 4,600,000
Total land concessions 39,881,000
II. State farm sector
(estimated area divested: 400,000
4
.00,000 of600,000 hectares)
III. Existing private agricultural enter- 500,000 prises (estimated from DINAGECA)
Total distribution of land rights (ha) 40,781,000
* Government-controlled area does not include RENAMO-administered lands. All data have been
rounded to nearest 1,000. N/A = not applicable; N/D = no data available.
a. Reported in the Boletim (68,000) and by DINAGECA, Maputo (724,000).
b. Ministry of Agriculture.
c. Ministry of Mineral Resources. Three types of licenses are available, including exclusive and
nonexclusive rights.
d. Partial data from selected districts in five provinces.
e. Unconfirmed reported cases; includes estimates for concessions granted at provincial level in Cabo
Delgado, Tete, Zambezia, Sofala, and Niassa.
f. Unconfirmed reported cases.
g. Includes one pending application for 800,000 hectares.
h. One concession has recently been approved by the Ministry of Finances for 20 million hectares
to the religious organization, Heaven on Earth.
i. Includes one reported case of 1 million hectares in Cabo Delgado.34
We have attempted to desegregate these data by sector to illustrate to whom much of
Mozambique's agricultural, arable, and total land area has been granted in concessions. We
know that many of these concessions overlap (as discussed below). Nonetheless, we are able
to make reasonable projections. The area granted for agricultural concessions at both levels
of government
73 represents 28 percent of all agricultural land (18 million hectares). This is
illustrated in diagram 4. Diagram 5 represents the available and unconfirmed recorded data
for agricultural, hunting, and forestry concessions as a percentage of total agricultural
land.
74 This represents 41 percent of all agricultural land. When we add the minimum
estimated area currently held by private agricultural enterprises
75 and the estimated area
divested by the state farm sector,
76 the total area granted by government for agriculture
(including hunting, grazing, and forestry)" represents 45 percent of agricultural land and
23 percent of all arable land (36 million hectares) in the country.
78 These relationships are
illustrated in diagrams 6 and 7.
Diagram 8 portrays available data for all concessions, 40.8 million hectares, including
mining,
79 tourism,
SO and other multiple-use concessions,
91 in relation to total arable land.
These concessions represent more than 113 percent of total arable land and 51 percent of the
country's total land area.
82 This last relationship is illustrated in diagram 9.
Land concessions are creating land shortages in numerous locations, many of which are
also the most densely populated and strategically economic in Mozambique. One wonders
what the impact of such trends will be on investment, productivity, political stability,
democratization, and the environment. If our data on concessions are accurate, then in
addition to weak land-tenure and land-administration systems there is a potentially serious
problem regarding land availability and scarcity in Mozambique. This predicament has the
potential of becoming much more serious as recipients of concessions occupy land and assert
their rights.
73. Area granted encompasses 4,990,000 hectares (792,000 MOA concessions; 606,000 provincial
concessions; 2,092,000 joint-venture concessions; 1,500,000 unconfirmed MOA and provincial concessions).
74. Area conceded covers 7,337,000 hectares (4,990,000 agriculture; 597,000 hunting; 250,000 estimated
hunting; and 1,500,000 estimated forestry concessions).
75. Estimated at 500,000 hectares.
76. Estimated at 400,000 hectares.
77. The total for agriculture is 8,237,000 hectares.
78. Arable land as designated by government includes all grazing and agricultural land, forestry land
(including natural forests and reserves), and unexploited or unproductive savanna.
79. Consists of 11,194,000 hectares.
80. Minimum estimate of 350,000 hectares.
81. One concession to Heaven on Earth is for 20,000,000 hectares. It is likely that there have been other
such grants. The multinational organization Pidico is rumored to have received a large multipurpose concession
covering thousands of hectares (see New Era 1994, p. 32). To our knowledge, none of these massive concessions
is registered or the information made public.
82. As noted above, the total land area is approximately 79.5 million hectares, which include all land,
streams, mountains, swamps, and other ecologically fragile zones.35
DIAGRAM 4
Agricultural Land Concessions
As a Percentage of Total Agricultural Land*
Agricultural Land
(18 Million Hectares)
* Includes reported and unconfirmed agricultural concessions as stated in Table 3.36
DIAGRAM 5
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Our research reveals that the rights acquired through concessions are frequently not clear,
nor is the way in which they are acquired transparent. The process for acquiring concessions
has at times contradicted statutory law. For example, the 1979 Land Law and 1987 Land Law
Regulations prohibit the granting of land occupied by smallholders to commercial (private
sector) interests. However, central, provincial, and district administrators have often
distributed land that is occupied or claimed by smallholders. In several instances, as noted
earlier, government officials justified this process by arguing that smallholders do not have
the capacity to exploit these lands.
The confusion surrounding land concessions—particularly the lack of transparency in the
way these concessions are acquired and held—and the inability of the state to enforce its own
rules or follow its own procedures with regard to concessions in areas currently held by
smallholders are leading to numerous land conflicts. These conflicts are the subject of the
final part of this section.
5. COMPETITIVE AND OVERLAPPING LAND CLAIMS
There are indications that rights to a number of government-granted concessions overlap.
For example, agricultural concessions may partly coincide with each other, or agricultural
concessions may overlay mining concessions. And it is likely that in many—if not
most—instances these state concessions have been granted for land already claimed by local
smallholders under customary tenure regimes.
83 This scenario is, of course, made more
complex by numerous categories of smallholders who also hold competing and complementary
rights to the same lands.
84 Research reveals that in many districts smallholders have been
pushed off their lands, pushed into marginal areas, or had their land rights reduced—in some
cases becoming tenant laborers—when their rights conflicted with those of individuals who
had received state concessions. As the government continues to grant concessions, in several
areas of the country the landless population is growing or changing to include new individuals
who previously held land rights (some of whom maintained rights during the war).
S5 In
many cases in different locations in Mozambique, smallholders have resisted attempts to
displace them. Smallholder resistance has taken many forms, including (1) violent
83. Although there are many areas in the country where overlapping concessions have been granted, perhaps
one of the most dramatic is in the Limpopo River Valley. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Gaza Provincial
Office of DINAGECA have granted land concessions in excess of 170,000 hectares in the same stretch along
the river. The MOA has also granted a hunting concession in the area, which co, .,rs approximately 100,000
hectares. The Ministry of Mineral Resources has given concessions totaling more than 4,000 hectares in the
valley (see table 2, p. 31, for additional information). A national park also borders these lands.
84. The case material presented below illustrates an example of competing and complementary smallholder
rights in Gaza Province. This phenomenon was also presented succinctly at the Second National Land
Conference in Mozambique by smallholder farmers from Homoine, Inhambane Province, who argued that their
lands had been distributed by government thrice over to former combatants of the war for independence, to
displaced people during the past civil war, and now to new private interests. This process created four layers
of possible claimants to many of the same parcels in Homoine (Weiss and Myers 1994).
85. This is a particularly serious problem in the more economically important areas, such as near urban
centers, near remaining infrastructure, and near roads, waterways, and markets. Our researchers interviewed
newly (postwar) displaced smallholders in Homoine, Chokwe, Xai-Xai, Angonia, Maputo, Nhamatanda, and
Vanduzi districts. The case of Chokwe is especially revealing, as discussed below.42
confrontation with state officials or new landholders, (2) peaceful confrontation and
compromise with officials and new landholders, (3) destruction of property, (4) labor
withdrawal and land abandonment, and (5) refusal to withdraw and land squatting.
86
In addition to multiple overlapping claims as a result of the government's land-distribution
process, there are other possible layers of competitive claimants due to historical events in
many locations of the country. For example, families who had land rights in the precolonial
era may still claim rights to land that was later occupied by (1) private companies or
individuals who acquired land during the colonial period; (2) people who were given land as
part of a colonial villagization scheme, otherwise know as aldeamentos; and (3) people who
acquired land in one of the colonial-era colonato schemes.
87 After independence a third layer
of land claimants was created as the new government created its own aldeias comunais,
88
state farms, and cooperatives. Under these schemes, smallholders were moved to new
locations, which were often already claimed by other families or communities. At the same
time, the organization of state farms and cooperatives decreased the amount of land that was
available to smallholder farmers. e9
During the war another layer of land claimants was created as people fled to secure zones
and established new lives—in all, more than 5 million people moved at least once during the
war. Displaced families created new demands on land. In several research locations we have
already witnessed land disputes between "returning" smallholders and uprooted families who
chose to remain in their new locations.
90 And finally, a new set of claimants is emerging as
larger private-sector enterprises acquire or reactivate (preindependence) landholdings.
Many claimants interviewed felt that they had a legitimate, legally based right to the land
and were not willing to relinquish their control. When two or more individuals feel that they
have valid rights and will not concede, a conflict occurs. These feelings that claims are
legitimate is what makes many land disputes especially complex and acrimonious. Ultimately,
government and civil society will be faced with an enormous task as they disentangle these
86. See case studies below. Also, see Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993);
and Negrão (1994).
87. For a discussion of the colonatos and aldeamentos, see Isaacman (1982, 1992); and Isaacman and
Isaacman (1983). For discussions of specific colonato schemes in Manica, Gaza, and Zambezia provinces, see,
respectively, Alexander (1994), Hermele (1988), and Negrão (1994).
88. The aldeias comunais were part of the state-created villagization program. For a complete discussion
of this program, see Hanlon (1990); Geffray (1990); Urdang (1989); Egero (1992); Araujo (1983); Coehlo
(1993).
89. For a discussion of the state farm sector, see Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). In the late 1980s, before
the state farm sector collapsed in 1989-1990, it was reported that this sector covered millions of hectares of the
best land in the country. One scheme alone in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces covered more than 400,000
hectares. In 1991, LTC researchers were able to identify approximately 83 state farms covering more than
580,000 hectares.
90. Examples are noted in the following case studies. See also Eliseu (1994); Boucher et al. (1993);
Alexander (1994); and Ken Wilson, personal communications on Angonia, Tete Province, 1994. At the Second
National Land Conference, smallholder farmers from Homoine, Inhambane Province, presented oral evidence
documenting disputes between returning smallholders and formerly displaced families who chose to remain in
their current locations (see Weiss and Myers 1994).43
overlapping rights and determine who will hold the land. This will be an expensive and
politically difficult process.
B. ACCESS UNDER CUSTOMARY LAND LAW
1. CUSTOMARY RULES AND LAND ACCESS
Parallel to the formal or statutory land-tenure system are customary regimes of land
tenure that are based largely on local traditions and procedures. As elsewhere in Africa,
Mozambique has numerous customary land-tenure regimes, which taken together constitute
its customary land-tenure sector. These regimes differ remarkably from location to location
depending on a variety of factors, including population density, kinship organization,
inheritance patterns (i.e., matrilineal or patrilineal), land quality, markets, and historical
experience. Customary regimes also differ from ethnic group to ethnic group depending on
the social evolution of that group and the political and economic constraints encountered. The
civil war after independence (with its concurrent displacement of more than 6 million people),
droughts, government policy, and recent economic changes also affect customary rules.91
This section focuses on general characteristics of customary land tenure as they apply to our
discussion of land access.
Land held under customary tenure is often held by the group, community, lineage, or
clan. Sometimes it is held by the family, and sometimes by the individual. Land that is held
by the community (or lineage, clan, or family) is not necessarily held under communal
tenure. This is a misinterpretation often made in Mozambique. Government officials have
frequently justified communal villages (aldeias comunais) as a result of this fundamental
misunderstanding of local social organizations and relationships.
92 In reality, even though
land is held by the community, families and individuals usually have greater control and are
responsible for the day-to-day management of the resource.
While the lineage or other community hierarchy may have the power to approve or
disapprove of land alienation, the families or individuals may negotiate many types of land
transaction on their holdings. These rights include leasing, borrowing, and lending.
Landholders may also sell certain tenure rights while not selling the land itself. In response
91. This paper does not discuss the historical evolution of formal (statutory) and informal (customary) tenure
and legal systems in Mozambique. While these subjects are important—and indeed have an impact on our
discussion—they are beyond the scope of this paper. See Moiane (1994); Lundin (1992a, 1992b, 1993); Carrilho
(1991, 1993); Amaral (1990); Coissoro (1966, 1987); Dias and Dias (n.d.); Isaacman and Isaacman (1977,
1983); Curtin et al. (1981); and Alpers (1969).
For a partial discussion of the transformation of customary institutions during and after the colonial period,
see Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); Geffray (1990); Hanlon (1990); Sidaway (1992); Coehlo (1993).
92. The Minister of Agriculture recently defended the creation of these villages and their continuation based
upon FRELIMO's misunderstanding of customary social institutions, stating that they were an extension of the
traditional African way of life. See Domingo, 17 October 1993.44
to political and economic changes, land markets are emerging and evolving in rural
Mozambique.
93
In some FRELIMO-controlled areas customary authorities were strongly repressed or
attacked; in others localities they were allowed (or succeeded in achieving) a certain degree
of independence from the state and some freedom of operation." In RENAMO areas,
authorities were allowed to exist but were exploited for the organization's own political and
military objectives. There is strong evidence that both FRELIMO and RENAMO are
currently exploiting customary authorities to support their postwar purposes.
95
In some areas customary authorities have maintained strong control over land and other
resources since independence, while in other areas their authority has withered as a result of
government and RENAMO interference, war, or social and economic pressure. In still other
areas new relationships of cooperation have developed between local customary authorities
and locality-level government officials. In some instances customary officials have infiltrated
the lower levels of state government (e.g., in Gaza and Maputo provinces) and influenced
land distribution; in other areas locality-level officials have deferred to customary authorities
over the distribution of these resources (e.g., in parts of Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia
provinces). We are just beginning to learn how these authorities have interacted with
RENAMO and how this interaction is changing in the postwar period"
Customary authorities in Mozambique do not have an officially sanctioned role in the
process of land distribution. Indeed, with regard to land distribution to commercial interests,
customary authorities are rarely encouraged by formal administrators to become involved in
the process; more frequently they are isolated or ignored. As noted earlier, this negative
attitude toward customary authorities and institutions is not new.
Research revealed cases in which locality or district authorities distributed land to
smallholder and larger commercial farmers, ignoring local leaders and customary rules of
acquisition and occupation. Land distributed to smallholders was usually given for a set time
period; the rights were temporary. This was witnessed in Manica, Sofala, and Gaza
provinces. Government officials identified "vacant" or "unoccupied" land and distributed it
to "needy" farmers or outside private interests. This often started a cycle of displacement and
reacquisition of land, where the formal authorities displaced one group in favor of another,
only to be forced into finding new lands (often again on a temporary basis) for those they had
93. See Roth, Boucher, and Francisco (1994) for a discussion of informal land markets in Maputo Province.
Also, rural land markets were noted in Sofala, Manica, and Gaza provinces by the LTC research team; see
Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); Boucher et al. (1994); and Roth et al. (1994).
94. See, for example, Geffray (1990); Sidaway (1992); and Hanlon (1990). Also, João Carrilho, personal
communication, April 1992.
95. See, for example, Alexander (1994); Cahen (1987); and Geffray (1990); also, Ken Wilson, personal
communication, December 1993; and Jocelyn Alexander, personal communication, August 1993. Confirmed
reports suggest that both parties are actively manipulating these authorities as part of their respective political
campaigns during elections.
96. See Alexander (1994); and Wilson (1991d, 1992a, 1992c).45
inadvertently displaced. In the process, a second or third group might be displaced, leading
to a new round of movement, displacement, and acquisition.
97
Smallholders, both men and women, have reported gaining access to land through a
variety of means, including clearing virgin land, inheritance, borrowing, marriage, lease, and
purchase. Where population concentration is highest, lively markets for land or land rights
exist, and smallholders are active participants in these markets. In most areas where research
was conducted, smallholders who needed land negotiated directly with a "land abundant"
family or with the local customary authority.
Women's access to land in rural areas continues to be determined by local custom.
However, in some cases it appears that women are having greater difficulty maintaining land
rights with the return of displaced populations and with the increase in commercialized
landholders. In the southern province of Gaza, where patrilineal descent is more common,
women have claimed losing control over land to returning husbands and nonlocal private
interests. It is not clear whether they have been pushed off the land or simply have had their
powers over day-to-day decisions reduced. At the same time, many women said that they
could not move to new locations (i.e., from centers of accommodation or the areas to which
they were displaced during the war) without their husbands' approval. It is not clear if this
is an indication of the weakness of women's rights with regard to land access and tenure
security, or if it signifies some other social dynamic within the household. Other interesting
examples are noted in the case studies that follow. In general, with regard to land access,
female smallholders appeared to be more vulnerable than male smallholders. Further research
is needed on the composition of—and relations within—the household unit with regard to land
access and tenure security in the postwar period.
There are two additional methods outside the customary system by which a sizable
number of smallholders have gained access to land. The first of these methods is exploitation
of the formal political structure and, by extension, of the formal tenure system. Many
smallholders, particularly in the peri-urban areas and in the Green Zones, have gained access
to land through agricultural cooperatives. These cooperatives secure their members' rights
to land in a variety of ways as individual or communal rights-holders. Since a large
percentage of cooperative members are women, women have taken the lead in directing the
political development of these organizations. Cooperatives, particularly in Maputo and Beira,
have experienced increasing land tenure insecurity as the state and courts have been unwilling
to defend or recognize their rights in the face of commercial encroachment.
98
The second way in which smallholders gain access to land apart from the customary
tenure system is squatting. Smallholders squat on both state and private land in a number of
localities. Squatting is often a tactic used where land is scarce, but increasingly smallholders
settle on land that is better endowed, even when bush or fallow land is available. In some
cases smallholders are squatting on family or community land that has been acquired by
97. This process of postwar displacement and the creation of a new group of refugees was recently noted
in Noticias, 17 December 1993.
98. See Garvey (1994); and Weiss and Myers (1994)46
someone else. The practice has also led to land conflicts among smallholders, between
smallholders and the state, and between smallholders and private interests.
Most smallholders interviewed stated that they did not rely on the local government-
appointed officials for access to land, though some local government officials were found to
be distributing land to reintegrating smallholders in Sofala, Zambezia, and Manica. In several
cases smallholders receiving land through state authorities said that they had spoken with local
customary authorities or elders to verify that their use of the land was acceptable to the local
community. In the cases where the state had distributed land to smallholders, some recipients
(including reintegrating individuals) admitted that they felt less secure in their rights to the
land. They thought that they might lose the land to another returning family, to the local
community, or to the state; they commented that they would not plant trees on the land given
to them by governmental authorities. In contrast, smallholders in Inhambane openly declared
that they relied on both customary and local government officials, depending on the reputation
of the customary authority.'
2. CUSTOMARY RULES AND REFUGEE REINTEGRATION
Population movement and integration of the more than 6 million displaced persons are
affecting—and will continue to affect—land access for all Mozambicans. In some areas
reintegration is putting a strain on the customary tenure regimes.
100 When a family returns
to an area where they previously farmed, they usually reclaim family lands. If those lands are
occupied, they either apply to the elders to relocate the "squatting" family or request new
lands. Local authorities frequently resolve disputes. However, in some areas, such as Gaza,
Inhambane, and Tete provinces, disputes that are not easily resolved by customary authorities
or government officials result in conflicts and further displacement (see case studies below).
Many peasants have relocated and resumed farming in the past year; some have already
harvested two or more crops. Many individuals have left the refugee camps and accommoda-
tion centers in Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique itself.
101 But many more people have
neither returned to their areas of origin nor taken up permanent residence. Because they are
farming, it is assumed that the formerly displaced are settled and that their land needs have
been satisfied. Both of these assumptions are incorrect.
99. In some areas of the country, such as those investigated in Inhambane and Gaza, a few Mozambicans
exhibited openly negative attitudes toward regulos because of their role as "collaborators" with the Portuguese
during the colonial period. It was not always clear if these regulos were from the same families as the former
customary authorities.
100. See Myers (1993c).
101. UNHCR reported that by October 1993 nearly 400,000 refugees and approximately 2 million internally
displaced individuals had already "returned" (cited in Drumtra 1993, p. 21). We believe that the estimate for
returning displaced families may be highly exaggerated. Having no countrywide data at this time, we base our
hypothesis on field interviews conducted in four provinces. During those interviews a large number of
respondents had not yet "returned to their areas of origin"; many had no desire to return. Clearly, more research
is needed before we can make substantive conclusions about where people have settled. At best, we can say with
certainty only that a large percentage of internally displaced persons have resumed agricultural production.47
People who are returning to family lands form part of the large population movements
witnessed in several areas of the country. But other persons are moving to new lands to take
advantage of better economic opportunities. Many are "leap-frogging" from place to place,
depending on land availability and relative physical security. They have chosen to farm on
land that is not their own for at least one season and will move on again in the next season
if the harvest is good and the peace accord continues in effect. Some of the displaced are
moving in stages, with some family members remaining in the refugee areas and others
moving back to family lands or to other areas to clear land and begin planting. Aspects of
this phenomenon were observed in all districts investigated; however, the responses of district
or local government officials to this trend differed greatly from area to area. For example,
in Chilembene, Chokwe District, smallholders allege that all members of some families were
forced to return to their own lands in Chibuto when they tried to divide between two
locations.
102 Other displaced persons who are moving in stages or who have divided their
families remarked that if they had a successful season they might consider gathering all of the
family in the new location. But in the interim the family will remain divided to optimize
opportunities and minimize risks.
Many smallholders will not return to their areas of origin; many have stated that they are
not sure where these lands are located. Displaced people often argue that they come from
many different locations since they have been displaced repeatedly over the last sixteen years
by war, drought, and government policy.
103 Many of these individuals have established new
economic and social relations, thus inhibiting their desire to relocate and start again to build
these relationships. Some are not sure where they should go since the government forcibly
relocated them to new villages before the war. They are not sure if they should stay where
they are, return to the government villages, move elsewhere, or return to the land of their
parents (Myers 1993c). Other smallholders appear reluctant to return to their "family lands"
because of other factors, including the uncertainty of the political environment. Where
reintegrating people go and when they go depend on many things, such as where they came
from, the length of time they were displaced, the land rights or work they acquired in their
new homes, and the economic opportunities that exist in their present location. They are also
influenced by perceptions of land availability, land conflict, and physical security (Weiss and
Myers 1994).
Like commercial farmers, smallholders are making and will continue to make decisions
based on their best economic opportunities and physical safety. For example, land that is
located near markets, transport, waterways, and social services is attractive to all categories
of producers and investors. Land considered to be in secure areas is also desirable. Many
smallholders said that they believe the war will resume and that physical security is an
102. Smallholders claimed that government authorities destroyed or threatened to destroy their houses if they
tried to take up dual locations in Chibuto and Chilembene. District officials stated that smallholders in the area
had not understood their directions or the objectives of the local government council, that the smallholders were
not in fact being forced to leave (District Agricultural Officer, Chibuto, personal communication, October 1993).
103. This attitude was noted in each district investigated. Margaret Segal (from the International Rescue
Committee in Malawi) interviewed refugees before repatriation. In 1993 she reported similar attitudes, saying,
"We ask people where they are from and the name of their village might be five places..." (cited in Drumtra
1993, p. 22). See also Myers (1993c).48
important consideration. Even with the cease-fire, many rural Mozambicans have chosen to
remain where they are—or move to more secure areas or areas with better economic
opportunities—rather than return to their areas of origin. Research suggests that if displaced
smallholders perceive the quality of life to be better, or if there are better economic
opportunities or greater physical security in their present location, they are less willing to
move back to the areas of origin. On the other hand, smallholders who are in weak economic
positions and have less land or weaker land rights than before they were displaced are more
likely to relocate and may indeed return to their areas of origin.
Another complex set of factors influencing reintegration and resettlement relates to local
political relations. For a number of reasons we believe that some individuals will not go back
to their areas of origin because of their gender, their prewar political status, or their position
in the household. For some people, the war created opportunities to resist or flee from
undesirable political and social relationships. Individuals who had weaker rights within the
family or the wider community may choose not to return to their areas of origin. The same
observation applies to families or lineages. Some families who were subordinate before the
war may also choose to move elsewhere or remain in their new location in the postwar
period. Research conducted in a number of districts supports this hypothesis.
104
Some individuals or families may choose not to return to their homelands because the war
created opportunities for them to resist or attack dominant individuals and institutions. For
example, the success of RENAMO operations in Angonia and Tsangano districts of Tete
Province in the mid-1980s is partially credited to the "mobilization" of poorer peasants
against wealthier peasants, customary elite, commercial traders, and the government.
105 It
is likely that some of these people will choose to move elsewhere rather than return to
Angonia. At the same time, the war created opportunities for some individuals who were able
to gain access to land and other resources. These people may return to their communities but
may also encounter tension and conflict as they attempt to assert rights over their new
resources. Other individuals were able to exploit new political opportunities and assert more
influence within their communities.
106
3. CUSTOMARY RULES AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS
The customary tenure system appears generally effective in securing tenure rights and
resolving local disputes among smallholders; however, it is unsuccessful in securing these
rights and resolving disputes when commercial interests or the state is involved. Thus it is
104. Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994; Olaf Juergensen, personal communication,
December 1993; and Jocelyn Alexander, personal communication, August 1993. For evidence from Tete
Province, see Wilson (1991b); for Zambezia Province, see Wilson (1991a, 1991d); and for Manica Province,
see Alexander (1994).
105. Ibid. Wilson cites one woman in Angonia who stated, "Most of the damage done during the war was
just people stealing privately. People stole from each other and from the official buildings." This same
respondent reported that FRELIMO officers stole government property. Another wealthy respondent said that
he knew who stole his property in Ulongue. He declared that he would report them to the police when the war
was over (Wilson, unpublished field notes, 1991; and Wilson, personal communication, February 1994).
106. Ibid.49
not accurate to assume that occupation is sufficient to secure smallholder tenure rights.
Contrary to the 1979 Land Law and the 1987 Land Law Regulations, people are often
displaced from their land, without compensation, by state authorities or by private interests
operating outside the law but with tacit state approval. This suggests a serious problem or
discontinuity between social reality, on the one hand, and law and public policy, on the other.
Most rural Mozambicans rely on a legal system that is not recognized by the state; they
apparently know little about statutory law. Also, the customary system does not seem to
function well when two or more communities are involved in a dispute.
107
At the same time, smallholder access and security are adversely affected by limitations
of the official judiciary system. The official court system does not hear land disputes
involving only the family sector. Infrequently the court system will hear a dispute involving
a smallholder and a commercial farmer.
108 Judges and lawyers at the district level in several
areas of the country stated that they would not hear or represent land cases involving
smallholders. The reasons they cited were few but consistent, including: (1) it was not their
responsibility to hear or represent these cases; (2) smallholders did not understand the law;
(3) they did not understand smallholder disputes (i.e., custom and law); and (4) smallholders
could not afford their services.
There is no structure that links the customary and the statutory legal systems—no courts
exist that bridge the gap between the two and bind them together. While some disputes enter
the court system (most disputes brought before official authorities are decided upon by
administrators and not the judiciary), customary rules and procedures are not part of or
permitted to be used in the official hearing process. No structure exists to permit disputes
heard at the local level in a customary setting, using customary laws, to be passed to a
"higher," formal court of appeal.
109
The overriding impression is that smallholders are largely excluded from the official
judiciary system. Disputes between smallholders and commercial interests or the state (and
to a large extent disputes among commercial producers) are often resolved by executive fiat.
The same officials who make decisions with regard to land distribution and access also make
judicial decisions on land conflicts. Thus, determinations about land access and land conflict
tend to be politically oriented and not necessarily based on the rule of law.
Significantly, the same may be said with respect to customary tenure in Mozam-
bique—decisions regarding land access may be politically or economically resolved rather
107. Although we lack substantial data on this point, the argument was made several times by participants
in the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique, 1994. These particular persons were not smallholder
farmers but government officials.
108. See Garvey (1994). This was also discussed at the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique,
1994.
109. This point was debated at the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique. Some participants
claimed that it was the fault of neither the law nor the judiciary; rather, the blame for unresolved land disputes
lay with smallholders because they did not use the official court system. Other conferees professed that
smallholders did not use the legal system because they did not understand it. See Weiss and Myers (1994).50
than based on local custom or rules. Just as with the statutory system, there is no
independent, customary judicial system. Often smallholders must rely on the same authorities
for both dispute resolution and land distribution. However, it appears that smallholders
generally view the customary system as more legitimate and transparent (despite internal
struggles) than the formal statutory system. The discrepancies and absence of linkages
between the two systems—statutory and customary—undermine the positive aspects of each
system and impoverish those with weaker rights in the customary system. For example, those
with feeble land rights (women, second wives, junior family members, nonlineage members,
and those with no historical rights) will not have an opportunity to exploit the statutory legal
system to defend their rights. The disconnection between the two systems means that civil
society is less able to influence the development of local rules and institutions and, at the
same time, that government authorities and policymakers are unaware of the social reality and
aspirations of civil society.
C. LAND DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS
As suggested earlier, the inconsistencies in both formal and customary land-tenure systems
are leading to land disputes and conflicts. Our research revealed a growing number of land
disputes involving smallholders, commercial interests, and joint-venture enterprises,
particularly in areas that have large concentrations of displaced populations and in regions
where demand for land is high, such as in urban and Green Zones, around irrigated farming
sites, near former state farms, and on private estates.
10 These are the most strategically
located lands, which have received the greatest capital investment from the colonial period
to the present. Land near the coast and the frontiers is also heavily contested. Indeed,
research discloses an important relationship between land conflicts and such factors as
population density, capital investment, and official land concessions. The most economically
important lands in the country have been the places of most land conflict.
Map 6 illustrates where the largest number of land conflicts have developed in
Mozambique, depicting the location and frequency of these disputes. The data for this map,
which was produced in November 1993, are drawn from field research, unpublished research
reports, anecdotal testimonies in the Mozambican press, and other sources within the
government and donor communities that have focused on this issue. We would like to
emphasize that this map is a graphic representation of where most land conflicts appear to be
occurring and their relative levels of intensity. The map is not based on discrete data (i.e.,
a specific number of conflict cases enumerated in a specified area). It is difficult to determine
how much land in the country is under dispute. At the same time, we should not be deceived
into thinking that these areas represent a small part of the country and that conflicts are
110. In November 1993, at a Maputo-based NGO conference that focused on land tenure issues in
Mozambique, participants reported on numerous conflicts occurring throughout the country. Conferees demanded
that government officials in attendance make known their intentions to resolve these disputes and inhibit the
spread of land conflicts. The same issues and demands were raised by smallholder farmers at the Second
National Land Conference in Mozambique in May 1994. Government officials offered neither recommendations
nor solutions on either occasion.51
localized and minimal. These areas of conflict cover a large part of the nation; as noted, they
are occurring on the country's most economically valuable and politically strategic land."'
Reported conflicts occur in at least eleven different configurations. These include:
1. conflicts between the state and smallholders (and in some cases larger commercial
interests) due to expropriation of lands by the state;
2. conflicts between the state and smallholders over state farm land that smallholders have
occupied as squatters, laborers, or former owners;
3. conflicts between the state and commercial producers over land alienated more than once
by the state (e.g., by different ministries, by provincial and central government, or by
the same ministry or province to more than one person);
4. conflicts between the state and commercial producers over state farm lands;
5. conflicts among private commercial producers;
6. conflicts between the state and commercial producers over short-term leases;
7. conflicts between new commercial producers and returning Portuguese interests or
between new commercial interests (both foreign and domestic) and Mozambican capital
from the colonial period;
8. conflicts between joint-venture enterprises and private commercial interests and between
joint-venture enterprises and smallholders;
9. conflicts between commercial interests and smallholders;
10. conflicts among smallholders, particularly between displaced or reintegrating and local
smallholder populations; and
11. conflicts between the government and RENAMO (or other political parties) over the
distribution of land concessions outside the scope of the law in their respective zones of
influence.
This last and newest category may be one of the most problematic. It is also the one that we
know the least about.
Land disputes occurring among smallholders or between smallholders and commercial
interests are supposed to be resolved through the formal structure, beginning with locality
officials or officials at the community level, that is, enquadradores, secretarios de aldea,
lideres de comunidade, or others who are appointed by or brought into cooperation with the
formal government at the local level. These persons often include lineage heads or other
customary authorities. If these people are unable to resolve the differences, the conflict is
passed up to the district level. Resolution of land disputes involving commercial farmers
normally begins at the district level. In reality, the procedures followed by smallholders and
larger commercial interests to resolve conflicts often do not conform to official rules or
guidelines.
Most smallholders interviewed said that if they had a conflict with another smallholder,
they would discuss the issue with the "old ones"—the senior elders or lineage heads in the
111. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); Rose et al. (1992); Roth,
Boucher, and Francisco (1994); Roth et al. (1994); Boucher et al. (1994); and Garvey (1994). See also Weiss
and Myers (1994).52
village. But this process is very irregular, as discussed below. In only a few cases did
smallholders allow that they would present their cases to locality-level government officials.
(Upon closer examination it became apparent that locality-level government administrators
had strong connections with the local customary leaders in several of these instances.)
Smallholders frequently asserted that government officials in their locality did not know the
area or were not qualified to hear disputes; some stated that they did not have confidence in
these individuals. At the same time, in some areas smallholders interviewed could not identify
their local government officials or where they lived, but they could readily state the name of
their local customary leaders and where they resided. In a few cases involving nonlocal
commercial interests or joint-venture enterprises, smallholders maintained that they presented
complaints to locality officials.
In many locations investigated, land disputes have occurred between native and returning
smallholders. Farmers frequently declared that disputes were quickly resolved by customary
leaders. For example, if smallholders returned to their land and found other smallholders
using it, the customary authorities would determine who had rights to the land. If the persons
in residence were determined not to be the true rights-holders, they were allowed to stay for
harvesting their crops, after which time they might be given other land within the community.
But this smooth process is not happening in all locations and for all smallholders, particularly
for those who are trying to return to areas with high economic potential or population
concentration. Nor does the process of resolving disputes between smallholders and larger
commercial interests follow this pattern. In fact, in most reported cases such conflicts are
resolved in favor of commercial interests.
12 In areas where disputes are occurring between
commercial and smallholder producers, we have also witnessed an increase in disputes among
smallholders as they compete for resources.
The fact that smallholders apparently lose their disputes with commercial interests and the
state on a regular basis means that smallholders will probably be less inclined to resolve
disputes by the formal executive and judicial structures. This may foreshadow continued
hostility between smallholders and the state and between smallholders and commercial
interests. As we have seen, this hostility can have destructive consequences for Mozambique.
It is apparent—but not yet empirically proved by this research—that in many parts of the
country the suppression of customary authorities by FRELIMO has affected dispute-resolution
mechanisms and processes. In several locations, it seems that decisions regarding disputes that
were normally heard by chiefs (or regulos) are now handled by senior lineage heads or family
heads. Dispute resolution has apparently been compressed down to the lineage and family
levels in customary society. For example, smallholders in Chibuto District said that the "old
chiefs" and regulos no longer had power in the area. They initially stated that if there was
a dispute, they would travel to the locality (post) administrative area or to the seat of the
district to lodge the complaint. They argued that those with power in the area were the lideres
de comunidade. However, none of the farmers interviewed stated that they deferred to this
latter group regarding disputes. After further discussion one of the farmers referred to a local
"land problem." He was attempting to gain access to a neighbor's land to lay an irrigation
112. See Garvey (1994); and Weiss and Myers (1994).53
canal to his farm. The senior members of the two families were resolving the problem.
Historically this would have been resolved by the regulo or local chief. In this particular case,
it will be interesting to observe what types of "customary authority" evolve or emerge as
political and administrative power is decentralized in the postelection period.
Disputes among commercial interests, between commercial interests and the state, and
between smallholders and the state are almost always resolved by bureaucrats within the
government, not by the judiciary. For smallholders and commercial interests alike, this
creates a great deal of tenure insecurity. We have interviewed commercial farmers who
acquired property according to law (though in the process they may have displaced local
smallholders), but who were nevertheless unwilling to invest in that land. They feared that
the very authority that issued their rights would reclaim those rights and that they would then
lose their investment. This administrative, nonjudicial system permits unscrupulous officials
to make decisions based on factors other than justice, equity, or rule of law. This leads to
uncertainty and insecurity, which in turn lead to underinvestment, speculation, and poor
resource management.
In summary, we believe that the number of land disputes and conflicts will continue to
grow in Mozambique as long as there are discrepancies between the formal land-tenure
system (i.e., statutory law), actual land-tenure practice and rules (i.e., customary systems),
and administrative and judicial capacity. These conflicts will, in the long run, undermine the
peace process and democratic reform and lead to both political and economic instability.54
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Total No. of Farms: 83
Total Reported Area: 587,277 ha
1. Unago Ag., Sanga (20,000 ha)
2. Matama (M'sawise) Ag., Lichinga (5,200 ha)
3. Luissa Ag., Lichinga (18,900 ha)
4. Lichinga Poultry, Lichinga
5. Mandimba Cotton, Mandimba (2,500 ha)
6. Cuamba Timber, Cuamba (3,600 ha)
7. Cuamba Cotton, Cuamba (? ha)
8. Nguri Ag., Mueda (816 ha)
9. Cabo Delgado Cotton, Montepuez (4,251 ha)
10. Cabo Delgado Timber, Pemba (? ha)
11. Cabo Delgado Poultry, Pemba
12. Nampula Tabacco, Malema (37,469 ha)
13. Nampula Cotton, Ribaue (28,000 ha)
14. Nampula Poultry, Nampula
15. Nampula Livestock, Moma & Mogovolas
(41,221 ha)
16. Angoche Ag., Angoche (? ha)
17. Agricultural Complex of Angonia, Angonia
(22,012 ha)
18. Tete Cotton, Moatize & Mutara (? ha)
19. Tete Poultry, ? (14,007 ha)
20. EMOCHA (tea), Gurue & Milange (? ha)
21. CAPEL-UDAR (maize), Gurue (7,000 ha)
22. Nauela Ag., Alto Molocue (20,000 ha)
23. Mocuba Cotton, Mocuba (33,400 ha)
24. BOROR (copra), Various (25,600 ha)
25. Nante Ag., Maganja Da Costa (1,700 ha)
26. Quelimane Livestock, Nicoadala (15,890 ha)
27. Licuari Ag., Nicoadala (891 ha)
28. Manica Citrus, Gondola (6,950 ha)
29. Gondola Ag., Gondola (18,386 ha)
30. Manica Livestock, Gondola
31. Manica Vineyard, Manica (61 ha)
32. Mutambarico Ag., Manica (1,500 ha)
33. IFLOMA (timber), Manica (36,078 ha)
34. Vanduzi Ag., Manica (4,000 ha)
35. Manica Timber, Gondola
36. Manica Poultry, Manica (250 ha)
37. Sussundenga Ag., Sussundenga (6,000 ha)
38. Manica Tobacco, Sussundenga (3,900 ha)
39. Sena Sugar, Marromeu (15,000 ha)
40. Lamego Ag., Nhamatanda (3,726 ha)
41. Muda Ag. & Livestock, Nharnatanda (? ha)
42. Mozambique Sugar, Dondo (10,950 ha)
43. INEMPREMA, Beira City
44. FACOP, Beira City
45. SERBEIRA, Beira City
46. Beira Rice Mill, Beira City
47. Swine & Sausages of Beira, Beira City
48. Buzi Sugar, Buzi (5,500 ha)
49. Sofala Livestock, Buzi & Beira (? ha)
50. SIREMO (irrigation), Chokwe
51. Massavasse Ag., Chokwe (1,382 ha)
52. Conhane Ag., Chokwe (870 ha)
53. Nwachicoluane Ag., Chokwe (809 ha)
54. Chilembene Ag., Chokwe (1,570 ha)
55. Hokwe Ag., Chokwe (700 ha)
56. Mapapa Ag., Chokwe (400 ha)
57. Chokwe Dairy, Chokwe (1,192 ha)
58. GAPECOM, Chokwe
59. Chokwe Mills & Silos. Chokwe
60. Chirrame Ag., Xai-Xai (30 ha)
61. Xai-Xai Livestock, Xai-Xai (700 ha)
62. SRBL (irrigation), Xai-Xai
63. Magula Ag., Xai-Xai (2,168 ha)
64. Macia Ag., Bilene (5,623 ha)
65. Chibuto Ag., Chibuto (? ha)
66. Inhambane Livestock, ? (? ha)
67. Inhambane Cotton, Homoine (? ha)
68. Inhambane Timber, Homoine
69. Inhambane Poultry, Inhambane City
70. Inhassune Rama Cotton, Panda (1,820 ha)
71. Inhambane Palms & Fruits. ? (5,255 ha)
72. Magude Ag., Magude (2,000 ha)
73. Magude Livestock. Magude (71,399 ha)
74. Moamba Ag., Moamba (2,000 ha)
75. Namacha Poultry, Namacha (1,008 ha)
76. Namacha Vineyards, Namacha (40 ha)
77. Maragra Ag., Manhica (7,279 ha)
78. Marracuene Ag., Marracuene (300 ha)
79. Maputo Citrus, Maputo (1,140 ha)
80. Matola Dairy, Maputo (554 ha)
81. Boane Ag., Boane (280 ha)
82. Catuane Ag., Matutuine (60.000 ha)






Data: Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo, Mozambique, 1993






Coutada 4: 123,000 ha
Coutada 5: Benguela Holdings, East
African Safaris, 68,680 ha
Coutada 6: Safrique, 45,630 ha
Coutada 7: Safrique, Andre Mazalo & Alfredo
Violi, Gepolar, 54,080 ha
Coutada 8: Safrique, 3,100 ha
Coutada 9: Safrique, Andre Mazalo &
Alfredo Violi, 43,330 ha
Coutada 10: Gepolar, Lomaco, Safrique, Madal,
Promotur, Lindsay Hunt Safaris,
Engonyamen Safaris, 20,080 ha
Coutada 11: 19,280 ha
Coutada 12: 29,630 ha
Coutada 13: Safrique, Andre Mazalo &
Alfredo Violi, 56,830 ha
Coutada 14: 13,530 ha
Coutada 15: Safrique, 20,000 ha
Coutada 16: Companhia Agricola J.F.S.,
Tim Otto Safaris, 100,000 ha58
Source: Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, July 1994
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IV. FOUR CASE STUDIES OF LAND ACCESS
A. CHOKWE AND CHIBUTO DISTRICTS, GAZA PROVINCE
1. RESEARCH SITES AND OBJECTIVES
Two geographical locations were chosen for investigation in Gaza Province: The first was
sited in the area around Chaimite and Chilembene, while the second was situated in the
region of Chokwe city (see maps 7-9). In the first spot, sites were visited in Chilembene and
across the river in Chaimite as well as along the road between Chaimite and Guija. In the
second place, several points were visited along the Maputo-Macarretane road northwest of
Chokwe city.
13
In the first location we sought to discover if the persons displaced from Chaimite and
other areas in Chibuto to Chilembene had returned to their family lands.
14 We attempted to
learn more about the interactions between the people of Chaimite and Chilembene with regard
to land and to determine what type of land rights returning farmers were securing. We wanted
to learn who was distributing land and resolving conflicts. We also sought to find out more
about the private commercial farmers operating in the area. In the second location we focused
on displaced people living in and around the city of Chokwe. In this area we sought to learn
if displaced people had moved from the accommodation centers and other areas to which they
had been displaced or sought refuge during the war and returned to their homesteads.
Focusing on the private-sector commercial farmers and joint-venture enterprises operating in
the area, we tried to determine how they were interacting with smallholder farmers and if
they were investing in their holdings. The case study begins with a brief review of land
tenure relations before independence and continues with a discussion of land tenure in the
period between independence and the collapse of the state farm sector. This is followed by
a study of tenure during the war and after the peace accord.
113. The districts of Chokwe and Chibuto in Gaza Province were visited several times over the last two and
one-half years. The most recent visit was in January 1994. In addition to government officials, more than 100
smallholders and displaced farmers were interviewed in 1993 and 1994. Earlier research by LTC focused largely
on land tenure and ecological concerns within the Chokwe irrigation scheme. This research, on the other hand,
was part of a larger project investigating the processes and impacts of state farm divestiture (see Tanner, Myers,
and Oad 1993; Myers and Tanner 1992). The current work built upon earlier research conducted in the area
before the southern portion of Gaza Province was consumed by war (see Bowen 1988; Hermele 1986, 1988;
Roesch 1988; Van den Berg 1987; and Wardman 1985).
114. In this paper we use the term "family lands" to mean the land that a family held before the war or
before they were displaced by government policy, i.e., moved to a communal village. These lands may be
ancestral or they may have been acquired either during the colonial period or after independence. Smallholders
themselves use the term family land loosely, and have used the term in interviews to defend rights to land that
may not otherwise be secure.62
2. LAND TENURE IN CHOKWE AND CHIBUTO DISTRICTS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE
Chokwe and Chibuto are linked culturally, politically, and economically. Both locations
include land in the fertile Limpopo Valley. The major ethnic group in both districts is the
Shangaan. Resource allocation and political power are determined by patrilineal rules.
Families have historically traded and established social links on both sides of the river. The
men of both districts migrate to South Africa for labor opportunities. By comparison with
central and northern Mozambique, there are more female-headed households. In addition,
they share a common history from the colonial period to the present.
15
In several locations peasants in the Limpopo River Valley were displaced from their lands
early in this century by private Portuguese farmers. Those farmers who occupied the
lowlands, close to the river, were particularly affected. In several places on both sides of the
river, farmers were forced away from the lowlands and up to the highlands. Later, in the
early 1950s, the colonial government encouraged poorer Portuguese farmers to settle in the
area. The government established the Colonato da Vale do Rio Limpopo, a huge irrigation
scheme covering more than 30,000 hectares.
Many peasants who lived in the territory of the scheme were forced to abandon their lands
and move elsewhere within the district or to another district. Some Mozambicans remained
to work as laborers on the colonato farms. Once the irrigation scheme was completed,
Mozambicans, some of whom had family land in the area, tried to enter the scheme but were
denied admission by the colonato administration. Others, who were angered by the loss of
land and the reportedly heavy-handed rule of colonato administrators, abandoned the land and
moved away from the area. At the same time, farmers who did not have land around the
scheme entered the area seeking access to land. These new land-aspirants would later
contribute to a complex picture of overlapping land rights and competitive claims as those
who had abandoned land attempted to return after independence, as war and drought forced
displaced people into the area, and as government policy displaced some persons while
granting land concessions to others.
1'
Although the situation is far from clear, it appears that local customary authorities
experienced a diminution of power and a transformation of responsibility with the introduction
of the colonato. These changes also came from the imposition of colonial political authorities
in the area. The transformation became even more manifest after independence, as noted
below. Some customary authorities were renamed regulos by the colonial government,
maintained their positions, and carried out the directives of the colonial government. Others,
who chose not to collaborate, were replaced or had their powers superseded by colonial
appointed regulos. Finally, others remained in power and quietly resisted and/or benefited
from the colonial administration."'
115. See Roesch (1988, 1992); Bowen (1988); Hermele (1986, 1988); Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); and
Wardman (1985).
116. See Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); Roesch (1988); Hermele (1988); and Bowen (1988).
117. Ibid.63
3. LAND ACCESS AND TENURE AFTER INDEPENDENCE
After independence, many local families attempted to acquire land in the scheme and
elsewhere in the Limpopo Valley. Between 1974 and 1976, for example, more than 6,000
families had moved into the irrigation scheme south of the city of Chokwe and an even
greater number were hoping to enter the area. Many of these people were trying to reclaim
lost land rights; those not originally from the area hoped to capitalize on new opportunities
created by Mozambican ownership of the irrigation scheme and infrastructure.'"
Most farmers were not successful in their attempts to acquire or reacquire land. The
process came to a halt in 1977, however, when the river flooded the lowlands. The
government moved smallholders from the lowlands, out of the irrigation scheme, and into
communal villages in the highlands. Perhaps 50 percent of the population of the entire
province was affected by the government villagization program (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983;
Araujo 1983, 1985). Some of those displaced claim that they had secure land rights in the
lowlands before they were dislodged; some have titles or other documents supporting their
land claims. Many communal villages (aldeias comunais) were established in both Chibuto
and Chokwe districts, and countless smallholder families were displaced from their lands. The
land available around the aldeias was often insufficient for the population and, in many cases,
was of poor quality.
19
Through nationalization, concurrent with the establishment of villages and the forced
movement of local families, the government assumed control of the irrigation scheme and the
colonato farms in Chokwe. The administration of the colonato was taken over by the central
government and converted to the Complexo Agro-Industrial do Vale do Limpopo (CAIL).
CAIL operated as a massive state farm. Local displaced smallholders were invited back to
the scheme to work, though not all who chose to work as CAIL farm laborers were
historically from the area—that is, not all state farm workers had occupied land in the area
before the colonial government established the colonato. This would lead to land conflicts in
the future since these laborers would claim land rights to which they were not historically
entitled and which would compete with those who were. At the same time, the independent
government of Mozambique created state farms by assuming control (by intervention or
nationalization) of other private colonial farms. Some of these farms, such as Matuba, were
located in the Limpopo Valley, north of the irrigation scheme (Myers, West, and Eliseu
1993).
The independent government established a new level of bureaucrats and a party structure
at the locality level, in many cases appointing officials who were not from the area. Although
these new officials were usually not former regulos (who were seen to have been collabora-
tors with the colonial power), research conducted in 1992 showed that many of the lowest-
level bureaucrats and state farm officials were related to the precolonial chiefs and colonial
regulos. It also revealed that many of the former regulos were related to former customary
118. Ibid.
119. Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); see also Weiss and Myers (1994).64
authorities (Tanner, Myers, and Oad 1993). But further investigation after the peace accord
determined that this process was very uneven. In several areas visited, smallholders reported
that they continued to consult lineage heads when they experienced family problems
(including land disputes within the family), but that they relied on locality-level government
officials (especially rural agricultural extension agents) when they had a land problem that
was between families or between smallholders and larger commercial interests. One older
farmer interviewed in Chokwe District scoffed at the idea of consulting regulos, calling them
colonial creations and things of the past. This uneven process may indicate the existence or
reemergence of local struggles between families, a topic that merits further exploration.
Peasant fanners who attempted to return to their old homesteads and lands after 1977
were forced back into the communal villages by the Mozambican government. In some cases,
government authorities destroyed their old farms. This second wave of displacement in the
period after independence angered local smallholders—and in many ways undermined the
legitimacy and popularity of the new government.'"
Many local Mozambicans refused to work for the state farms, preferring to farm
elsewhere across the river or in the highlands. In some cases local farmers worked as laborers
while their wives maintained farms in the communal villages or elsewhere in the region.
Some farmers became tenants elsewhere, acquiring land rights through the customary tenure
system by asking the head of a local family for land-use rights. The government was able to
hire enough labor but could not successfully manage the irrigation scheme.
121
Some smallholders who were displaced by the irrigation scheme were successful in
maintaining access to land, much of which, suitable for limited dryland agriculture, was
located in the highlands. Some farmers were able to care for homesteads northwest of the
city, in the area west of the road and rail line. Some smallholders north of the river were also
able to preserve land rights.
The relocation/villagization policy led to land shortages in the less fertile highlands as the
newcomers and communal villages competed with local residents for land. The villagization
program initially provided some benefits, including education, health care, and other social
services. But these benefits may have been outweighed by the disadvantages of forced
villagization. The advantages were wiped out at any rate as war progressed in the area.
120. João Carrilho, former director of Ad Hoc Land Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo,
personal communication, 1993; see also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).
121. Sr. João Mosca, former head of CAIL, personal communication, May 1992; Margarida Martins,
formerly with the Department of Agrarian Economics, Ministry of Agriculture, personal communication, April
1992. See also Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).
This point is highly debated, of course. Many officials at the central and provincial levels of government
maintain that the centralized irrigation scheme was indeed a success or had the potential to become a success
if the war and other external factors had not adversely affected it. Sr. Fagilde, former manager of plant and
equipment, CAIL, personal communication, May 1993; Sr. Nhocumbe, Director, Conhane State Farm, personal
communication, May 1993; Sr. Taelane, Director, Chilembene State Farm, personal communication, May 1993.65
Land tenure and other social relations overall were transformed during the colonial era
and the period after independence. There was a shift in power from local customary
authorities first to the colonial government and later to the independent Mozambican central
government. This shift undermined tenure security in the area and created dependent and
unequal economic relationships (Tanner, Myers, and Oad 1993). These relationships—as well
as simultaneous land shortages—were intensified by the war, particularly as more and more
people fled into the area south of the river and closer to the boundaries of the city.
4. LAND ACCESS AND TENURE DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Chokwe District was much richer than Chibuto before the war. It had direct access to the
rail line and roads to Maputo. In addition, the irrigation complex and most of the state farms
in the province were situated in Chokwe District. Then, after independence, the government
invested heavily in these schemes and permitted the state farms to borrow substantial sums
of money from Mozambican banks. As the war progressed, the government was forced to
invest heavily in defending Chokwe; because of infrastructure created and other defense
spending, many war refugees entered the district, bringing their cattle and other movable
resources with them.
War-displaced farmers inundated the city of Chokwe beginning in the late 1980s. The
population and boundaries of the city expanded considerably; bairros were established to hold
the displaced. Many people came from across the river or from the area northwest of Matuba,
but others fled from communal or other villages that were no longer secure. Before the war
began, there were many settlements along the road from Chokwe to Macarretane. As the war
intensified, people escaped to the relative safety of the city. Those displaced from these areas
went to Bairros Three, Four, and Five.
As the civil war progressed, drawing resources from the central and provincial
governments, many smallholders were able to escape the confines of the communal villages
and farm their original lands, in a few cases reestablishing homesteads. Other relocated
farmers, who were not as fortunate, were forced to use land in the area south of the rail line,
between Matuba Aldeia and Bairro Four (see map 8). This land was later taken over by the
thousands displaced by war and drought in the 1980s, however. These aldeias grew
considerably in population once they were established; their allocated lands had become
deficient in expanse by the late 1980s while their soil quality deteriorated with its continual
use.
The irrigation scheme was restructured in 1984 and divided into ten smaller production
units of approximately 2,000 hectares each. These production units included Massavasse,
Conhane, and Chilembene, three of the largest farms. The most generous amount of land
reportedly went to smallholders in 1984 when 9,000 hectares of the 33,000-hectare scheme
were divested.
122 Rights to the best land were acquired by the private sector.' In many
122. It is unclear how much of this land actually went to smallholders, for many private sector interests
received land that was designated as family sector land and theoretically reserved for the family sector. See
Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993); and Myers and Tanner (1992).
123. Ibid.66
cases the private sector included state farm managers, district and provincial officials, and
other government officials acting on their own account.'
24
Despite the new structure, state farms continued to experience serious difficulties, were
unable to earn profits, and achieved minimal output. Land shortages remained acute for both
smallholders and private commercial farmers inside and outside the scheme. The land
divested to smallholders was grossly inadequate to meet the needs of the local population, let
alone the thousands of displaced families who relocated in the area.'
Additional distributions of land were made within the irrigation scheme and north of the
scheme in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, as the state farms went bankrupt and closed. Again,
most of this land was acquired by the private sector, especially large commercial interests
such as JFS and joint-venture enterprises such as LOMACO and SEMOC. Some land was
distributed to smallholder farmers, and a few displaced people received temporary use rights.
Despite these distributions, smallholders had no tenure security, since the government has
reacquired and redistributed land in many areas of the scheme several times over in the last
few years. Thus tenure insecurity for smallholders remains a serious issue as government
continues new rounds of distribution of land rights. Provincial and central government
authorities counter that smallholders do not have the capacity to exploit lands in the irrigation
scheme or near the river or state farms.'
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At the same time, research conducted in the district revealed a growing number of private
commercial interests that successfully acquired land in the area outside of the irrigation
scheme. These interests obtained land through the formal state structure, both legally and
extralegally, displacing local smallholders, some of whom had already been moved several
times. Many of these allocations were apparently acquired for speculative reasons: no
utilization of the land followed. Sources working for NGOs in the area say that many farms
in the scheme are owned by officials in Maputo, Xai-Xai, and Chokwe, and that they are not
being exploited.
The joint-venture enterprise LOMACO acquired land in the irrigation scheme in 1987
(Tanner, Myers, and Oad 1993; Myers and Tanner 1992). Local residents claim that
LOMACO got an additional parcel, part of the former Matuba State Farm, in 1990 or 1991.
Both parcels are between the road and the river northwest of the city (see area marked as
124. Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); Myers and Tanner (1992); and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).
125. Ibid.
126. This point was made numerous times during the course of our research and was repeated several times
recently during the Second National Land Conference in Maputo (see Weiss and Myers 1994). Smallholder
conferees took issue with the official government position, saying that they had not only the capacity but also
the desire to work the land. They argued further that they could work their own farms and also provide labor
to the bigger farms. Their only real problems, they said, were land shortages, insufficient credit, and cost of
pesticides and fertilizers.67
LOMACO-1 and LOMACO-2, respectively, on map 8). The two parcels represent at least
3,830 hectares of prime irrigated land.
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Some farmers interviewed said that they once had land in the area where LOMACO-1 is
located. They state that they lost their rights many years ago when the state took control of
the irrigation scheme following independence. Some of these farmers tried at some point to
reoccupy their land but were forced to leave again once the joint venture began operations.
The land designated as LOMACO-2 was identified by many smallholders interviewed as
a problem area. Several remarked that they were told by government officials and LOMACO
management that they had to leave before the company started operations on this parcel.
Many of these families had houses and trees as well as fields in the area. They report that
when they refused to leave, they were "chased off" by LOMACO and their houses were
destroyed. Some stated that LOMACO cut down their trees to lay irrigation tubes. Although
these farmers say they were told that they would receive compensation from either the
government or the company, it is unclear who told them this. To date, the farmers say, they
have obtained neither new land nor compensation from either the government or the
company; a formal protest was filed with the district government last year.
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As a result, tension is high in the smallholder community, particularly in the LOMACO-2
area. Smallholders blame both the government and the company for again displacing them
from their lands. Many expressed anger and said that they blamed the government
administration for permitting LOMACO to take their lands. Two other farmers declared that
they want revenge on the company for appropriating their lands and houses. Peasants who
still live in the communal villages fear that LOMACO will soon take all of the land in the
lowlands—property that they previously held and to which they still claim rights.
João Ferreira dos Santos (JFS), a large private commercial company, has also moved into
the zone between the road and the river, northwest of LOMACO's holdings; however, we
have little information about this operation. While all of the smallholders interviewed thought
negatively of—or had negative experience with—LOMACO, none of the smallholders
127. These data are from the Land Registry, Provincial Office of DINAGECA, Xai-Xai, Gaza Province.
The registrar reports that LOMACO controls over 3,830 hectares in Macarnetane and an additional 1,808
hectares in Chilembene. Provincial sources also report that JFS has rights to approximately 2,000 hectares, while
SEMOC has 2,500 hectares in the irrigation scheme. Throughout the country, LOMACO has rights to
approximately 500,000 hectares of land for agriculture and forestry. The company also has monopolistic rights
in several areas covering more than 1 million hectares of smallholder farms (see Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
It is difficult to determine exactly how much land these companies have or where their holdings are located, for
they are extremely secretive—despite the fact that all three are involved in joint-venture operations with the
Government of Mozambique.
128. At the recent Second National Land Conference in Maputo (25-27 May 1994), Carlos Enriques,
General Director of LOMACO, disputed these claims, saying, "LOMACO is not the enemy of the peasants as
portrayed by the Land Tenure Center in its publications." Smallholder farmers responded, "We are not lying;
LOMACO took our land and it takes all the water [from the irrigation canals]." See Weiss and Myers (1994);
and Myers and Weiss (1994).68
questioned offered comments regarding JFS. In fact, smallholders observed that JFS assisted
local farmers, whereas LOMACO would not even give them a greeting.
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Chibuto District, located across the Limpopo River from Chokwe District, was attacked
regularly during the years before the cease-fire in 1992. Local residents reported that from
1989 to 1992, one area or another in Chibuto was attacked weekly. RENAMO troops
occupied or moved about freely in many areas of the district. Displaced smallholders from
Chibuto were interviewed before the peace accord in Chilembene. They said that most people
in Chibuto, particularly those along the river, were forced to flee to more secure zones.
Security in nearby areas was also unreliable. People who fled from Chibuto were not immune
to attacks elsewhere, but suffered less frequently from hostilities than those few who chose
to remain. At the same time, others moved into the communal villages in Chibuto District
from areas that they perceived to be less secure.
A large percentage of the people who fled Chibuto District during the war moved across
the river to Chilembene (Chokwe District). The movement occurred over a period of three
to five years, but intensified in the last two years of the war as attacks increased and the
drought continued. It appears that political relations were transplanted from Chaimite to
Chilembene. Displaced farmers reported that lineage groupings moved together from
Chaimite and apparently attempted to reproduce their spatial relationships, including the
location of their temporary homes vis-à-vis their neighbors and lineage elders. Lineage heads
had access to better land in the areas to which they were displaced. In addition, customary
political leaders tried to maintain their political roles with their communities by negotiating
on behalf of their people for access to land and other resources as well as to humanitarian
food assistance. At the same time that people were fleeing from Chaimite, other people
moved north into Chilembene from less secure zones to the south and east. The new
population of displaced families intensified land shortages, ecological degradation, and social
conflict in Chilembene.
13o
During the war, few displaced people gained access to land on the state farms in Chokwe
District. Those who got land did so on a temporary basis, usually as tenants. Displaced
families who arrived earlier were apparently more likely to gain access to land anywhere in
the district than those who arrived later. Individuals in the latter group were forced to survive
in other ways, that is, as farm or urban labor or as traders. Many depended on food aid,
acquired either through formal donor assistance or through customary relationships. In
129. Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). See Weiss and Myers (1994); and Myers and Weiss (1994).
130. There was not enough land available in these areas to accommodate "local" families, let alone all the
newly displaced. Those who were fortunate enough to acquire temporary land rights were usually people who
had close kinship ties in Chilembene. According to field interviews, most of the displaced families gained access
to less than 0.5 hectare of land. This land was used continually through the last few years of the war and
suffered serious ecological degradation as a result. The fact that there were so many displaced people living on
the fringes of the cities in Chokwe District—and using available dry-land farms—meant that smallholders who
had access to land in the irrigation scheme were also forced to overexploit their holdings, either because they
lost access to dry-land farms or because they feared their land in the scheme would be considered abandoned
and therefore confiscated by government authorities (see Tanner, Myers, and Oad 1993; and Myers and Tanner
1992).69
addition, a small number of individuals migrated back and forth between Chilembene and
other localities such as Chaimite. These persons maintained their farms in Chibuto and
returned at night to temporary homesteads in Chilembene (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
Customary rules for acquiring and securing land rights in the irrigation scheme appear
not to be used at all, and this may have also weakened the power of customary authorities
over land in areas outside of the scheme. Most individuals interviewed before the cease-fire
reported that local government officials had control over land distribution and conflict
resolution. They said that if they wanted land, they had to ask the state farm, executive
council, or district officials. They also commented that the government could move them to
another location and take away their land rights if it so desired. Smallholders frequently stated
that customary chiefs, including the regulos, no longer had power in the area (Myers, West,
and Eliseu 1993).
5. LAND TENURE IN CHOKWE AND CHIBUTO DISTRICTS AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD
The adverse affects of the war and the horror that it created for the people of Mozam-
bique have been documented elsewhere and in great detail There is no question that the
war created great hardship, including economic and political disruption. Many lives were lost
while countless numbers were maimed physically or traumatized. It is apparent that the war
created political and economic opportunities for many individuals (in labor, land, markets,
and exchange), including smallholder farmers It is also clear that after the peace accord
some smallholders tried to maintain the economic and political advantages they had gained
while exploring new opportunities or reactivating old economic relationships in the postwar
period.
In the Chokwe region many people were moving even before the cease-fire was signed.
Newly displaced families were coming into the area from RENAMO-held zones, while others
were leaving the state-farm sector in the irrigation scheme as the government granted land
to various interests, including private commercial enterprises, joint-venture companies (such
as LOMACO and SEMOC), and some smallholder farmers. Still others were entering the
area to capitalize on opportunities created by the irrigation scheme, the private companies,
the NGOs, and the district government. At the same time, people were being displaced by
LOMACO (and probably JFS) northwest of the city, creating a new group of landless
farmers. Smallholder farmers in increasing numbers, particularly displaced smallholders living
in the city's bairros, were traveling great distances to farm their old plots during the day.
After the peace accord an even greater number of people began to move around the region
seeking access to land for homesteads and agriculture. However, the land available had
diminished considerably as formerly displaced people returned to the area and more private
131. Bonga and Wilson (1993); Vines (1991); Drumtra (1993); Minter (1989); Hall (1990); Finnegan
(1992); Geffray (1990); Gersony (1988); Hanlon (1990); and Wilson (1992a).
132. Obviously, the "big winners" in this process were those who gained access to land and other natural
resources (most of whom were not smallholder farmers but rather government officials and others with political
connections).70
sector commercial interests and joint-venture enterprises acquired land concessions. There
appear to be many people in the district who are from the district but who have no place to
live and little or no land to farm (see map 8). Some farmers who lived and farmed in the area
northwest of Matuba have returned to their farms and homesteads. The land in this area is
of poor quality, however, and will support only a small population
When the first round of field interviews was conducted in May 1993, farmers displaced
to Chilembene had just started to return to Chaimite. Most were quite insecure about their
safety and often said that they expected the war to resume. As a consequence, farmers were
investing a minimal amount of time and resources in agricultural production. A lot of time
was being spent on renegotiating land rights and land access with other returning farmers and
displaced families. Given the government relocation and villagization programs, farmers
returning to Chaimite were not always certain where they should farm. Some farmers in
Chaimite expressed concern that they would be forced to move again.
Most of the farmers interviewed in Chaimite were women, who reported several different
land-use strategies. Some of them were the vanguard of their families, responsible for
opening new lands or recovering family lands while their husbands and/or children remained
behind in Chilembene. In other cases, older wives remained with children while husbands and
senior sons moved back to Chaimite. Those who remained in Chilembene did so because they
wanted to maximize their access to resources and government services—and minimize risks
involved in a move away from those resources and areas they perceived as relatively secure.
Some women in Chilembene continued to work as laborers on other people's farms rather
than return immediately to Chaimite. Some reported that they remained in Chilembene to
protect their houses, which the government was destroying or threatening to destroy if they
were abandoned; others, displaced from greater distances, were attempting to farm in
Chaimite on a temporary basis until they could move on or return to their family lands.
A majority of the people interviewed in the centers for displaced people were women.
Many of them reported that they were waiting for their husbands to return from South Africa
before they made a decision to leave the camps. In some cases, women were forced to remain
in the camps in Chilembene because they lacked the financial resources to move.
There were at least two categories of individuals who were voluntarily displaced and
attempting to farm in the area: those arriving from RENAMO-administered areas, and
families from Chokwe District who had been relocated by the colonial and state farms. It also
became apparent that a new category of the displaced was emerging in Chaimite, that is,
individuals who were losing land to the private sector as the district and provincial
governments distributed land to commercial interests. Farmers reported that the lowlands
close to the river were difficult to recover since they were most often occupied or claimed
by such private commercial interests. Farmers and locality officials confirmed that locality
officials, infrequently in coordination with customary authorities, granted land to smallhold-
ers. Most of these grants were for land in the highlands, farthest (from 0.5 to 4 kilometers)
from the river.
133. See Weiss and Myers (1994); and Myers and Weiss (1994).71
Across the river in Chilembene, conditions were somewhat different. There was less land
available, and all land in the irrigation scheme was claimed by private sector or smallholder
farmers The area was more densely populated by individuals claiming historical rights
and uprooted farmers, also claiming historical rights, who had been displaced off their own
lands.
In May 1993, accommodation centers for the displaced, as well as "displaced camps,"
continued to exist, but the number of their occupants had diminished. Those who remained
did so because they were afraid to leave the relative security of the area, because they had
no place to go, or because of opportunities in Chilembene such as access to education and
other social services, irrigated land, markets, and better transport.
Some individuals living in the camps had been effectively displaced from their own land.
These individuals asserted that they or their families were from Chilembene and that they had
lost land at some point in time either to colonial farmers, to the state after independence, or
to new private or smallholder farmers. They now were laborers or squatters on their land.
They said that they were hoping to reacquire rights to land somewhere in the locality; some
had spoken with district officials about their needs.
Individuals from Chilembene who claimed historical rights to land reported that they
would like the displaced families to return to their areas of origin. It is a common opinion
among smallholders that there is not enough land in Chilembene and that residents have done
their part to support the displaced people. At the same time, important economic—and
sometimes social—relationships have developed between the smallholders and displaced
people in Chilembene. Local residents have benefited from the relatively cheap labor afforded
by a large supply of displaced persons, who have worked in construction and in agriculture.
Some displaced people have established trading enterprises while others have specialized in
services In addition, many young men have married women in Chilembene and have no
intention of moving away.
Locality government officials also said that they would like the displaced people to return
to their areas of origin. They claim that the displaced are a drain on the city's financial
resources and administrative capacity. Displaced people in Chilembene reported that they
were being forced to leave—to return to their areas of origin or to move across the river.
Some said that the locality government was destroying or threatening to destroy their houses
in the camps. Apparently those who were trying to divide their residences were targeted more
than those who were attempting to remain in Chilembene. District officials reported that
displaced farmers had not understood their instructions and that no houses had been
destroyed; they insisted that smallholders were not being forced to leave Smallholders
134. There is an important difference between "claimed land" and "occupied land." There are many reported
cases of individuals from Xai-Xai, Chokwe, or Maputo acquiring land (i.e., claiming rights) without occupying
it or planting crops. Smallholders complain that these absentee landholders are not using the land and that local
residents would use it productively (see Weiss and Myers 1994; and Myers and Weiss 1994).
135. See Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).
136. See also Myers (1993a); Myers (1993c).72
responded to this perceived threat by leaving schoolchildren in the Chilembene camp while
they worked in other locations. Evidently this type of encouragement to move is also
happening elsewhere in the country '
When a second round of research was conducted seven months later, in January 1994,
conditions had changed in both Chilembene and Chaimite. Investigations in Chilembene
revealed that many more displaced farmers had moved back across the river to Chaimite and
to other places south of Chilembene. However, many displaced smallholders still remained
in Chilembene, frequently for the same reasons as noted during the first round of research.
Some women said that they were waiting for their husbands to return from South Africa;
others claimed that they did not have the financial resources to support a move. Still other
individuals feared that the war was not really over and did not want to risk moving at this
time. A final category of individuals simply had no place to go.
In Chaimite several farmers were interviewed who had returned from Chilembene or other
areas in the irrigation scheme. These farmers said that they were now farming on land that
they possessed before the war displaced them. Upon closer examination it became evident that
these farmers had actually been displaced during the villagization program of the late 1970s,
though some had managed to continue farming until the war drove them across the river to
Chilembene. These farmers reported that before the villagization program, they had larger
tracts of land in the area, but some land was taken by the government and redistributed to
other members of the communal village. Although they returned to the land to which they
claimed historical rights, in reality those rights had been superseded by a government-created
village. In fact, their rights were now qualified by the state.
Other farmers were interviewed along the road between Guija and Chaimite. Several
smallholder and small private commercial farmers had recently (re)established themselves
within a 25-kilometer stretch along the highway. A few new houses and homesteads were
built on the north side of the road, clustered on the periphery of Guija and around the
communal villages near Capela. Other newly established homesteads and farms were scattered
between these two points.
Interviews revealed that many of the new farms were being maintained by "week
farmers." These individuals are planting and maintaining their crops during the week and
returning to Chaimite city, Chilembene, or one of the communal villages during the weekend
or at night. They do this to keep their households in areas that they perceive to be relatively
secure. Again, it is unclear if these week farmers have tenure security. It is clear that many
of those returning to the area were given land by the government in 1977, when they were
all displaced from the south side of the road. It is not clear how many of these people had
land in this area before 1977 and how many had their holdings reduced when the government
redistributed land. It is also unclear what the economic costs are for a population to invest
time and resources in maintaining two homesteads.
137. See Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (1993). A similar phenomenon was reported in Sofala
Province; other unconfirmed cases have been reported by NGOs operating in rural Mozambique.73
The January 1994 field research in Chokwe showed that conditions had not changed much
in seven months. While many people in the outer areas and bairros of the city have moved,
many more have remained in the aldeias and in the city. It is unclear how many of these
individuals are staying because they have no place to go and how many are staying because
of opportunities that exist in Chokwe. However, people frequently reported both reasons for
not moving from their current location in the camps. As in Chibuto District, many individuals
said that they were either fearful or convinced that the war would resume in the near
future
In January we witnessed many small plots being farmed along the road between the city
of Chokwe and the dam at Macarretane as well as between the rail line and the road (map 8).
All of the farmers in this latter category reportedly belong to displaced families, some of
whom come from Chokwe District but have no place to go. It is obvious that these
individuals, literally farming in the margins, have little or no tenure security. Research also
disclosed that some smallholders had succeeded in returning to land near the river, but that
they were hemmed in by large private commercial farms and joint-venture enterprises. They
complained that they had to walk long distances around these holdings to gain access to the
main roads and the city.
6. CONCERNS RAISED BY THE CASE OF CHOKWE AND CHIBUTO DISTRICTS
Research in both districts has elucidated several issues of concern. Government officials
feel that many of the landless peasants living in the region are displaced and will move back
to their lands of origin now that the war is over. Officials fail to recognize that many of the
displaced are actually from this area and thus have no other place to return to. Essentially
these smallholders have been dispossessed of their land and are trapped in the aldeias or
bairros. The problem is exacerbated by government officials, who continue to grant land
concessions in the area or who permit the expansion ofprivate sector commercial and joint-
venture enterprises. This suggests another concern: Government believes both that it knows
where free land is located and that it has the capacity and authority to distribute it. These
ongoing concessions are leading to a new category of postwar displaced who are extremely
frustrated with government.
Another concern is the official view that those displaced people who have begun to farm
have settled permanently. Indeed, this is far from the case. Smallholders will continue to
move as new opportunities or constraints arise. Government officials fail to recognize that
smallholders are influenced by the same economic rationale as larger commercial inter-
ests—they too want access to the better irrigated lands in the Limpopo River Valley. Officials
justify the displacement of smallholders in favor of larger commercial interests and joint-
venture enterprises by claiming that the latter have a greater capacity to exploit the land. If
138. See also Myers (1993a); and Myers (1993c). This point, that the war would resume in the near future,
was voiced by smallholders and other Mozambicans throughout the country. Nina Berg, Norwegian Refugee
Council, reported similar observations in Tete Province (personal communication, February 1994). Harry West,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, after conducting field research in Inhambane and Cabo Delgado provinces,
also commented on the view among smallholders that war would resume (personal communications, February
and May 1994).74
many commercial farm holders are in fact not currently farming their lands (i.e., they are
speculating), are underutilizing their land, or are unable to exploit their concession profitably,
then it appears that this justification is unwarranted and requires reevaluation. However, it
is naive to assume that such concessions are being granted simply on a "capacity to farm"
basis. Other factors, including personal accumulation and corruption, are presumably fueling
the land concessions being granted.
The case of LOMACO's land acquisition is of particular concern. After the government
granted permission to LOMACO to expand in the area described as LOMACO-2, it is unclear
whether the government itself failed to find new land or compensate local farmers for their
losses or whether LOMACO was supposed to compensate local farmers. Local government
officials in Chokwe also reported that they had not favored the enterprise's expansion in the
area and had tried to prevent it. In any case, it is particularly worrisome that the government
would permit the dislocation of smallholders in favor of a joint-venture enterprise, and
specifically one that has had several unprofitable years Further, LOMACO's expansion as
described above has led to great tenure insecurity in the area, since local smallholders and
small private commercial farmers fear that the enterprise will soon control all land in the area
near LOMACO-2. This situation can only inhibit smallholder and private investment. Since
smallholders and other private interests are not confident of their tenure security, they will
not be inclined to make long-term investments, instead focusing on short-term gains. This
strategy often results in poor resource management and ecological degradation
As part of our analysis, we need to determine if LOMACO has satisfied the terms of its
contractual arrangement. In order to do this, we need the terms of the agreement; up to the
present, however, neither LOMACO nor the government has disclosed this information.
Additionally, the enterprise has not been forthcoming regarding its profitability (or,
conversely, its losses) in Chokwe or elsewhere in the country.
Smallholders in the area are well aware of the government's participation in LOMACO.
As noted, the government is frequently cited as a central antagonist in the region. Indeed,
smallholders interviewed complained that the government was facilitating theft of their land
by private interests and joint ventures. One example will demonstrate this point. A group of
farmers who participated in a group interview professed that "party" (i.e., FRELIMO)
representatives had visited them before LOMACO expanded operations in 1991. Government
(and sometimes FRELIMO) representatives reportedly also accompany private and large
139. Mozambican members of LOMACO's managing board of directors report that the company has not
been profitable for several years between 1990 and 1994. Another government official admitted that the company
was drawing credit from the Central Bank of Mozambique, which could be used more productively elsewhere
in the economy (see also Myers and West 1993). These sources asked to remain anonymous. In a series of
debates with the Land Tenure Center (verbal and written communications), LOMACO officials deny that the
company is unprofitable, asserting that it has brought "development" to the region. LOMACO refuses to open
its books to financial scrutiny, despite the fact that it is a joint-venture company with the Government of
Mozambique. Consequently, we are forced to rely on the comments of Mozambicans involved in the LOMACO
operations, without recourse to the actual documents in question. (Any documents that have been gathered by
the LTC project in Mozambique, including written communications with LOMACO, are available through the
Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.)
140. See Myers and Tanner (1992); and Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993).75
commercial interests who wish to acquire land in the area. The officials supposedly ask the
local farmers to assist them by giving these visitors land for farms. In return, the officials
aver, the local farmers will receive assistance (such as seeds and sprays) and services
(including extension and transport). Local farmers who recounted this story said that not only
did they not receive any assistance or services, but also these enterprises took much more
land than the areas agreed to by the local farmers. The farmers also expressed dismay with
government officials who facilitate "land theft," since key central government dignitaries
(including the past president, the current president, the minister of agriculture, and other
high-ranking officials) are themselves from southern Gaza Province and were therefore
expected to be more sympathetic to the smallholders' situation. In short, these farmers did
not speak positively about government—and some specifically spoke with anger about
FRELIMO.
LOMACO's involvement in the region could potentially be constructive. The enterprise
has the capacity to open new lands, develop infrastructure (roads and transport), and train
manpower. However, the company seems destined to fail in this capacity since it condones
its antagonistic relationship with the local community. It is unfortunate that the local
population sees LOMACO as an adversary rather than a partner "
Investment in the area is also being adversely affected by the pervasive fear that war will
resume soon. As in other part of the country, smallholders claim that the war is not finished.
Therefore, they do not wish to invest in building new permanent homesteads, clearing new
fields, planting trees, and so forth Another factor affecting investment, for both
smallholders and private commercial interests, is the unproductive use of significant amounts
of money and other resources to secure rights to land. As previously noted, some commercial
interests appear to be speculating on a future land market, for they have acquired land and
have not begun production—and do not intend to.
Above all, it appears that the tension between official authorities and local smallholders
has not diminished in the postwar period. This is particularly worrisome given a near
breakdown of customary authority with regard to land in the region. It is unclear how local
farmers are resolving land disputes south of the Limpopo River. It seems that they rely on
family elders, though local officials are called upon when the elders are unable to resolve
differences. What types of social and political transformations are taking place as a result of
these tensions are unclear, and further research is necessary.
141. See also Weiss and Myers (1994); and Myers and Weiss (1994).
142. Apparently smallholders' opinion about the continuation of peace is positively affected by the passage
of more and more time without a resumption of hostilities. At the Second National Land Conference in
Mozambique in May 1994, for example, smallholders from Gaza and Inhambane provinces seemed more hopeful
about prospects for peace than when they were interviewed in Chokwe in January. Many said that they were
waiting until after elections before making long-term commitments and investments in their new homesteads.
This concern about elections was heard throughout the country (see also Alexander 1994).76
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B. NHAMATANDA DISTRICT, SOFALA PROVINCE
1. RESEARCH SITES AND OBJECTIVES
LTC researchers visited Nhamatanda District three times in the last two years, choosing
five geographical locations, north and south of the road and railway line, for further
investigation: (1) Djasse, (2) Nharuchonga, (3) Nhamatanda, (4) Lamego, and (5) Muda (see
maps 10-14). The most recent field study was conducted in July 1993, approximately nine
months after the peace accord was initiated This case study on land access builds upon
a 1992 LTC investigation that was part of a larger study focusing on divestiture of state farm
lands and assets in Mozambique
In this and the case study of Manica Province that follows, we endeavor to enrich our
understanding of tenure and power relations in several districts along or contiguous to the
Beira corridor in central Mozambique. As discussed below, the corridor has been the site of
substantial financial investment from the colonial period to the present. This investment has
affected economic and power relations as well as land tenure rules and land access in the
colonial, independence, and postwar periods. The entire corridor is densely populated (see
map 2), and during the war it was heavily settled by displaced families. It is the sight of
major road and rail transport between Zimbabwe and the Mozambican seaport in Beira. The
case studies in Nhamatanda and Vanduzi districts are representative of other communities in
the Beira corridor.
In the case of Nhamatanda we specifically attempted to understand if returning refugees
and displaced farmers had returned to their family lands and to discover more about the
interaction between displaced farmers, returning refugees, and local inhabitants with regard
to land access and control over natural resources in the postwar period. We also focused on
who was distributing land and resolving land disputes and on the interaction between new or
returning nonlocal commercial interests and local smallholders.
2. COMMON HISTORICAL, LAND TENURE, AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCES WITHIN THE
BEIRA CORRIDOR
The districts investigated in both Sofala and Manica Province, while different in many
ways, share numerous common historical experiences. These happenings influenced social,
143. Approximately 75 farmers were interviewed at these five sites in 1993, ten of whom were returning
refugees while 32 were displaced farmers. In addition, two group interviews were held in Lamego and Muda;
six farmers participated at Lamego while seven farmers took part at Muda. Small commercial private farmers
were queried as well. Besides these farmers, we interviewed several locality and district-level government
officials, rural extension agents, and representatives of NGOs operating in the area. The government officials
included the district agricultural officer, the provincial agricultural officer, the district chief of DINAGECA,
the secretary of the government repatriation center at Muda, the secretary of the center for displaced people at
Gorongosa, and extension agents in Lamego and Nharuchonga.
144. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). In this earlier investigation we interviewed many of the same
government officials and approximately 56 smallholders in and around Lamego. In addition, Harry West and
Julieta Eliseu conducted group interviews at two sites in Lamego, Eliseu interviewing approximately 25 women
in one meeting.80
political, and economic relations within the local communities and between these communities
and the outside world. When the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century they found a
relatively dense settlement of Africans and a smaller number of Indians living along the coast,
including the territory around the present-day coastal city of Beira in Sofala Province. The
interior territory, stretching west, was significantly less populated. Ndau-, Sena-, Teve-,
Tonga-, Gorongosa-, and Shona-speaking peoples inhabited the region. These groups were
patrilocal, organized by lineage or clan structures. Politically they were vertically
hierarchical, with power vested in a chief at the top of the organization. The authorities were
supported in descending order by mambos or subchiefs, their assistants, and lineage or clan
elders. These groups continue to inhabit the area, they are patrilocal, and there is some
evidence indicating that the political structures are similar to those the Portuguese encoun-tered
Today, the port city of Beira and the coast remain more densely populated than the
interior regions; however, a high percentage of the population in central Mozambique is now
squeezed into a narrow band running along the historic trade corridor between Zimbabwe and
the coast. This area was, and continues to be, the site of significant economic investment.
During the war the region was heavily defended (and often attacked), attracting many
thousands of refugees
As early as 1525 the Portuguese gained military control over parts of Sofala Province.
In the 1600s the Portuguese government granted concessions to Portuguese settlers to extend
this control. These concessions, known as prazos, granted settlers monopolistic marketing
authority, land, and the right to exploit local labor and collect taxes The holders of
prazos had complete political and economic authority in their areas and often waged war to
expand or maintain control From the 1600s to the 1800s, the history of Sofala and
Manica Province is one of intense conflict between the Portuguese and the local populations,
with the former losing many military campaigns. However, a combination of fac-
tors—including the prazos, labor practices which involved slavery, and military cam-
paigns—created or stimulated divisions within local communities and between communities
and led to population dislocation. These separations created opportunities for the "disadvan-
taged" or disaffected in many communities to rebel against the control or rules established
145. For a brief summary of ethnic groups in this region and their political structures, see Lundin (1992a).
For a more specific discussion of the Shona, see Beach (1994).
146. District Agricultural Officer, personal communication, July 1992; Chief, Services of Provincial
Department of Agrarian Economics, personal communication, July 1992. See also Myers, West, and Eliseu
(1993).
This area is unique in these provinces. The communities further away from the corridor are poorer and were
virtually undefended during the war. In the areas north and south of the corridor, power and economic struggles
and relations are different; land access and tenure relations, as a result, are distinct (see Alexander 1994).
147. For two different perspectives on the prazos, see Isaacman (1972); Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); and
Lundin (1992a). For a historical discussion, see Lacerda (1929).
148. Lundin (1992a) notes that the prazos also had cooperative relationships with local communities and
customary authorities. They often paid tribute to local leaders for their assistance and cooperation and their
owners often married the daughters of customary authorities. These cooperative arrangements transformed both
the nature of customary society and the power of the prazos.81
by more powerful communities or segments within their own societies In turn, these
internal social rebellions created opportunities for colonial economic and political penetration.
By the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese were able to capitalize on internal divisions and
gain administrative control over the territory. Chibalo, a forced labor system, was introduced
in 1900 and continued until 1950. According to Isaacman the struggle between indigenous
communities and the Portuguese resulted in a transformation of social (including gender)
relations, "individualization of the peasantry," dissolution of "collective" working
arrangements, decline of "supra-household" kinship affiliations, and heightened economic
differentiation.
150 Lundin (1992a, 1992b) observes that not only were local social, political,
and economic relations transformed by the Portuguese presence, but also local Portuguese
relations were changed, creating tensions within the community and between the colony and
Lisbon (Lundin 1992a, 1992b).
The Portuguese government in Lisbon, as a result of its own economic weaknesses, was
unable to invest directly in Mozambique. It sold concessions to foreign companies. These
concessions, covering vast tracts of land, gave the companies administrative rights in their
respective zones. The Mozambique Company was chartered to administer and develop a large
area in Manica and Sofala provinces. It reaped great profits through labor exploitation and
the purchase of cotton at artificially low prices. The company sold labor to nearby settler
estates. After 1925, Portuguese settlers, mostly peasants, came to Mozambique in greater
numbers (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983). The settlers were given choice tracts of land, cash
bonuses, low-interest credit, and technical assistance. Most of these earlier settlers acquired
land in southern Gaza Province, along the Limpopo River, and in the Manica highlands.
Small and large private firms also acquired concessions in Manica and Sofala throughout
this period, displacing many local families. The operations of these firms ranged from citrus
farming to cattle ranching to sugar production and processing. Some of the farms in the area
of investigation included Polpa Papel, Companhia Textile do Pungõe, Mocambique Industrial,
SOALPO, and Textafrica in Sofala; and SOALPO, Textafrica, and Chimonica in Manica.
151
Indeed, cadastre maps of the lands north and south of the corridor from the colonial period
illustrate that the entire area was heavily occupied by small and large private agricultural
operations. In Sofala, near Nhamatanda, Srs. Soares, Osvaldo, Popadac, Sanglides, and
Castanheira had holdings averaging 1,000 hectares each. In Manica, near Vanduzi, Srs.
Nogueira, Pina, and Ribeiro held properties in excess of 1,000 hectares, while several other
individuals had farms between 180 and 500 hectares. A little further north of Vanduzi post,
another cluster of private farms, held by Srs. Nobre, SimOes, and Nogueira, controlled
approximately 2,000 hectares each. There were several other medium-sized holdings
extending northward, each approximately 2,000 hectares (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
149. See Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); Isaacman (1992); Vail and White (1980); and Curtin et al. (1981).
150. Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, 1977); Isaacman (1992); see also Vail and White (1980).
151. For a more complete list and discussion of these companies, see Coelho (1993); for a complete
discussion of Mocambique Industrial, see Lundin (1992a).
Several of these same companies are still in operation or are returning to reassert claims. See Myers, West,
and Eliseu (1993); and Alexander (1994).82
The prazo system was abolished in 1930 and the colonial government assumed direct
administrative control over more than 260,000 square kilometers (26 million hectares) of land
throughout the country. Sofala and Manica provinces were administered as one district
covering approximately 12.5 million hectares. Economic and administrative zones were
established after 1938 and twelve companies were given monopolistic control over the
production of cotton. The companies were allowed to buy cotton from native producers at
artificially depressed prices (lower than the prices paid to white settlers). These zones covered
more than half the country; two of them, Companhia Colonial do Buzi and Companhia
Nacional Algodoeira, covered vast areas in Sofala and Manica provinces. In these zones, the
government in Lisbon imposed a policy of forced cotton cultivation on indigenous black
Mozambicans.'
S"
In the face of growing opposition (largely but not exclusively from black Mozambicans)
and the successes of FRELIMO in the early 1960s, the colonial government initiated the
development of the aldeamentos and colonatos. Aldeamentos were part of a forced
villagization program; peasants were moved into "strategic hamlets" as a buffer against
FRELIMO advances and to optimize colonial control of the local population. Aldeamentos
were created all over the country, particularly in the northern provinces of Tete, Niassa, and
Cabo Delgado. Between 50 and 60 percent of the indigenous population in these three
provinces was forcibly relocated,
153 resulting in population concentration, landlessness, and
declining agricultural productivity. The colonial regime did not begin the villagization
program in Sofala and Manica until 1971, and by then the government had few resources to
devote to its implementation.'
At about the same time in the 1960s, the colonial government started a colonization
program using colonatos. These colonies of white settlers and a few assimilados (assimilated
black Mozambicans) also were often located in strategic military areas; they, too, were used
as buffers against the advances of FRELIMO. The settlers were mostly poor Portuguese
farmers. The colonial government selected large tracts of prime land, surveyed and cleared
blocks for the colonos, and provided low-interest credit, seeds, and technical services. The
tracts were frequently already occupied by indigenous smallholder farmers, who were forced
off the land but who either remained on marginal land around the periphery of the colonato
or stayed on their old land as tenants of the colonos. Several of these blocks were established
in Sofala and Manica provinces. One colonato in Sussundenga District, Manica Province,
covered approximately 18,000 hectares.1
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152. Isaacman and Isaacman (1983); Isaacman (1992, 1982, 1972); Lundin (1992a, 1992b); and Henriksen
(1983).
153. Ibid. See also Coelho (1993).
154. Ibid.
155. Alexander (1994); interviews with Hermes Sueia, UREA (Unidade de Reestrutação de Empresas
Agrárias), Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo, February 1992 and August 1993.83
By 1967, it is estimated that there were 4,043 "registered" farms, totaling 2.27 million
hectares, in Mozambique.
156 Many of these farms were part of the established colonatos.
In Sofala and Manica, 451 farms (or 11 percent) of the farms registered countrywide covered
677,000 hectares (29.8 percent of the total area registered).
The more intrusive colonial political and economic policies were designed to control land
and natural resources. The prazos, plantations, concessions, aldeamentos, and colonatos all
resulted in physical displacement as well as political and economic disruption. Mozambicans
were either forced off their lands or became landless laborers on their own farms. This
eventually led to the growth of the independence movement and the downfall of the colonial
regime. However, not all parties in the resistance had the same goals and objectives. Some
of those supporting the fight for independence had ideological goals that conflicted with those
of the movement's leadership, particularly regarding the future nature of the Mozambican
economy and society. Many who later broke from FRELIMO thought differently about race
and property relations, preferring to purge whites from Mozambique and capitalize on
reclaimed resources. Some of these individuals came from "traditional" political families
while others belonged to an emerging black capitalist class, including the assimilados. Many
of both groups came from Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica provinces. It is not coincidental,
therefore, that there is a strong relationship between the economic and political history of
these three provinces and the evolution of civil war in Mozambique.
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3. LAND TENURE IN NHAMATANDA DISTRICT BEFORE THE PEACE ACCORD
After independence most private farmers, including the colonos, abandoned their farms
in Sofala Province. The newly independent government began to "intervene" (i.e., take over)
and nationalize several of these farms in 1976 and eventually created at least thirteen state
enterprises in Sofala Province.
158 These enterprises covered more than 35,000 hectares (see
map 3). Two of these farms were located in Nhamatanda District—Lamego Agricultural State
Farm (3,726 hectares) and Muda Agriculture and Livestock State Enterprise. The area of the
latter enterprise is thought to have been several thousand hectares but is unknown by
government officials in Maputo.
159 The boundaries of the state farms were not necessarily
coterminous with their colonial counterparts. In some instances the state farms were carved
from larger colonial-era private farms, but in many more cases they were amalgamations of
several small or medium-sized colonial private farms. Consequently, smallholders, who may
156. See Standard Bank Group, Annual Economic Review, Mozambique, 1968, p. 3, cited in Isaacman and
Isaacman (1983, p. 44). In 1993 officials at DINAGECA estimated that at least 6,000-7,000 land titles were
issued by independence. In addition, after independence the state farm sector covered approximately 600,000
hectares. Government officials in Maputo assert that the state farm sector included only a fraction of the farms
abandoned at independence. Consequently, it is likely that both the number of colonial-era "private" farms and
their area exceeds the figures reported by the Standard Bank Group.
157. See Sidaway (1992); and Geffray and Pederson (1988).
158. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
159. Interviews with Hermes Sueia, UREA (Unidade de Reestrutação de Empresas Agrárias), Ministry of
Agriculture, Maputo, February 1992 and August 1993. When research was conducted on the state farm sector
in 1992, the Muda Agriculture and Livestock State Enterprise had closed. We were unable to interview farm
officials about its operations.84
have been able to maintain rights to land between the private farms during the colonial era,
were pushed farther away from their land when the state enterprises were created. The
Lamego Agricultural State Farm in Nhamatanda is an example of such an amalgamation
(Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
At about the same time that the state farms were created, the government established
cooperative farms for smallholders near the agricultural enterprises and initiated its own
villagization program with the creation of the aldeias comunais (communal villages). Many
of these villages were established in the same location as the old colonial aldeamentos.
Neither Sofala nor Manica Province had as many communal villages as other areas in the
country such as Gaza or Cabo Delgado Province. Nonetheless, communal villages were
established in the former two provinces in the period from 1975 through 1978. Isaacman and
Araujo,
160 respectively, estimate that in 1982-1983 between 9.5 and 12.6 percent of the
population in Sofala Province was forced into communal villages. This contrasts with Manica
Province where estimates range from 22.4 to 25.4 percent.
161
It is not coincidental that the
number ofaldeias comunais established in each province parallels the number of aldeamentos.
To understand the dismay, frustration, and resentment that people initially had toward the
aldeias comunais, it is necessary to understand their attitudes toward the aldeamentos. Lundin
(1992, p. 28) writes about the latter: "The aldeamentos were a means of controlling the
population in a situation of social disorder. The aldeamento was an arbitrary attitude of
violence and was regarded as an imposition."
Regardless of which estimate for villagization we use, the total figure remains staggering.
Countrywide estimations of the number of people affected by the program range from 1.2
million to 1.8 million to 2.5 million.
162 If total population was 13 million in Mozambique in
1982, then between 9.2 percent and 19.2 percent of the country's population was moved into
communal villages.163
We know from field research in Nhamatanda and Vanduzi that all of
these people did not remain in the villages and in many cases maintained two home-
steads—one official in the village and one traditional on their family land.
164 At the same
time, many of the communal villages, particularly in the central part of the country, became
RENAMO targets during the war. Consequently, in many locations smallholders were in a
no-win situation: They were damned if the stayed in the villages and damned if they left.
160. Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, p. 155) draw their data from the National Commission of Communal
Villages, 31 May 1982; Araujo (1988).
161. In Tete the figures range from 10.1 to 17.3 percent, in Gaza from 30.1 to 50.9 percent, and in Cabo
Delgado from 86.7 to 90.0 percent.
162. Noticias (28 August 1982) reported that 1.2 million people were affected by the villagization program,
while Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, p. 155) suggest that 1.8 million people were moved into the villages. We
extrapolate from Araujo's (1988) work and figure that 2.5 million people were moved into communal villages.
163. Araujo (1988) estimates that by 1983, 20.0 percent of the rural population was relocated into
government villages.
164. See also João Carrilho, former chief, Ad Hoc Land Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo,
personal communication, July and August 1992.85
The new government's policies with regard to land—the creation of state farms,
cooperatives, and communal villages—and its emphasis on large-scale, state-managed
production at the expense of small-scale (private and family) producers led to new social
tensions, physical dislocation, and economic disruption in the countryside.
165 Fundamental
social relations and institutions were affected, including bride wealth, inheritance patterns,
and dispute-resolution mechanisms. At the same time, many aspiring entrepreneurs and petty
capitalists were prevented from realizing their goals. Smallholders and smaller commercial
interests (including the assimilados, whites, and Indians) had planned to move into the
vacuum left by white settlers. Smallholders and assimilados say that when they were
prevented from reacquiring holdings lost during the colonial period or from capitalizing on
opportunities created when the Portuguese and others abandoned the country, they became
frustrated and angry.
166 It is likely that this frustration made fertile ground for the expansion
of hostilities.
Field research, conducted in 1992 before the peace accord, documented a number of land
tenure practices, most of which were based on local social relations, war-time conditions, and
government policy. Tenure relations represented a patch-quilt of multiple types of temporary
(and occasionally illegal) and semipermanent land-tenure regimes. A broad mix of
smallholders, displaced families, commercial interests, and state enterprises existed
concurrently, and often conterminously, in Nhamatanda District. Although state farms had
recently closed due to financial and managerial difficulties,
167 they maintained control over
their land. Some smallholders were farming family land, while others were squatting on state
farm land or land belonging to former private enterprises. Some conflicts were reported in
1992.
As noted at the beginning of this section, the majority of the province's estimated
population of 1.42 million people—and uncounted displaced people from other provinces
—were squeezed into a narrow band, perhaps 3 to 5 kilometers wide, on either side of the
road and railway line (i.e., the corridor) or in protected government areas. Others were
forced to remain in RENAMO-held areas. Many of those living in the government-controlled
areas were living in or around government-created villages and cooperatives. These villages
and cooperatives had populations far exceeding their intended capacity. For example, one
village visited in Lamego had a population of approximately 5,800 individuals, though it was
intended to accommodate only 40 or 50 families.
168 Many of the current inhabitants were not
from the area, but came from farther south or north of the corridor seeking safety from
RENAMO attacks. Conversely, many people who claimed historical rights had fled the area
165. See Sidaway (1992); Geffray and Pederson (1988); Geffray (1990); Hanlon (1990).
166. Field interviews with smallholders, Chokwe, Gaza Province, April 1992 and November 1993; see also
Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993). Field interviews with smallholders, Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, July 1992;
and Vanduzi, Manica Province, August 1993; Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). See also Sidaway (1992);
Geffray (1990); and Hanlon (1990).
167. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
168. Interviews with smallholder farmer, Lamego, July 1992; this information was confirmed by agricultural
extension agents from Lamego, July 1992. See also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).86
for Beira or other more secure zones.' Smallholders and displaced farmers frequently
reported overcrowding, land shortages, soil degradation, and tenure insecurity.
Smallholders were not always clearheaded about their tenure rights. For example, some
smallholders in Lamego had been displaced by the colonial plantation concessions. Some of
the same families were again displaced by the colonatos and aldeamentos. After indepen-
dence, many of these same individuals, who were hoping to recover their precolonial land,
were forced into communal villages and had to work on cooperative farms; others worked
on the state farms. With the war, many farmers self-displaced to new areas of relative safety
and frequently moved more than once to avoid fighting or being captured—or to capitalize
on economic opportunities, better climatic conditions, infrastructure, or international
assistance. Farmers said that they were not sure when or where they would move once the
war was over. They did not know if they would stay where they were in the communal
villages, move to new areas to secure land, or return to family land.
170 However, most
smallholders interviewed in 1992 maintained that they wanted to leave the communal villages.
In comparison to Gaza Province, farmers in Sofala Province appeared more angry about their
forced resettlement and the conditions in communal villages. They were more outspoken
about the issue, blaming the government (and particularly FRELIMO) for the war, the
drought, and other problems associated with hunger, malnutrition, and disease.'"
In Nhamatanda interviews many of the smallholders who were not on state farm land or
in communal villages had insecure, temporary land rights. These rights were being renewed
by local customary authorities or lineages from season to season. In some cases rural
agricultural extension agents were helping to renegotiate these rights. Others who were
squatting on state farm land or on colonial-era private holdings believed that they would have
to vacate their farms once the war was over and the former owners returned.
12 Farmers and
displaced individuals expressed concern about the future. They believed that many refugees
and other internally displaced families would move back to the district, creating land
shortages.
173
169. As in many other places in Mozambique during the war, there was a process of constant movement
or displacement, reshifting, and temporary settlement as people tried to find secure areas relatively free from
violence. At the same time, people relocated and settled to capitalize on economic opportunities. This constant
shifting added additional layers of claimants to land and natural resources, which would, eventually, lead to
conflict.
Interviews with District Agricultural Director, Nhamatanda, July 1992; rural agricultural extension agents,
Nhamatanda, July 1992; and smallholder farmers, Nhamatanda, July 1992.
170. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and Myers (1993c).
171. Smallholders in Lamego voiced clear criticisms of FRELIMO and the government; they often had
positive comments regarding developments in education, health care, and other services. At the same time, they
offered no positive comments about RENAMO. On the contrary, when they did refer or answer questions
pertaining to RENAMO, they recounted horror stories about displacement and hunger, abuse and murder
(smallholder interviews, Lamego, July 1992).
172. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Lamego, July 1992; see also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
173. Ibid. This position was supported by rural agricultural extension agents interviewed in Lamego, July
1992.87
By July 1992, provincial and district officials were already distributing land (including
state farm land) to private commercial interests, government officials, and other well-
positioned elite.
174 District authorities were distributing some parcels on a temporary basis
to smallholders in the district. In contrast to Gaza, Maputo, Manica, and Nampula provinces,
few data are available on land concessions in Sofala Province. However, we know that at
least 4,100 hectares were granted in Nhamatanda in 1992 and 1993.
175 The Lamego State
Agricultural Enterprise covered approximately 3,726 hectares. Consequently, it appears that
the government is granting more land than was occupied by the state agricultural sector.
176
In addition, it was reported by district officials that both private companies and individuals
have acquired or reassumed rights to land in the district, and that these transactions have not
yet been recorded. The larger enterprises reacquiring land include Mocambique Industrial,
Textafrica, and SOALPO.1
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Interviews conducted in 1992 revealed that provincial and district authorities, including
the DPA (Provincial Director of Agriculture) and the DDA (District Director of Agriculture)
in Nhamatanda, did not think there would be land shortages anywhere in the province or
district once the war was over. They said that the displaced families would return to their
areas of origin, alleviating any pressure on the land. At the same time, officials noted that
it was unnecessary for the province to reserve or distribute land for (family sector)
smallholders. Significantly, officials stated that smallholders were incapable of exploiting the
better land, much of which belonged to the state farm sector or the abandoned colonial farms,
because they lacked sufficient "capacity. "
"s
In 1992, we were unable to penetrate the areas controlled by RENAMO north and south
of the corridor. However, we believed that those areas, particularly in Machanga, Muanza,
Gorongosa, Maringue, and Cheringoma districts, were relatively less populated and less likely
174. Provincial Director of Agriculture, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; District
Director of Agriculture, Nhamatanda, personal communication, July 1992; Director, Lamego State Farm,
personal communication, July 1992. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
175. The central government reports in the Boletim da República that 1,721 hectares were granted in
concessions in Nhamatanda District between 1991 and 1993. Field research conducted in Nhamatanda in 1992
revealed that 2,375 hectares were granted in concessions in the district in that year (see Myers, West, and Eliseu
1993). The concessions indicated by central government are not necessarily the same as the requests for land
at the provincial level.
176. Some of these concessions could have been for land formerly belonging to the Muda Agriculture and
Livestock State Enterprise; however, we have no data about this farm or its land to substantiate the argument.
177. Provincial Director of Agriculture, Sofala Province, personal communication, July 1992; District
Director of Agriculture, Nhamatanda, personal communication, July 1992; Director, Lamego State Farm,
personal communication, July 1992; also see Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). These same companies were
reacquiring holdings in Manica Province as well (see Alexander 1994).
178. In 1992 officials at the provincial and district levels of government and officials from the provincial
office of DINAGECA were repeatedly asked about land access, conflicts, and shortages for smallholder
producers and small private interests. The DPA, DDA, and several representatives from provincial and district
offices of DINAGECA were convinced that land access was not a problem for smallholders or small private
interests in Nhamatanda or Buzi districts—the two most densely populated districts in the province. They
believed that any localized problems would be resolved once the war was over and the displaced people returned
to their homes. They seemed to believe that overcrowding was only a result of the war. See also Myers, West,
and Eliseu (1993, pp. 34-38); and Myers and Weiss (1994).88
to experience land shortages and conflicts (see maps 2 and 6). At the same time, we knew
that these areas had experienced less investment in the colonial and postindependence
periods—thus making them less desirable in the short term to commercial interests in the
postwar period. These assumptions, and our expectations regarding land access and conflict,
were in some ways confirmed and in other aspects challenged by our findings a year later.
4. LAND TENURE IN NHAMATANDA DISTRICT AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD
In July 1993, Nhamatanda District was revisited. Research focused not only on the area
surrounding Lamego State Agricultural Enterprise, but also included several other localities
in the district. Displaced, repatriated, and indigenous farmers were interviewed at Lamego
Center (map 13),
179 Muda (map 14),
180 Nharuchonga (map 12),
181 and Djasse (map
11).
182
Many of the people interviewed at Muda and Nharuchonga were repatriated from
Malawi and Zimbabwe.
183 By far the most interesting and unsettling observations were made
at Lamego and Muda. These cases are discussed first.
In both Lamego and Muda, approximately 50 percent of the repatriated people
interviewed said they had access to land and were farming. They stated that they had either
reclaimed old family land or acquired new land since their return. Those people who said
they had recovered family land are differentiated into several categories: Some were returning
to land they claimed was owned by their family during or before the colonial period; others
were returning to land that they had been given by colonial authorities or by colonial-era
private farmers; and still others were recovering land that had been granted to them by
government since independence.' In some cases we witnessed overlapping claims, which the
locality government was attempting to sort out. It is not clear if this effort will be successful.
The fact that only half of the repatriated families—that is, returning families—had access
to land at the time of the interviews is revealing. It was assumed by government that all those
returning would have securable land since they had land in this area before the war. In
practice, however, this has not happened. There are several possible explanations for the
anomaly. First, displaced families are not moving out of the district to their former family
farms, thus giving way for returning refugees. Second, a new category of individuals
(smallholders) is self-displacing into the area as people move away from RENAMO-controlled
179. Lamego is 12 kilometers east of the district capital.
180. Muda is 25 kilometers east of the district capital.
181. Nharuchonga is 10 kilometers west of the district center.
182. Djasse is 26 kilometers from the district capital.
183. Displaced, repatriated, returning, and other smallholder farmers were also interviewed at the Gorongosa
Center, Ramos Center, and Quarry of Mount Siluvu village. These interviews are not specifically reported in
this case study, though the findings have been used in the overall analysis.
184. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993.89
areas.
185 Third, another new category of smallholders is choosing to move to the area because
of available opportunities. Fourth, land previously held by smallholders is being granted to
nonlocal smallholders, commercial interests, government employees, and retired military
personnel.
In the first instance, displaced farmers are not leaving the district. While in 1992 many
expressed a desire to leave the government-created communal villages (and indeed many
have), they have not moved out of the district. One government administrator insisted that
over 200,000 displaced people were living in Nhamatanda District in 1992 (Myers, West, and
Eliseu 1993), and another local government official stated that only 150 families had left the
district in July 1993.
186
When interviewed, displaced farmers gave several reasons for staying
in the locality or, conversely, for not returning to their family lands. People said that they
felt the corridor was relatively safe, and that if the war resumed they would not want to be
far away. One older man remarked that he did not want to live through the same experiences
again if the war resumed in his native area; he preferred to remain landless in Muda. Others
stated that they would not return to the rural areas outside the corridor until the government
created more positive conditions, such as access to water, health facilities, and transportation,
or until the government agreed to help them rebuild their homesteads. This latter comment
was often voiced by female household heads, who frequently had no male relatives to rebuild
homesteads or the financial means to hire someone.
187
We know little about the movements of the internally displaced in Mozambique. In our
field research in Sofala, we noted that more people (most of whom were internally displaced)
had entered the district than had exited. Some families moved to the corridor because of
opportunities there, not necessarily because they have land or are from the area.
188 At the
same time, smallholders frequently acknowledged that they had divided their households
between two locations: The family household, and particularly the children, remained in the
corridor, while other members exploited farmland outside the safety of the region.
185. There is some evidence suggesting that many people chose—and were able—to leave RENAMO-held
areas for government-controlled zones shortly after the peace accord was initiated. It is likely that RENAMO
was unable to completely control the large exodus of people shortly after the accord was signed. Given food
shortages and manpower constraints, RENAMO may have opted to ignore the exodus. However, current field
research in RENAMO-administered areas shows that RENAMO has reimposed tight controls on population
movement, particularly for people entering and exiting its administrative zones (see Alexander 1994).
186. Secretary for Muda Repatriation Center, personal communication, July 1993.
187. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993.
188. UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and several NGOs are monitoring refugee
movement; however, few are carefully observing the movement of internally displaced families, a group that
in number exceeds the refugee population by a ratio of at least 4 to 1.
Whereas estimates of the number of refugees residing in foreign countries during the war range from 1
million to 2 million, estimates for the number of internally displaced vary from 4.5 million to 6 million. World
Refugee Survey, 1984-1993, approximates that 1.7 million Mozambicans were refugees and 4 million were
internally displaced (cited in Drumtra 1993, p. 9). We believe the actual figure for refugees to be slightly higher
because many who fled to South Africa were not counted; we calculate that the number of internally displaced
is close to 5 million.90
We also spoke to farmers who were entering the district from RENAMO-administered
areas. They self-displaced to avoid being detained in the RENAMO region; they thought that
war would resume, and they were afraid that they would suffer if they stayed where they
were. Others left from RENAMO-held lands because they desired to benefit from the
opportunities in the government-controlled areas (e.g., greater international donor assistance,
access to seeds and food, employment, education, health care, transportation, etc.).
According to farmers interviewed at the accommodation centers, the number of landless
refugees in the district has also increased because the provincial government in Beira forced
many people onto buses, transported them to the district, and left them there.
189 They
reasoned that officials in Beira wanted to move people away from the city to reduce
overcrowding. One particular family acknowledged that they were among several families
who were forced to move; they were deposited in Nhamatanda, though it is not their home.
This family could not pay for transport to their old locality and was stranded in Nhama-
tanda.
190
Many returning refugees who had not yet acquired land were confident that they would
get land from one of the government authorities or a local NGO. Displaced farmers,
however, were not so confident about the future and their prospects of acquiring or
reacquiring land in the district. The difference in expectations may come from the fact that
displaced families living in the district are better informed about land access and distribution,
or it may come from their knowledge that government and international donors tend to favor
refugees in their assistance programs.
Finally, as noted in the first two sections of this report, government officials are granting
land concessions in the district and throughout the province. These concessions, often the
most pernicious trend for smallholders, are frequently in the best areas, near the corridor or
city and locality centers. A few examples from Muda and Lamego will show the various
consequences of granting of concessions.
Map 13 depicts land use patterns in Bairro Seven of Lamego locality. We interviewed
smallholders and private commercial interests farming in the area south of the rail line. The
area west of the road to Mecuze was previously part of a colonial farm (designated "A").
This land later became part of the Lamego State Farm. During the war many smallholders
from south of the Muda River were forced north into this zone. Native smallholders and
displaced farmers squatted on land belonging to the state farm and, when possible, farmed
either on state farm land or around the perimeter of the farm. In 1992, when we visited this
area, it was densely populated with smallholders and displaced farmers. When we returned
in 1993, we found that the area was still heavily populated (though some people had moved
away), but that a private individual had also acquired a large tract of land as part of a
concession along the bank of the Muda, between the river and the road to Mecuze. At least
twenty-five families were forced out of the zone; they were told by local officials either to
189. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993. This was confirmed by local
agricultural rural extension agents in Muda, July 1993.
190. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993.91
move across the river (regardless of whether they came from the south side or not) or to find
land elsewhere.
191 Since the smallholders felt that the south side of the river was still
insecure (this area had previously been subject to attack by RENAMO), they refused to move.
Some farmers complained to local authorities, while others requested new land from the same
officials or from NGOs operating in the area.
192 Still others remained squatting, hoping that
the new owner will let them stay. Some of the smallholders who were squatting in the zone
had worked for the state farm before it closed; they felt that they should have priority over
other smallholders in the area (even though they may not have historical rights to the land).
Consequently, there was tension between groups of smallholders.
A similar case was reported by smallholders west of the Mecuze road (marked "B" on
map 13). Displaced farmers and former workers of the state farm were farming in this zone.
Farmers disclosed that a private commercial farmer had acquired the land and that they were
told to leave. Although unconfirmed by government officials, several farmers testified that
the land was acquired by a local government official. It is not clear if the official was from
the defunct state farm or the district capital. As in the case above, many smallholders
abandoned this land, others squatted and waited for the new owner to assert his rights, and
still others presented complaints to local government officials.1
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Land access patterns in Muda were also very revealing (see map 14). The area labeled
"A" was a private farm during the colonial period. After independence, part of the farm
became a state agricultural enterprise. Smallholders squatted in the area surrounding the
larger block. In 1993 both blocks were claimed by a nonlocal private farmer. Smallholders
had not yet been expelled from the land when interviewed, though they had been told by
government officials that they might be. Some claimed that they had farmed in this area since
the colonial period.
In 1992 and early 1993, smallholders were farming in the area designated as "B." After
the war, repatriated refugees took land in this same area, but it is not clear if they were from
this area or simply were trying to acquire land in a strategic location. In July 1993,
smallholders were told by locality officials that the block had been acquired by a district (or
provincial) government official and that they had to leave.
194 This affected several hundred
people and led to a public protest. Farmers complained to locality officials, who in turn
claimed that they knew nothing about the concession.
195 Officials claimed that they were not
consulted and were frustrated by concessions being granted without their approval or
knowledge.
196 In July 1993, locality officials were attempting to secure temporary rights
191. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993. This was confirmed by local
agricultural rural extension agents in Muda, July 1993.
192. Ibid.
193. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Lamego and Muda, July 1993.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. District Agricultural Officer, personal communications, July 1993; locality administrator, personal
communications, July 1993; and agricultural extension agent, personal communications, July 1993.92
for these "postwar displaced" families in area "D"; they were waiting for a response when
the last field site visit was made. Regardless, district officials could not guarantee tenure
security in the new location.
Finally, Mocambique Industrial, a colonial-era cotton-producing company, was in the
process of reclaiming area "C." During the war some of this land was farmed by local
smallholders who claim historical rights and by displaced farmers. Repatriated refugees were
using the land on a temporary basis after the peace accord. The fate of the farmers in this
area is not known. Some smallholders had moved on to marginal land between the road and
the rail line.
Other examples of land access are shown in Djasse and Nharuchonga (maps 11 and 12).
Nharuchonga, a few kilometers from Inchope locality, is the site of two government-created
communal villages, Nharuchonga I and Nharuchonga II. During the war many smallholders
fled north from RENAMO-administered areas and wealdy controlled government areas to
Nharuchonga II. Displaced people accounted for most of the population in this village. They
were crowded in between the road and the railway. Some smallholders farmed south of the
rail line, but usually returned to the safety of the village for the night. Some families were
also farming north of the road, where the bulk of the commune's farms were located.
Nharuchonga I was also inhabited by displaced families, though less so than its counterpart
village. When the peace accord was initiated, repatriated refugees moved into Nharuchonga
I.
197 In July 1993, government officials announced that more than 1,300 refugees had entered
the village seeking permission to stay.
198 Locality officials negotiated with local authorities
and other private commercial interests, securing temporary land-use rights for returning
refugees in area "A" between the road and the river. However, displaced and local
smallholders were also farming in this area. Due to land shortages, locality officials
approached a private owner who had acquired land north of the river ("B" on map 12) after
the peace accord. He agreed to allow returning refugees to use the land on a temporary basis.
He supposedly told locality officials that as soon as he acquires enough capital, he will
expand his operations and exploit all of the land. At that time, he said, the refugees will have
to leave.1
99
Interestingly, some displaced farmers professed to be aggravated with the NGOs for
granting assistance to returning refugees rather than to other displaced farmers. At the same
time, local farmers expressed frustration with the assistance being extended to both displaced
smallholders and returning refugees. Indigenous smallholders, here as elsewhere, often said
that they felt they had "done their job" by helping displaced families and returning refugees
with land and wished that these people would now "go home."
It is not our intention to suggest that no displaced or few returning farmers are
reacquiring land in Nhamatanda District. Nor do we wish to suggest that all indigenous
197. Interviews with smallholder farmers in Nharuchonga, July 1993.
198. Agricultural extension agent, Nharuchonga, personal communication, July 1993.
199. Reported by smallholder farmers and agricultural extension agent, Nharuchonga, July 1993.93
farmers who remained in the area did not keep or acquire rights to land. On the contrary,
many smallholders are farming in the corridor, albeit often on marginal lands in scattered
locations. Some farmers admitted to gaining access to land (usually on a temporary basis) by
clearing land that had gone to bush. One farmer in Muda was aware that the former
Portuguese owner might return soon and that he would have to abandon the land he had
cleared. Others said that they had secured land through customary lease arrangements: they
had borrowed land for a season from local families and paid in either cash or labor for its
use. A smaller number of farmers reported that they had purchased rights to land, usually on
a seasonal or temporary basis.
200 Finally, several farmers reported that they or other family
members acquired land through squatting.
We do intend to convey, however, that numerous returning refugees, displaced families,
and indigenous farmers are competing with each other for access to a limited resource in a
constrained area. At the same time, they are challenged with nonlocal commercial interests
who are buying land or acquiring land concessions from government officials.
Interaction among smallholders over access to potentially problematic land differed,
however. For example, in one case, an old man who had worked as the capatez (overseer)
on a colonial farm refused to allow squatters on the land, let alone any monetized
transactions. In another location, one family that claimed historical rights to land, which was
occupied by a Portuguese farmer during the colonial period, was leasing to landless families.
In some cases, land disputes were easily resolved; and in other instances, customary
authorities or government officials were asked to intervene.
201 Interaction between
smallholders and private commercial interests and between smallholders and the state was also
dissimilar. As noted, in some cases smallholders simply abandoned land that had been
distributed to commercial interests or reclaimed by returning enterprises; however, in other
cases farmers resisted such encroachment by remaining on the land and farming in marginal
areas, by squatting on prime land, and by registering complaints with locality government
officials. It is interesting that newly displaced families did not complain to local customary
authorities in any of these cases involving the state or commercial interests; instead, they
identified government officials and demanded solutions from them.
We found that tenure security was weak for many smallholders in Nhamatanda District.
Many rural families were obviously focusing only on the short term—they were planting for
the current season and hoped to reap their harvests before being expelled or forced to leave.
200. One farmer in Lamego affirmed that in 1992 the price for land outside the corridor was 100,000
meticais per hectare.
201. This disparate process requires closer examination; it is likely that such an investigation would reveal
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C. MANICA DISTRICT, MANICA PROVINCE
1. RESEARCH SITES AND OBJECTIVES
Manica District was visited three times between June 1992 and August 1993. Like the
investigation in Sofala, this case study builds upon a 1992 inquiry that highlighted divestiture
of state farm land and assets.
202 In this section we focus on tenure relations at several points
along the Beira corridor in Vanduzi District (see map 15), though a few of the sites visited
were outside the passageway. As in Sofala, we attempted in this case to understand if
returning refugees and displaced farmers had gone back to their family lands or had acquired
land elsewhere in the postwar period. We wanted to learn more about the interaction between
smallholders and larger commercial interests in the corridor as well as among local
smallholders, displaced families, and returning refugees.
Seven locations were visited during the course of the investigation: (1) administrative post
of Vanduzi (map 16);
203 (2) area around Vanduzi State Farm; (3) June 25 communal village
in Vanduzi; (4) Almada communal village (map 17);
204 (5) Belas communal villages (map
17);
205 (6) September 25 communal village;
206
and (7) Pungoe Sol.
207 This last site is
the seat of local customary authority, one of two in the territory surrounding Vanduzi. We
report here on the sites in and around Vanduzi (locations 1-3), that is, the terrain around the
state farm, Almada communal village, and Belas communal villages. At these sites we
interviewed approximately sixty-five individuals, including thirty-nine smallholders and eleven
government officials. Twenty-six smallholders were from displaced families, while ten more
were local persons claiming historical rights. Three individuals were returning refugees. We
conducted two group interviews in the Belas villages, speaking to local smallholders,
repatriated refugees, and displaced families. Government officials were interviewed at
Vanduzi Administrative Post and at the provincial capital in Chimoio. In addition, we spoke
to two commercial private farmers and to representatives from NGOs
208 operating in the
district.
209
202. Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). Apart from research on land access in the postwar period, LTC also
sponsored a more detailed study of land and political power relations in several locations within Manica
Province. This examination, focusing largely on RENAMO-administered areas, is an in-depth analysis of both
historical and current land and political relations (see Alexander 1994).
203. The post is 25 kilometers west of Chimoio.
204. The villages are 7 kilometers east of Vanduzi District Center.
205. The villages are 7 kilometers southwest of Vanduzi.
206. The village is 15 kilometers northwest of Vanduzi.
207. Pungoe Sol is 48 kilometers northwest of Vanduzi.
208. Representatives from CARE and Italian Cooperation were consulted.
209. In 1992 we spoke to many of the same government officials, including the Provincial Director of
Agriculture; District Director of Agriculture; Chief, Provincial Office of DINAGECA; Chief, Agricultural
Extension (Vanduzi District); agricultural extension agents; FRELIMO party representatives at the Belas villages;
Chief, Vanduzi Administrative Post; and a representative from the Provincial Department of Agrarian
Economics. In 1992 we also interviewed representatives from Italian Cooperation. We interviewed approximately
forty-five smallholders individually and conducted two group interviews. During both projects, in 1992 and
1993, we interviewed several customary authorities and former regulos. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).100
Like Sofala Province, this area in Manica Province has historically been an area of
considerable financial investment. It is a region of great agricultural and industrial potential:
The lands are fertile and located near transportation, markets, and rivers; there is an
abundance of labor. Although the government invested heavily in the security of the corridor
and Zimbabwean troops were stationed along the route during the war, both infrastructure and
population centers suffered from repeated RENAMO attacks. The area will require substantial
reinvestment to recover the productive capability of the zone. Also, like Sofala, the territory
outside the corridor, north and south, was largely controlled by RENAMO during the war.
Little investment historically took place in these latter areas and there is no important
infrastructure, though what did exist prior to the war was destroyed in large part by
RENAMO itself.
210 These areas, also of great economic potential, will require much more
investment and time if they are to achieve any of their productive potential. The fact that such
economic disparities exist between the two zones—those controlled by government and those
run by RENAMO—may prove destabilizing in the near future.'"
2. LAND TENURE IN MANICA DISTRICT BEFORE THE PEACE ACCORD
After independence most of the colonial farms in Manica Province were abandoned; most
white farmers and a few assimilados fled the country. We were told by provincial authorities
that only "a few of the white privados stayed, while several of the assimilados remained in
Manica.""' The government intervened, nationalizing several private holdings and
eventually creating eleven state farms, 13 percent of the total number reported nationwide
(see map 3), covering approximately 73,000 hectares
213
(this figure also represents about
13 percent of the total land held by the state farm sector nationwide). One of the farms,
Vanduzi (4,000 hectares), was located in Manica District. It closed in 1990 due to financial
and administrative difficulties.'" Land tenure relations in this locality are influenced by the
area's proximity to the corridor—and consequently population concentration, infrastructure,
210. See Alexander (1994).
211. Ibid.
212. Interviews with district government officials and rural extension agents, Vanduzi Administrative Post,
August 1993.
We do not have accurate data for Manica District; Alexander (1994), however, has been able to compile
rather detailed data for Sussundenga District, Manica Province. While probably not complete, the data are
revealing. Alexander notes that only two colonial privados remained, while at least sixteen assimilados have
reemerged in the last two years to reclaim or reregister their holdings.
213. Our records from Manica Province on state farm land differ from other sources. For example, we
believe that IFLOMA in Sussundenga District comprised approximately 36,000 hectares; however, Alexander's
(1994) data put the actual size at more than 50,000 hectares. Since the provincial government has already
registered this much land from the state farm in Sussundenga, we think her figures must be more accurate.
Therefore, the total area held by the state agricultural sector in Manica is likely higher than that reported by the
central government in Maputo.
In addition, we have no data on Manica Timber State Enterprise and Manica Livestock Enterprise, both in
Gondola District. It is probable that Manica Livestock alone covered several thousand hectares, for cattle grazing
requires a substantial area. However, we cannot substantiate this because the information is unavailable in
Maputo at UREA (Unidade de Reestrutação de Empresas Agrárias), the organization responsible for monitoring
and organizing the state farm sector (interviews with Hermes Sueia, UREA, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo,
February 1992 and August 1993).
214. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).101
and capital investment. It is representative of other commercially strategic areas in the
passageway.
Field research conducted in 1992 before the peace accord and in 1993 after the treaty was
signed revealed many different types of land-tenure practices and land uses. In 1992, we were
also told about a number of land conflicts that had erupted. The area was highly populated
with local smallholders and displaced families, particularly the communal villages.
As in Sofala, the government created many communal villages and cooperative farms in
Manica Province. Many smallholders, perhaps as much as 12.5 percent of the rural
population in the province, were moved into these villages in the late 1970s. They farmed
land that was allocated to them by the communal village and lost rights to family land. Other
smallholders were given land in cooperative farms, usually attached to or part of a state farm
enterprise. Still other smallholders were employed on the state farms.
In Vanduzi, and in other parts of Manica, the communal villages were transformed as a
result of the war. With this transformation, people's views of the villages have changed. As
noted earlier, people were often forced to move into the villages and abandon their family
land. Other individuals were "encouraged" to move with the promise of better social services,
education, and other benefits. Initially the government was able to provide some of these
services in some places, but could not mitigate the fact that people had lost rights to family
land.
In the early to mid-1980s, RENAMO increased its attacks on government-created villages.
Many communal villages became unsafe places to live. As a result, smallholders abandoned
the towns for the bush. In 1982, Zimbabwean troops began to help government forces secure
the corridor from assaults, and by 1987 there were 10,000 Zimbabweans in the area (Sidaway
1992). Because of these changes, many smallholders and displaced families moved back to
the communal villages. Smallholders replied that they did so because these villages—or
"centers" as they were often called—had some infrastructure and services
215 and had
become considerably safer than the unprotected rural zones. However, land became
increasingly scarce as more people moved into the centers, thereby decreasing output and
food supply per family and leading to conflict.
216
In the period from 1990 to 1992, many NGOs began operating in the district; they
brought food, seeds, and services, including medical assistance. This presence had a pull
effect on the local population, influencing some to stay in the communal villages. In 1992,
many farmers claimed that when the war was over, they wanted to leave the villages; in fact,
many expressed a great deal of animosity toward the government regarding the communal
villages (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993). At the same time, however, smallholders and
displaced individuals made positive remarks about the services that were available at the
centers. In other areas, we frequently heard of families' dividing themselves between two
locations, one part remaining in or near the center while the second part moved to other
215. Interviews with smallholders, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992; and agricultural extension
agents, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992.
216. Ibid.102
(perhaps family) land (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993). This will be discussed in greater detail
in the following section. Here we wish to emphasize the pull effect that social services and
infrastructure had on people who otherwise strongly disliked the communal villages. Although
not stated directly, our interview responses suggested a strong negative reaction more to the
way people, often without consultation or option, were forced into the villages and how local
customary authorities were treated in the process than to the actual creation of the villages
and the attempts to provide services for rural populations.
217 In any case, the pull effect of
social services, safety, and other opportunities will continue to influence where—and
when—smallholders go.
Other land tenure practices included squatting and customary arrangements. In the first
case, some smallholders settled on former state farm land while others went to former
colonial holdings.
218 Neither of these groups had tenure security because no guarantees were
given that government would not distribute these same lands to outside interests. Smallholders
conceded that they would have to abandon the land when the state farm resumed operations
or when the old privado returned. In the second case, we recorded many farmers who were
farming on their own family land or land acquired from another local family, though
admittedly these farms either were far from Vanduzi Administrative Post and lacked access
to services and infrastructure (let alone security) or were on marginal land around the colonial
farms or state farm production units. This latter group depended on poorer quality land yet
had even weaker security. It remains to be seen how or whether the prospect of acquiring
rights in less congested areas will draw people away from the centers.
219 In addition, we
noted that some smallholders were settled on land that had been granted by concession to
nonlocal commercial farmers; they worked for the new landholders as landless laborers or
tenant farmers. In one case investigated in 1992, a new private landowner had acquired a
concession greater than 1,000 hectares. He had given smallholders temporary access to 350
hectares of his concession.'
When the first round of research was conducted in 1992, the Vanduzi State Farm had
recently closed. The directors of the farm as well as district and provincial officials were
involved in the divestiture of the farmlands and assets. At that time, the state had already
redistributed over 4,275 hectares of Vanduzi State Farm land.
221
The provincial and district
217. Interviews with smallholders in Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992 and August 1993; and
agricultural extension agents, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992 and 1993.
218. Not all of these instances are true cases of squatting, because some smallholders claim historical rights.
According to these smallholders, it was the colonial farmers, the state, or the new private interests who were
squatting, and they were simply reclaiming their land.
219. This, of course, assumes that unclaimed land is available. Most likely, when and if people move from
the centers, they will either return to family land or negotiate with another land-abundant community or family
for use rights. According to field interviews, Alexander (1994) notes that there was more "free" land available
in Sussundenga District, away from the corridor.
220. Interview with private commercial farmer, Vanduzi, August 1992.
221. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). The central government reported that Vanduzi State Farm
occupied only 4,000 hectares of land. While it is likely that the central government underestimated the actual
area controlled by Vanduzi, this and other discrepancies suggest a more ominous problem. Government may be
granting concessions for land that was not previously claimed by a state farm. In doing so, it cheats
smallholders, who maintained or reacquired the area between the state farm production units and the colonial103
governments were also processing applications for land concessions outside the state farm
sector, that is, for land formerly belonging to the private colonial farms. Provincial
government officials contended that they were not granting concessions for land that was
outside the state farm sector or part of former colonial holdings—that is, they were not giving
rights to the land that smallholders had managed to retain during the colonial and
postindependence periods.' However, our research in both 1992 and 1993 calls this asser-
tion into question.
223
As in Sofala Province, provincial government officials in Manica in 1992 said that they
believed larger (private sector) commercial farmers were better able to exploit the province's
higher quality and better positioned lands. Consequently, they argued that state farm land
should be distributed to these commercial interests. However, unlike officials in Sofala
Province, administrators in Manica frequently stated that they were concerned about
smallholder access to land and the welfare of smallholders in a postwar Mozambique; hence,
they discussed the creation of "reserves" for smallholder farmers. At the end of the day, the
positions of the two provinces are not all that different. While officials in Sofala Province did
not appear concerned about smallholders and their prospects for acquiring rights to land, they
argued that all of the best land should be reserved for commercial enterprises. Government
officials in Manica, while reportedly concerned about the welfare of smallholders, also said
that the best land should be reserved for commercial interests.
224 One issue that begs further
investigation is the way that government officials decide who has capacity to farm—that is,
who is a commercial (private sector) farmer—and how they subsequently distribute land.
Administrators at the provincial and district levels of government spoke of the need to
reserve some land for smallholders. In 1992, these officials were discussing options for
creating "protected zones" or reserves for smallholders. Four years earlier, the Manica
Province had created the PDRM (Manica Province Rural Development Program), the initial
purposes of which were to move displaced people away from the congested corridor and
urban areas and to stimulate agricultural production. More than twenty villages were created
as part of the program, most coterminous with former colonial holdings.
225
This program was
holdings. Although the area in question is rather unimportant in this particular case, its occurrence demonstrates
how smallholders increasingly lose rights to land. In addition, all of our sources suggested that the area granted
in concessions far exceeded the official record of 4,275 hectares. See also Alexander (1994).
222. Interviews with provincial and district agricultural officers, August 1992; and provincial and district
representatives of DINAGECA, August 1992.
223. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and see below. In fact, from debate presented at the recent
Second National Land Conference it appears that provincial government officials felt it their duty to grant this
land to commercial interests because smallholders were incapable of exploiting the more productive land (Weiss
and Myers 1994; Myers and Weiss 1994).
224. This position appears to contradict our observations. While larger firms may have certain economic
advantages, we noted that several recipients of these concessions throughout the country were not investing. In
fact, many were simply speculating on the land. In contrast, smallholders in many locations were investing and
enjoying successful harvests. In Vanduzi, they boasted of substantial harvests in 1993 and looked forward to
similar yields in 1994. Many objected to problems with transport and markets, saying that some crops were
wasting in storage or being sold for low prices.
225. Since many of these holdings are reactivated or acquired by new commercial interests, it is a concern
that the villages created by the PDRM will become labor reserves for the commercial farms.104
funded by Italian Cooperation and implemented by various NGOs in the area.
226
Two of these
villages, Belas I and Belas II, were near Vanduzi State Farm and are discussed in more detail
in the next section; the limitations of the policy of devising such reserve villages have been
discussed elsewhere.'
In 1992, provincial government officials thought that after the war people would return
to their homelands immediately; they believed that then there would be less population
concentration in the district. In 1992, officials at Vanduzi Administrative Post told us that the
total population of the post had increased from 18,297 in 1990-1991 to 31,669 in 1992. Of
this latter figure, 4,207 were registered as displaced persons.
228 When we returned in 1993,
Vanduzi officials said that the population of the post was 38,409 and that 80 percent of the
total was displaced families. Despite the anomalies, the data from 1991 and 1993 reveal an
increase in population of 13,372, 58 percent higher than the 1990-1991 figure. The difference
is most likely due to an influx of displaced families. In the year after the war, the population
of the post increased by another 6,740 individuals, a 21 percent increase over the 1992 post-
peace-accord figure. Thus, rather than decreasing, population has multiplied as refugees have
returned and displaced families have apparently remained in the area.
In 1992 we were unable to enter RENAMO-held territories in Manica Province. As in
Sofala Province, we thought that areas north and south of the corridor were relatively
underpopulated in comparison to the closer localities. This was later confirmed by Alexander
(1994). We did not anticipate that land shortages and conflicts would occur in these areas at
that time. This was later supported by our research in 1993, though certain land tenure
weaknesses could lead to conflict in the near future if RENAMO continues to pursue an
independent policy of land administration, including granting of land concessions.'
3. LAND TENURE IN MANICA DISTRICT AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD
Manica Province was revisited in July 1993. Research focused on the area around
Vanduzi State Farm as well as on nearby communal villages and communities.
Since most of the state farm land (and some contiguous properties) had been appropriated
in 1992, no new concessions were reported for Vanduzi.
230 Nonlocal private commercial
interests who had acquired concessions continued their exploitation. According to local rural
extension agents, these private interests had expanded operations in some cases, thus forcing
some smallholders, who had initially retained access to land, off their farms.
231 The fate of
these smallholders is not known.
226. Interview with Enzo Tromboni, representative of Italian Cooperation, Manica, August 1992. See also
Alexander (1994).
227. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
228. Ibid.
229. See Alexander (1994).
230. This does not suggest, of course, that concessions were not granted for other (nonstate farm) land in
the province during the intervening year.
231. Interviews, agricultural extension agents, Manica District, August 1993.105
District and provincial officers acknowledged that many more land concessions had been
granted in 1993. Our records indicate that over 125,000 hectares at the provincial level had
been granted for agricultural exploitation, in selected districts, in the last two years.232 We
suspect that concessions are also granted for hunting reserves and mineral exploration. The
figure of 125,000 hectares may represent 50 percent of the actual extent of provincial-level
allocations in the last two years.
233 Most of this land is in southern Manica and Gondola
districts and in northern Sussundenga District, near the corridor. At the same time, we heard
unconfirmed reports of land concessions being made (unofficially and often illegally) to
Zimbabweans and South Africans.234 Alexander (1994) reports two cases in which local
Mozambicans were fronting for Zimbabwean firms.
The population of the villages around the state farm had reportedly increased (rather than
decreased) as smallholders returned from refugee camps or self-displaced came from either
RENAMO-administered areas or other less favorable government-controlled sectors. We
found local residents, displaced families, and repatriated refugees living together in several
of the Vanduzi villages, including Almada Aldeia, Belas I and Belas II, September 25 Aldeia,
and June 25 Aldeia. There was no significant reduction in the populations of any of the
villages from 1992, and there were increases in a few. Since we did not perform standard
household surveys, we do not know details about the composition of the communities;
questions remain. We do not know, for example, whether the population did not decrease
because returning refugees are arriving faster than displaced families are leaving or because
repatriating refugees have temporarily settled elsewhere while displaced persons have not
moved back to their family lands. In the Belas villages, it was reported that no displaced
farmers have returned to family lands. Locality administrators said that the combination of
local residents, displaced families, and repatriating individuals was putting a strain on
resources in many locations.
5
Some smallholders explained that they traveled several kilometers north each day to farm
(often on land that was borrowed) and then returned to the locality center in the evening.
They did this because they felt that the rural areas more distant from Vanduzi were still not
safe and because many more social services were available in Vanduzi and other locality
centers. Women commented on the attraction of social services more frequently than men.
236
While we do not have statistical data, we deduce that some farmers continue to exploit either
family land or land that they held during the colonial period while others are simply
borrowing land for a short period of time.
232. See also Alexander (1994).
233. Alexander (1994) reported that about 50,000 of the 125,000 hectares granted in agricultural concessions
were registered to the provincial Government of Manica. This land is part of the IFLOMA State Enterprise
(forestry). The state is registering these concessions in order to legalize its intervention and facilitate their
alienation.
234. Given the nature of this topic, our sources asked to remain confidential. They asked that we not even
use their titles or positions.
235. Interview, Chief, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1993; and Secretary, September 25 Aldeia,
August 1993.
236. Interviews with smallholders, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1993.106
Smallholders are still farming in the margins around the new private farms and colonial-
era farms; some continue to squat on those farms. The majority of these farmers—indeed, the
majority of all farmers with whom we spoke—admitted that they had no confidence in their
ability to maintain their land rights. Some individuals seemed resigned to this while others
were angry. In two different locations in Vanduzi, farmers grumbled that nothing had
changed much since the colonial period and that they had gained little as a result of the
wars.
237 This view was echoed by officials at the locality, district, and provincial levels of
government (in several provinces).
As displaced farmers returned, some found new residents in their communities and new
farmers on their holdings. Some of the new residents are larger commercial farmers and
others are smallholders. Smallholders reported that if their family land was occupied by
another family, a meeting would be held to determine the status of the land. Land rights
would be confirmed or negotiated, and compensation was sometimes paid if the squatting
farmer had to abandon crops. Smallholders said that if the land was occupied by a
commercial interest, they had little recourse.
238 When farmers displaced by new commercial
interests complained to locality government officials, in some instances these authorities were
able to arrange temporary use rights in other locations.
As in Sofala, rural extension agents told about farmers who were self-displaced from
RENAMO-administered areas. Farmers said that when the peace accord was signed, they
were able to move south or north to the corridor, which they chose to do because of the
relative safety and because of the availability of humanitarian assistance and services.
In 1993, farmers who had no land, who had insecure rights (e.g., they were squatting on
state farm land or land belonging to colonial-era privados), or who were farming near new
private holdings expressed concern regarding their future ability to feed their families.
Despite the government's PDRM effort, smallholders in Manica were not as optimistic about
the future as those interviewed in Sofala.
Two examples of the complex nature of land access for smallholders and commercial
private farmers in Manica Province are discussed below. They are drawn from our research
in Belas I, Belas II, and Almada communal village.
Belas I and II (see map 16) are different from the other communities studied because they
are part of PDRM. With the approval of the provincial government, the Italian Cooperation
built the two villages in 1991 on land that once was part of one production unit of the
Vanduzi State Farm. Each village controlled a few hundred hectares for smallholder
production. In 1992, Italian Cooperation requested permission to build a third village at the
237. Ironically, white members of the research team were approached on several occasions by smallholders
and asked if they were returning to reclaim holdings. (This happened in several locations throughout the
country.) One old farmer in Nampula Province badgered the research team, asking when the "patron would
return." He echoed several others in different sites when he said that at least when the "whites" were here, he
had a job and food to feed his children. While this farmer obviously is not making a statement favoring one
ethnic group or a return to colonial government, he is clearly expressing dissatisfaction and frustration with the
results of independence and civil war.
238. Interviews with smallholders, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1993.107
same site. The organization built meetings halls, administrative buildings, and storehouses as
well as facilitating the acquisition of farm equipment and hand tools. The villages serve as
centers for aid programs (food and clothing distributions and medical assistance). Belas I and
II are also designed to support smallholder interests, particularly in acquiring and maintaining
rights to land in the vicinity. In 1992, each participant was granted 1 hectare in the
scheme.
239
In 1992, before the peace accord, villagers included local residents, displaced farmers,
reintegrating refugees, and former state farm workers. Each village was supported through
rural extension agents, who were appointed by the Italian Cooperation. The agent was
responsible for land allocation, though each village had an elected secretary and political
leaders.240 who assisted with determining allotments (the political leader was also charged
with resolving disputes). Local customary authorities became involved in the scheme at the
same time; they, too, influenced political decisions, adjudication, and resource distribution
and management (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
In 1992, the provincial government considered demarcating the villages and the land
belonging to Vanduzi and other state farms as "reserves."' This would protect them from
acquisition since any land demarcated as a reserve would not be surveyed and registered by
DINAGECA. In 1993, the villages had not yet been granted reserve status, and most of the
remaining state-farm land had been granted in concessions or acquired by commercial
interests. (Locality and district officials had earlier assumed that refugees and displaced
families would leave the villages and that the reserve areas would no longer be needed.)
242
When we returned to Belas I and Belas II in July 1993, we discovered that the populations
had not declined. In fact, they had apparently increased. Whereas in 1992 the population for
Belas I was 224 families, in 1993 it was 372 families, an increase of 60 percent. In 1993 we
noticed that mostly local residents (those claiming historical rights in the area) and
reintegrating farmers resided in Belas I, while displaced families lived in Belas II.
243
This
difference is interesting because the land directly contiguous to Belas II has been granted to
a private farmer, Sr. Chongo (area marked "C" on map 16) despite an unofficial policy of
239. Enzo Tromboni, Italian Cooperation, personal communication, August 1992. See also Myers, West,
and Eliseu (1993).
240. In 1992 we noted that, despite these popularly elected representatives, most of the individuals
interviewed in Belas I and II felt that the villages were run by the Italians (Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
241. Interviews with the Provincial Director of Agriculture, August 1992; Chief, Manica Provincial Office
of DINAGECA, August 1992. See also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
Demarcation as a reserve does not have legal standing in Mozambique or Manica Province, the application
of this measure being solely dependent on verbal agreements between the villages and DINAGECA to deny
private (nonlocal) farmer requests for occupation and title.
242. Interviews with representative of Vanduzi District Directorate of Agriculture, August 1992; President,
Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992; and Vanduzi State Farm Director, August 1992.
243. We do not know if there had been a shift in the population from Belas I to Belas II in the intervening
year. It appears as though some form of selection occurred in the original distribution of plots, and that some
self-selection developed as reintegrating smallholders returned. Hence, more of the formerly displaced were
reintegrating to Belas I. The social relationships within and between these two communities require further
investigation.108
refusing private commercial applications for land rights in this area.
244 Perhaps locality and
district government officials are hoping to squeeze displaced people out of this prime area.
At the same time, the inhabitants of Belas I are also suffering from land shortages; their
expansion is constrained by the Serra Nyawombe highlands to the east and by Belas II to the
west. Other land concessions in the area were reported in August 1993 by both smallholders
and local rural extension agents.
It is interesting that while displaced families have remained in these villages, reintegrating
families have also opted to settle here (rather than moving to family lands). The fact that
displaced farmers and reintegrating families are joining the Belas I and II villages supports
the argument that smallholders will not necessarily return to their homelands, even if they feel
it is safe and they have the means to do so. Like larger commercial interests, smallholders
want to exploit productive and strategically located lands.
Additionally, the population of displaced people in the Vanduzi locality has not
dramatically diminished. This may lead to tensions among smallholders over access to land
and other resources. Although we did not enumerate in 1992 or 1993, we did make visual
appraisals of these communities, including an approximate number of homesteads. We think
there were at least as many displaced families living near the post (areas marked "A") in 1993
as there were in 1992. When asked, farmers replied that they both wanted to take advantage
of the services in Vanduzi and felt that rural areas were still unsafe. They also claimed that
there was insufficient land near their homesteads. Local residents with historical rights wished
displaced farmers would return to their family lands or just move away.
245
The village of Almada was established in the late 1970s as part of the government's
villagization program (see map 17). In 1993 the population was approximately 430
families.246Local officials remarked that this is a substantial increase over the previous
year. The expansion was due to an influx of repatriated refugees. In 1993, repatriated
refugees, displaced families, and local residents were living in the village and farming
adjacent land.
247 The area between the Nhamahari River and the village was intensely farmed
by local residents and displaced farmers before the peace accord was launched. With the
rising population of returning refugees, there is even greater concentration.
244. Interviews with representative of District Directorate of Agriculture, August 1992; and agricultural
extension agent, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1992. See also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
245. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Vanduzi Administrative Post, August 1993. The lines between
the categories—local inhabitant (claiming historical rights) versus reintegrating refugee versus displaced
farmer—are often blurred. Not only do administrators misapply these definitions, but also smallholders
themselves may misuse them. This is indeed an area that requires further exploration. However, smallholders
are possibly manipulating these terms to secure certain benefits and services while inhibiting others' access to
the same opportunities. Deeper exploration of social relations with regard to access to and control over natural
resources may demonstrate important dynamics at the local level—which smallholders, for example, are most
likely to use the opportunities and constraints of war and peace to manipulate their political and economic
fortunes. One's status as a refugee rather than a displaced farmer may affect one's opportunities.
246. Secretary, Almada communal village, August 1993.
247. Ibid.109
Smallholders spoke of numerous land conflicts between local residents claiming historical
rights (and some displaced families) and returning refugees. The problem stems from
overlapping land rights in the area. The major conflicts seem to be between returning
refugees, many of whom have historical rights in the area, and residents of the village, that
is, between local smallholders and those who received land in the villagization program. Both
groups claim rights to the same land. While some returning refugees are using the village as
a stopping place on their way to other locations (e.g., one farmer said he would remain in
the area for one season before moving north of the corridor), others are returning home to
Almada to claim land that had belonged to them before the villagization program and the war.
Still other returning refugees are insisting that this land was given to them by the govern-
ment.
248 These disputes are heard both by local government officials and by customary
authorities.
'
Fewer land conflicts involve displaced people, for this category appears to have the
weakest rights of all smallholders in Almada. When a family returns and its land is occupied,
it usually abandons the plot and moves to an unused parcel. Local officials also asserted that
nonlocal private interests were trying to acquire land between the main road (E. N. 6) and the
river (see areas marked "A" and "B" on map 17). If the concession is approved, land
shortages will certainly increase for all farmers living in Almada. The first effect most likely
will be forcing displaced farmers away from the area.
4. CONCERNS RAISED BY CASES IN SOFALA AND MANICA
There continues to be a lack of understanding in both Sofala and Manica provinces about
smallholder intentions and actions for postwar reintegration. Provincial and district officials
are unaware of—and largely unconcerned about—the movement of smallholders. In general,
they still believe that smallholders will leave the centers and return to their areas of origin.
The fact that this has not happened on a large scale does not seem to have changed their
impressions or policies.
250 At the same time, government officials in both provinces appear
to deny that any of these smallholders have legitimate and historical claims to land in the
corridor. Locality administrators, who are better informed, often are not consulted and find
themselves in delicate positions with their respective communities when provincial and district
authorities distribute land. Given that displaced smallholders are not moving from these
centers and that many villages are experiencing population increases as refugees return and
others self-displace to the corridor, local communities will face greater challenges with land
distribution and resource allocation than anticipated. These difficulties will continue for
several years to come.
248. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Almada communal village, August 1993.
249. Smallholders may approach government officials if they think such action will advance their position
in land disputes. Families who were given land as part of the villagization scheme, particularly, may seek
government officials in a dispute rather than local customary authorities. This is another indication of the
tensions that exist within local communities as a result of both war and government land policy.
250. This was apparent in the debate at the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique. For a few
references to this discussion, see Weiss and Myers (1994); and Myers and Weiss (1994).110
Provincial governments are condoning land concessions for some of the best land in the
country. These allocations are creating land shortages in some areas and intensifying
shortages that already exist in other areas; thus they are leading to conflicts. In fact, the
highest number of disputes in any part of the country, outside of Maputo, appears to be in
the Beira corridor (see map 6). Authorities continue to justify their grants by claiming that
larger commercial interests are better equipped and are more efficient. On the positive side,
however, many concessions in Manica Province have been given to local commercial
Mozambican (former assimilado) fanners,251 some of whom may indeed be better
positioned to exploit resources than their foreign counterparts who have been acquiring or
attempting to acquire land. On the negative side, the process reinforces smallholders' status
by inhibiting the opportunity to accumulate capital and expand production. Officials in Manica
Province appear to be receptive to the needs of smallholders, particularly through their
implementation of the PDRM and identification of reserve areas. Nonetheless, the process of
demarcating reserves and formalizing the arrangement—let alone enforcing tenure
security—has not moved forward. We expressed concern in 1992 with the plan to create
reserves; we still maintain those reservations. But we would like to see the province legally
recognize smallholder land rights and protect them. At least the province should not grant
land concessions where smallholders are farming and should incorporate smallholders into
negotiations between commercial interests and the state.
There is growing tension among different categories of smallholders—displaced, refugees,
and families claiming historical rights—as they compete for resources. The tension is
heightened by the distribution of assistance and what appears as favoritism toward refugees,
who already seem to be better fed and better equipped. This tension will increase as
population density increases in some areas and may be a destabilizing influence.
In addition, military factors still cause concern. Smallholders and commercial farmers
continue to worry about unexploded land mines. We posit that the presence of land mines
affects people's decisions to move to less congested rural areas. At the same time, local
smallholders are worried about demobilization. They repeatedly mentioned that many people
in the bush still had weapons, and that they did not feel safe away from the corridor until
these weapons were confiscated. Both mines and demobilization constrain reintegration in
both provinces.
The conviction that smallholders are inefficient, subsistence producers is cause for great
concern. It not only exhibits a serious misunderstanding of smallholder production, but also
commits the government to a direction that will hinder its own development and political
objectives in the postwar period.
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D. ANGONIA DISTRICT, T1 PROVINCE
1. RESEARCH STIES AND OBJECTIVES
The final research site discussed in this study is Angonia District, Tete Province.
Approximately 200 individuals were interviewed in three rounds of research. More than 150
smallholders participated, including former refugees and displaced farmers, in three different
areas of the district. Provincial, district, and locality officials as well as rural agricultural
extension agents were also questioned. In addition, we spoke to small and medium-sized
commercial farmers and representatives from NGOs that operated in the area. Research sites
included: (1) villages around the perimeter of Ulongue city and farms along the road between
Ulongue and Dedza; (2) territory around the administrative post of Domue, particularly the
farms adjoining Block I of CAIA (Complexo Agro-Industrial de Angonia), a former state
farm; and (3) territory around M'Languene, specifically, lands near Block III of CAIA (see
maps 18-20).
252
The first round of research was conducted in March 1993, five months
after the beginning of the peace accord; a second round was undertaken in January 1994; and
a third round was completed in February 1994.
253
In this study we seek to understand land tenure, production, and power relations in a
district in northern Mozambique. We are particularly interested in the area because of its
proximity to the Malawian border, its high concentration of returning refugees, and its
relative poverty with regard to remaining infrastructure and services.
In all three locations we sought to understand if people were returning to their family
lands—that is, how were returning refugees and displaced farmers getting access to land. We
wanted to determine who was distributing land. We also tried to learn more about the land
concessions being granted to smallholders and larger commercial interests by government
officials and how recipients were investing in or exploiting the concessions. As in our other
research sites, we attempted to learn as much as possible about the frequency and nature of
land conflicts as well as the nature of and mechanisms for their resolution.
At the same time, we wanted to know if all categories of farmers at all locations felt they
had secure rights and were investing in their land. We also focused on the commercial
(private sector) farmers operating in the area to determine how they were interacting with
smallholder farmers and local, small private interests. In Tete, more than anywhere else
visited, larger commercial farmers complained about tenure insecurity, several alleging that
temporary rights had been revoked. This case illustrates a different set of problems affecting
investment and agriculture and a unique set of issues affecting local political relations.
252. CAIA was divided into four separate, noncontiguous production blocks, located in Angonia and
Tsangano districts.
253. Angonia was not included in the 1992 study of state farm divestiture. We were unable to make the
same types of comparison that we had made in other research sites. Nonetheless, we could draw on a
comparatively rich literature, noted in the following discussion, that focuses on Angonia and other parts of Tete
Province.115
The research locale differs substantially in several ways from the other cases reported in
this study. First, Angonia District is located in the far northwest of the country, bordering
Malawi. Consequently, during the war a larger percentage of the population sought refuge
in camps across the border than in government-secured areas. Proximity to the border created
social and economic opportunities that did not exist in most regions of the country. Second,
in comparison to other areas in the study, this district had been less commercialized by
Portuguese and Mozambicans during the colonial period—that is, there was a higher
percentage of smallholder farmers in relation to larger commercial interests than in the other
sites visited. At the same time, the district was relatively wealthy, and peasant smallholders
reportedly benefited from this wealth.' Third, large areas of Angonia were controlled by
RENAMO beginning early in the war; RENAMO continues to administer many of these
neighborhoods in the postwar period. These characteristics are discussed below as they relate
to our analysis.
We were interested in the area around Ulongue because of the high population
concentration and resulting competition for land. During the last few years of the war, the
city became a safe zone protected by government troops. Many families from Angonia and
surrounding districts moved to this zone, resulting in increased population concentration and
land conflicts between displaced and native families. We also interviewed families in the
territory along the road between Ulongue city and the border post at Dedza (in Malawi),
particularly focusing on Tchabualo and Calomue villages. These lands, bordering an
important transportation route, have substantial commercial value. During the colonial period
private farms were located on either side of the road; there is evidence that nonlocal
commercial interests are returning to the district to resume control of these farms. In the first
round of interviews, conducted in March 1993, some smallholders replied that they would
not occupy these lands because they expected the former private (Portuguese) farmers to
return when the war was truly over. The land near the border, adjacent to the Malawian city
of Dedza, was of interest also because of its relative security during the war. Although
RENAMO troops attacked some persons and kidnapped others in this region, people often
farmed the lands closest to the border during the day while returning to Malawi at night. In
some cases, these courageous farmers were not from the area but were exploiting abandoned
land; in other cases, refugees who previously had land close to the border and were staying
in Malawi continued to farm their own land. Many of the individuals in this latter group were
the first to resume agricultural and other social and economic activities after the peace accord.
We wanted to find out if returning refugees experienced any conflicts.
The second location investigated was Monequera village, Domue. We focused on the area
around one of the four production units of the former state farm, CAIA. The land assets of
this company were temporarily distributed during the war to nonlocal commercial farmers.
Substantial conflicts have developed between local smallholders, state farm workers, and
nonlocal private interests over rights to land.
The third location investigated was the locality of M'Languene in the villages of Bachone
and Chipala. Like Dedza, M'Languene is located on the Mozambican-Malawian border. It
254. See Coehlo (1993).116
was also the site of one CAIA production unit. However, there appear to be significant
differences between Domue and M'Languene that affect land access. These differences, which
are historical and relate to internal social and political struggles, will be discussed below.
Numerous land conflicts involving the private sector and smallholders have been recounted.
2. HISTORICAL, LAND TENURE, AND SOCIAL PATTERNS IN ANGONIA DISTRICT
Like others in Mozambique, the international border with Malawi cuts artificially across
natural geographical terrain and social and ethnic groupings. Also like other borders in the
country, it has been and continues to be very porous—with much population movement and
commercial transactions crossing in both directions. There are important cultural, political,
and economic relations among people on both sides of the border. These relations influence
land access and land use, among other social phenomena. The people on both sides of the
border are Chewa, a group having matrilineal inheritance patterns and matrilocal property
relations; that is, a new husband typically gains access to land from his wife's family and
remains in her father's compound for a number of years before moving elsewhere.
A number of private farms were established during the colonial period, but they were not
all located on the best land in the district. In 1968 the colonial regime began its campaign of
forced resettlement of the rural population into aldeamentos. In Tete Province, which became
a major combat zone after 1968, more than 250,000 people (or nearly 60 percent of the
population) were displaced by resettlement (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983).
After independence, the new government continued to move people into communal
villages, but its program was far less extensive and less successful, affecting only 10-17
percent of the province's population (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Araujo 1988). As
elsewhere, the government programs had mixed results. Women, for example, reportedly
benefited from the large government-created villages because of improved access to
education, grinding mills, and other commercial opportunities; at the same time, however,
they apparently lost control over land rights because the villages promoted patrilocal
marriage.
255
Similar to other places, traditional authorities were criticized and undermined
by the new government, but these deprecations proved ineffective and were soon abandoned.
In many areas FRELIMO secretaries were also holders of customary titles (Wilson 1991b;
Bonga and Wilson 1993). At this time several private farms were also taken over by
government to become part of CAIA, which then covered approximately 22,000 hectares and
split into four production blocks.
2 Upon its founding, CAIA assumed control over some
former private farms and adjoining smallholder farms. Displaced smallholders were moved
to state-created communal villages. The state farm went bankrupt, however, and was
255. Wilson (1991b); and Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994. In contrast, see Jean
Davison (1988, p. 246), who believed that women in Sofala Province benefited from the cooperative and
communal movements: "The state's role in land redistribution, in most cases, " she wrote, "has benefitted peasant
women by giving them greater access to land equally. At the same time, such redistribution does not affect all
women equally. Some women gain more than others." See also Isaacman and Isaacman (1983).
256. These production units were located in Domue (3,800 hectares), Matiasa (6,552 hectares), Tsangano
(31,994 hectares), and Maniquera (8,466 hectares).117
abandoned as early as 1984.
257 State farm workers then vacated the farm blocks and moved
to Malawi or occupied land in government-controlled areas 258
Angonia District, which before 1986 included the territory of present-day Tsangano
District, is among the most fertile areas of the country and has exceptional agricultural
potential. Therefore, historically Angonia has been one of the most productive and prosperous
regions of Mozambique. Before the war local inhabitants were relatively wealthy, controlling
cattle and other resources. The best lands are along the Domue-Ulongue-M'Languene-
Tsangano axis (three sites in this area were investigated). The remaining land in Angonia is
less productive and is not in high demand (Wilson 1991b); most of it has limited accessibility,
thereby reducing its attractiveness to both smallholder and commercial farmers. Before the
war people in Angonia maintained that there was plenty of land available, even though the
two districts were densely populated. The peasant population, though, was reportedly highly
differentiated and factionalized, features that RENAMO exploited during the war.
259
Villages in the district were heavily attacked during the war by both RENAMO and
FRELIMO soldiers.
260 By 1985 a large number of people had fled in Malawi. Not only was
Malawi relatively close for most of the refugees—less than a two-day walk in many
cases—but many refugees also had extended family living there. The government did not gain
control of the area around Ulongue, Dome, and M'Languene until much later in the war. The
territory being militarily insecure, smallholders confessed that they felt safer on their farms
or in the bush.
261 However, the majority of the population in Angonia District fled the
countryside between 1987 and 1989. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) estimates
that during the war about 220,000 people fled Angonia District, moving across the border to
refugee camps or staying in Malawi with relatives (Drumtra 1993; UNHCR 1993). USCR
257. Interview with administrator of Angonia, March 1993. See also Eliseu (1994).
258. Interviews with smallholders, Ulongue, March 1993; interviews with smallholders, M'languene,
February 1994; interview with administrator of Angonia, March 1993.
259. See Wilson (1991b); Bonga and Wilson (1993); and Ken Wilson, personal communication, February
1994.
Bonga and Wilson (1993) report that much of the killing and looting in northern Tete was committed by
local inhabitants, who were neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO adherents. They say that local people used the
war as a cover-up to resolve deep-seated ethnic, class, and other social struggles. At the same time, they
observed that RENAMO capitalized on these internal divisions, mobilizing poorer peasants to attack wealthier
peasants, commercial elite, and government officials. If these observations are correct, the end of the war may
not bring a calm period of productivity, but rather new struggles as victims attempt to recuperate lost property
or avenge perceived injustice.
260. Wilson and others report that FRELIMO soldiers frequently attacked the local populationin Tete, those
who were thought to be RENAMO collaborators in government-controlled areas being particularly targeted.
Additionally, FRELIMO encouraged people to flee to Malawi since this would limit the number of individuals
that RENAMO could (usually forcibly) use for logistical support (Wilson 1992b; Bonga and Wilson 1993; and
Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994).
261. Interviews, smallholder farmers, Ulongue, March 1993.118
also figures that an additional 92,000 people fled from Tsangano District to Malawi. We do
not have comprehensive data for the number of people internally displaced in the district.
262
3. LAND TENURE IN ANGONIA DISTRICT BEFORE THE PEACE ACCORD
As noted, much of the countryside in the district was abandoned after 1986.
263
Government had little control over much of the province; there was little farming outside of
the secure areas.
264 Some refugees and displaced families interviewed at the Malawian
border and in Ulongue thought they had secure land rights and that they could reclaim their
land when the war ended; others said they were not so sure about their land rights and were
anxious to resettle.
265
In 1988 many smallholder refugees in Malawi started to farm the land
nearest to the district borders while some farmers exploited the land surrounding the
government-protected areas. There were shortages and competition between displaced farmers
and smallholders claiming historical rights in just these two locations.
Also beginning in 1988 commercial producers occupied some of the lands formerly
belonging to colonial private farms and CAIA. These farmers came largely from Ulongue and
Tete city; they were secure during the war because they had their own security forces
(milicianos) (Eliseu 1994). "Temporary" use rights were approved by district officials, though
authorities insist that temporary users was given no legal documents to support their claims
or have their rights registered.' However, the results of an investigation by the Norwegian
Refugee Council in September 1993 suggested that some commercial producers were indeed
262. Both USCR and UNHCR report that only 13,000 people remained in Angonia District during the war
while an additional 5,000 persons stayed in Tsangano District. Presumably, by the end of the war, a great
majority of these refugees were living in the three secure, government-controlled cities. However, we believe
that the number of people reckoned to have remained in the districts is an underestimate. Further, the division
between refugees in Malawi and those staying in the districts suggests there was no movement back and forth
between Mozambique and Malawi and that people who fled to Malawi stayed there until the peace accord. We
know, however, that many people were returning to Ulongue as early as 1986 and that there was considerable
movement between Malawi and Ulongue (Eliseu 1994; Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994;
and Bonga and Wilson 1993).
263. Some individuals chose to remain in the RENAMO-controlled areas and continued to farm throughout
the war. The relationship between these farmers and RENAMO has been documented by Olaf Juergensen,
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario (forthcoming dissertation; see also Ken Wilson, unpublished notes on the
war in Tete Province, personal communication, February 1994). Juergensen's research also seeks to determine
why some inhabitants of the district went to Malawi and others to the government-controlled areas. He suggests
that tenure security may have affected this choice. His work will shed light on an important set of issues.
264. Although we know little about the RENAMO-held areas, it is likely that there was intensive cultivation
in a few of them (see Juergensen 1994?).
265. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Dedza and Ulongue, March 1993.
In 1993 Violet Bonga talked to refugees in Malawi before they repatriated to Mozambique. Many of her
questions focused on the refugees' perceptions about postwar Mozambique, including a very brief inquiry about
land access. She recounted that refugees did not think they would have difficulty acquiring land when they
returned to Mozambique.
266. Interview with administrator of Angonia; and District Agricultural Officer, March 1994.119
given titles.
26 Regardless, we later found that many of these farmers felt that their rights
were permanent and intended to remain on the land granted.
268
Shortly before the peace accord was signed, tens of thousands of people began to move
from the refugee camps in Malawi back to Angonia, particularly to Ulongue.
269 They joined
displaced and local inhabitants in the government-protected area. It is estimated that by
August 1993, 90 percent of the refugees had returned to Tete.
270
Refugees with stronger ties to the land in Angonia were the first to return. Others who
came back early either had weak ties in Malawi or had experienced problems while staying
there. At about the same time that these refugees started back, many people began to move
out of the government-controlled areas. This movement by both displaced and refugee
families may have been motivated as much by concerns over land availability and security
as by the absence of war and consequent physical safety271
4. LAND TENURE IN ANGONIA DISTRICT AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD
By the time the peace accord was signed, a large number of people had already returned
to Angonia, planted crops, and started building houses (albeit some were temporary). As time
passed, more and more smallholders became settled, mostly on their old family lands.
District authorities told the refugees in Malawi that when they returned to Angonia, they
should go directly to their old family lands and begin farming. However, the smallholders
encountered problems. Essentially there were two movements of people: one group moving
out of Ulongue, and another, larger group moving south from Malawi; in some areas these
two movements overlapped. Since many people were not sure that peace would last, they
maximized their options by planting as much land as they could near the secure zones,
regardless of whether it was their land. As smallholders returned from Malawi or moved out
of Ulongue, they often found other smallholders on their land. This generated conflicts. In
most cases customary authorities were called upon to resolve these disputes; they generally
decided in favor of the parties who had stronger claims to the land. The persons with weaker
267. Nina Berg, Norwegian Refugee Council, personal communication, November 1993.
268. Eliseu (1994) reports that several of these commercial farmers also complained that their rights were
weak, though they remained on the land. She noted that in at least two cases, commercial farmers were asked
by government to vacate the land they were given.
With regard to commercial farmers in Angonia, in 1991 Ken Wilson predicted that while commercial
farming would create economic opportunities, infrastructural and market development, and a suitable
"demonstration effect," it would also enhance conflict over land in prime areas, thus "depriving peasant
producers by privileging commercial producers" (Wilson 1991b, p. 5).
269. Many of them had already started to return as early as 1991.
270. Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994; and Drumtra (1993).
271. Ibid.120
rights or no claim were asked to leave. If they had planted crops, they were allowed to
harvest before they left.'
When we first visited the district in March 1993, there were many people farming outside
of the city of Ulongue, and there were a few new settlements along the road between Ulongue
and Dedza. In the area around Ulongue some smallholders mentioned land conflicts, largely
between displaced farmers who did not "belong" in the pen-urban areas and returning
refugees.
273 These conflicts were being sorted out by local lineage heads, other customary
authorities, and some locality government officials. There were a few reported conflicts
between local inhabitants and new farmers when the latter tried to farm on sacred lands
(Eliseu 1994). It is not clear if these new fanners were returning refugees or displaced
farmers looking for temporary use rights. District and locality officials were also involved
in distributing land on a temporary basis to returning refugees and others who did not have
land. One native farmer complained that district authorities were allotting land that was
sacred. Another smallholder said that the officials were distributing land that belonged to
other people who had not yet returned; he worried that there would be conflicts between these
new recipients and the returning refugees2
74
District government officials stated that they knew enough about land occupation (or
availability) in Angonia to distribute land to smallholders and nonlocal commercial interests.
They felt that there was plenty of land available in the district for all interested individuals,
and they encouraged outside interests to come to the district to invest in agriculture. In
addition, district agricultural officers declared there would be plenty of accessible land near
Ulongue because all the displaced farmers would move back to their homelands.
275
In the area along the road to Dedza (see map 19) in March 1993, we noticed many areas
that were unexploited. When asked, locality government officials and agricultural extension
agents replied that those lands would be claimed by returning refugees and displaced families
or by former colonial owners. They were convinced in the latter case that the owners would
return and that no local smallholders would occupy the parcels. They did not consider the




Most of the families living in the area had recently returned. The neighborhood was
sparsely populated and new permanent houses were being constructed. Smallholders claimed
272. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Ulongue, March 1993; and agricultural extension agents,
Ulongue, March 1993.
273. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Ulongue and Dedza, March 1993.
274. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Ulongue and Dedza, March 1993.
275. Interviews with administrator of Angonia Administrative Post, March 1993; agricultural extension
agents, March 1993; and representative of District Directorate of DINAGECA, March 1993.
276. Interviews with representatives of UlongueAdministrative Post, March 1993; and agricultural extension
agents, Ulongue, March 1993.121
that there was plenty of land available for their families and that they had returned to the
same spots they occupied before the war.
In March 1993 we also noticed that the land at Dedza, near the border with Malawi, was
already intensively cultivated. Smallholders recalled a few conflicts occurring as returning
farmers confronted temporary farmers who had exploited their land during the war or
occupied it during the months after the peace accord. By and large, however, smallholders
were resolving disputes and resuming their lives.
When we returned to Angonia in January and February 1994, we revisited the area around
Ulongue and the road between Ulongue and Dedza. We focused specifically on Tchabualo
and Calomue villages
277 (see maps 19 and 20). The land bordering the road and around
these villages was now intensely cultivated and densely populated.
278 Smallholders had
reacquired their lands and in a few locations had occupied former colonial holdings. They
asserted that these lands were historically theirs. Upon closer examination, however, it
appears that these colonial holdings are being occupied by extended family members who do
not wish to return to the interior of the district or province because the land there is
reportedly unsafe and less fertile. Smallholders in Tchabualo answered that despite the
population density, land access was not a problem. Most said that their family had at least
two parcels of land and that the community held land reserves for further expansion.
Smallholders told of numerous land disputes between returning smallholders over boundary
demarcation, but said that these disputes had been easily resolved by local authorities.'
The area around the border, specifically Calomue village, was more densely populated,
and the land intensely cultivated.
280 Smallholders noted that although historically Malawians
had also farmed on these lands, after the 1940s Portuguese authorities attempted to inhibit
their use of land near the village and on the Mozambican side of the border. Many small and
medium-sized colonial farms developed along the border during the colonial period. Most of
these farms were abandoned, but a few were reportedly occupied by native smallholders or
Mozambican commercial farmers after independence. Mozambican smallholders did move
onto lands "abandoned" by Malawian smallholders. This caused friction between the two
communities when Mozambicans moved into the vacuum. Smallholders said that after the
277. Tchabualo village is 25 kilometers north of Ulongue, and Calomue village is 40 kilometers north of
the city.
278. During the first round of research, we visited two villages along the road to Dedza; other communities
were just starting to reestablish themselves. At that time neither Tchabualo nor Calomue was densely populated.
The distance between the new (reestablished) communities was more than 2 kilometers in some cases. When we
returned in 1994, we drove through ten villages much like Tchabualo, all densely populated, and we witnessed
other villages that were just reforming. We made several "spot checks" along the road to ask people where they
came from. In most cases the smallholders responded that they or their families were rebuilding on exactly the
same spot they had abandoned when the war drove them away.
279. Interviews with smallholders in Calomue and Tchabualo, February 1994.
280. District authorities reported that the population of the village in 1993 was 7,652 people—and that this
was typical of villages along the border.122
peace accord, some Malawians were attempting to reclaim rights and that this was causing
conflicts between Mozambicans and Malawians.
281
As a result of Mozambicans' entering the area along with natural population increase
since the war (from births and marriages), smallholders admitted that there were land
shortages along the border, particularly around Calomue village. The local community
discussed the problem and appointed their chief (Nhacuacua) to contact locality government
officials. The village requested that the district authorize the reoccupation of colonial holdings
in the area. The community had not yet received a response to their petition when the study
was conducted. In the interim, the community asked for land from other nearby villages,
including Tchabualo. Some people were granted temporary use rights.'"
The lands around M'Languene were of considerable interest to our investigation not only
because the area is densely populated but also because a high number of land conflicts had
been reported. M'Languene is located approximately 40 kilometers east of Ulongue (see map
20). It is situated near the Malawi border. In 1989 the district registered a population density
of 32 persons per square kilometer, more than twice the average density of the nation.283 We
know that many smallholders have moved or returned to this area since the peace accord was
signed, so we think that the population has grown since 1989. We interviewed smallholders
in Bachone and Chipala villages.
284 Many smallholders admitted that they continued to farm
on Mozambican land nearest to the border during the war; however, it is clear that these
farmers would have exploited any land available, whether it was theirs or not.
Most of the local inhabitants returned to the area after the peace accord was signed.
Locality government officials advise that the population is significantly higher now than it was
in the prewar period. Customary authorities, smallholders, and locality officials point to a
number of land conflicts both among smallholders and between smallholders and nonlocal
commercial producers in the last year.
285
Most conflicts among smallholders involve returning refugees who have not respected old
family boundaries. These conflicts are being resolved largely by local customary officials.
Some conflicts are between displaced families and newly arriving farmers who are not
historically from the area. The outcome of these disputes is undetermined (Eliseu 1994).
Another set of conflicts between smallholders and nonlocal commercial producers resulted in
violent confrontations. These are discussed below.
281. Interviews with smallholders on the frontier, Dedza, February 1994.
282. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Calomue, February 1994.
283. Interview with representative of Directorate of Agriculture, Angonia District, Ulongue, February 1994.
284. Our field map of this area, also illustrating the CAIA holdings, was not prepared at time of publication.
It is available, however, through the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
285. Interview with M'Languene locality government representative, February 1994. This point was
confirmed by the provincial director of agriculture and the provincial governor at the recent Second National
Land Policy Conference in Mozambique. See Weiss and Myers (1994); and Myers and Weiss (1994).123
At independence, some of the colonial farms in this area were intervened and became part
of the CAIA production units. Local smallholders had thought that they could recover these
lands and were disappointed by the state's intervention. Smallholders reported that they were
encouraged to work for the state farm.' When the peace accord was signed, many small-
holders tried to reclaim these lands. Some were successful and planted crops, but their tenure
is uncertain because the government has not determined the status of the former state farm.
Supposedly, government officials want to alienate the land to private commercial enterprises.
In fact, some people were not successful in reasserting their rights precisely because some
of the CAIA lands had already been distributed to commercial farmers.
287 Some of these
commercial fanners got their land rights from district authorities as early as 1986.
288
Many
of these "temporary" land rights had been granted to nonlocal interests.
289
Local customary authorities conceded that there have been conflicts over agricultural and
sacred lands. Some of the case have been violent. In the first dispute, some smallholders are
struggling with the new commercial holders, claiming that they have priority rights to former
CAIA land. Other smallholders claim that the commercial producers are not respecting the
limits of their concessions and have encroached on adjoining land. In the second case,
smallholders attested that private farmers (and some nonlocal smallholders) had started to
farm on sacred (i.e., ceremonial and burial) land. In both cases the smallholders presented
their complaints to district and locality officials.
290
Government officials have not been successful in resolving conflicts that the government
initiated through granting concessions. One customary authority interviewed in Chipala
inferred that district officials protect the interests of commercial producers and disregard the
claims of smallholders.
291 At least one dispute case was passed to the local court, but it too
has not been resolved.
292 In the meantime, smallholders are acting on their own initiative.
The situation is far from clear and far from one-sided. While it appears that government
has been favoring commercial interests, it is not certain that smallholders have lost all
disputes. Two of the private commercial farmers interviewed complained that they had lost
286. Interviews with smallholder farmers, M'Languene, February 1994.
287. Interviews with smallholder farmers, M'Languene, February 1994; and with locality government
representatives, M'Languene, February 1994.
288. See Eliseu (1994).
289. Interview with representative of the District Directorate for Agriculture, Angonia, February 1994. The
information was confirmed by participant debates at the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique.
These land concessions were reportedly granted on a temporary basis. The term "temporary" was never
defined. Recipients say that they were told they could use the land until the war was over or until "things
changed." We do not know what these farmers paid for their concessions, though one reported investing 70
million meticais (approximately US$13,000 at the current rate of exchange, December 1993).
290. See Eliseu (1994); also see Weiss and Myers (1994).
291. In contrast, another district government official suggested that no one would be entitled to CAIA land
for a long period of time because the state was going to resume agricultural operations. Interviews with
representatives of the District Directorate of Agriculture, January 1994.
292. Interviews with smallholders and customary authorities, M'Languene, February 1994.124
land rights because the government retracted some of the land granted to them and permitted
smallholders to farm it. In these cases tenure security was explicitly defined for neither
commercial nor smallholder producers. At the same time, smallholders are aggressively
defending their own interests, in one area driving off some of the nonlocal commercial
producers. In a dispute over sacred lands, there was a violent demonstration that resulted in
casualties. In another case, local smallholders presented their complaint to district officials,
who suggested that the private farmer return part of the area to local inhabitants. Yet the
smallholders refused to accept the proposal, demanding the return of the entire concession and
threatening to drive out the commercial producer. Although the issue was still pending at the
time of the last investigation, smallholders had peremptorily squatted on some of the land,
reducing the private commercial farmer's access to part of the holding. Other commercial
farmers in the area have been pressured by smallholders to return part or all of the land they
were granted.'
District government officials acknowledged that they were not titling or registering land
concessions in the area until the disputes were resolved. Smallholders suggested that the
government should demarcate their lands and prevent commercial producers from occupying
those areas (Eliseu 1994).
The last site investigated in Angonia covered the terrain around Domue, the location of
a second CAIA production block. This locale also was chosen because of its fertile lands, its
location along the transportation corridor, and its high number of reported conflicts. Domue
is located approximately 45 kilometers northwest of Ulongue (maps 19 and 20). In February
1994, the NGO World Food Program estimated its population, including both government-
and RENAMO-administered areas, at 116,108 people.
Land conflicts among smallholders and between smallholders and commercial producers
in this area have been reported in the popular press. Our research confirmed these stories.'
Returning refugees complained of conflicts with other refugees because of confusion over land
rights. The difficulty stems from the colonial period when villages (aldeamentos) were created
and smallholders were forced to abandon their lands, at which time numerous villages were
created in the area around Domue.
295
The confusion was compounded by the government
after independence, when smallholders were again required to live in communal villages.'
When smallholders began to return to the area, district authorities told them to go to their
areas of origin or areas of choice. This poorly conceived plan brought on a number of
confrontations. Authorities presumably thought smallholders would return to the lands
293. This lack of clarity over rights and the struggles between commercial and smallholder producers in both
M'Languene and Dome (another CAIA production area) was debated in the Second National Land Conference.
The governor of Tete, Sr. Mutemba, concurred that there were land conflicts in these two areas.
294. They were also confirmed by other researchers in the area, including Nina Berg, Norwegian Refugee
Council, personal communication, November 1993; and Virgilio Ferrao, chair, Ad Hoc Land Commission,
Ministry of Agriculture, November 1993.
295. See DINAGECA, district and provincial maps, Maputo. This is confirmed in Coehlo (1993).
296. Ibid.125
belonging to the former communal villages. It is uncertain if they considered the plight or
demands of local smallholders with historical rights. Local customary authorities as well as
locality government officials are reportedly having difficulty resolving many of these disputes;
tension among smallholders persists.
Smallholders with historical rights reported that when they attempted to return to Domue
to reclaim their land, they found other smallholders already there. The former smallholders
claimed that the land had been given to them by either colonial or government officials. The
farmers already present maintained that the land had been abandoned and was free for
occupation. In other areas, farmers who had been given land as part of a colonial or
government scheme returned to find other smallholders, who said they had historical rights,
farming on what they thought was their land. Apparently there was great confusion over who
had superior rights to the land' Locality and district government officials were aware of
some of these conflicts but were unsure of what to do. They indicated that there was no
policy and that they were waiting for a course of action to be established. In the meantime,
they were attempting to help smallholders find land to farm temporarily.
298
As in M'Languene, private commercial farmers started acquiring some CAIA land in
1986. District authorities were unable to tell us how many commercial agricultural
concessions had been granted to these nonlocal farmers. Returning smallholders have tried
to recover these lands and have petitioned the district government authorities requesting the
removal of the commercial farmers.' Commercial farmers answered that they had acquired
the land legally and that the government was not protecting their rights. One commercial
farmer declared that he had invested several million meticais and demanded that the
government uphold his right to the land. Another commercial farmer accused the government
of withdrawing land-use rights in an election year.
30' District government authorities contend
that they are reviewing the case and that no titles will be issued until all the facts have been
acquired. In the interim, tension between smallholders and commercial farmers remains.
5. CONCERNS RAISED BY THE CASE OF ANGONIA
The case study in Tete Province reveals that a large percentage of the refugee population
has returned to the province, specifically to Angonia District, without hinderance. Although
we do not know what is happening in the RENAMO-controlled areas, we are certain that
most of the refugees in the government-controlled portions have gained access to some land
and have planted crops during the last two agricultural seasons. It is not evident, however,
whether smallholders have secure tenure rights. It is also not clear where smallholders are
297. Interviews with smallholder farmers, Domue, February 1994; interviews with agricultural extension
agents, Domue, February 1994.
Unfortunately, we have no data on the number of conflicts occurring in either Domue or M'Languene;
however, the frequency of reports about conflict from smallholders was substantial.
298. Interview with locality representative, Domue, February 1994.
299. Interview with locality agricultural extension agent, Domue, February 1994.
300. Smallholders commented that both FRELIMO and RENAMO have been trying to "mobilize" peasants
in the district.126
going. In the cases of Calomue and Tchabualo, smallholders seemingly returned to their
family lands with little difficulty. In other areas, such as Domue and M'Languene, there has
been great difficulty with reintegration; much of the problem has come from confusion over
land rights, most of which is due to overlapping and competitive claims. This process is being
complicated by the government as it grants concessions and fails to devise a determinate
tenure policy. The fact that government authorities simply told people to return to the land
they had abandoned exhibits extreme insensitivity toward smallholders and the historical
circumstances surrounding land access and tenure security.
Reports from other sources indicate that there are few land conflicts in the interior region
of the province or away from the major transportation/commercial Domue-Ulongue-
M'Languene-Tsangano axis.
301 Most conflicts are occurring where population density is
high and where the best (most strategic) land is located—in addition to the areas where land
concessions have been granted.
It appears that most conflicts between smallholders are being resolved by customary
authorities, though several of these farmers reported that locality officials had also been
involved. It is obvious, however, that further research is needed to understand the dynamics
between returning refugees, new arrivals, and other local smallholders. Internal struggles
within these communities may become manifest as the refugee population settles and more
land is exploited for agricultural production. This area should be monitored in the future.
There is some evidence that Mozambicans and Malawians are entering the district because
of its fertile and productive lands. Demobilized soldiers have also been negotiating for land
rights, and their demands may be accelerated by the demobilization process. These new
entrants may destabilize the district, particularly since the latter group is powerful and has
the backing of international donor agencies.
Although we cannot be certain, at the time of research it appeared that district authorities
had stopped granting land concessions. Whether this moratorium is for election purposes or
some other objective, the end result is positive. In addition, however, district authorities must
resolve problems pertaining to the concessions granted during the war. Part of the difficulty
stems from the fact that CAIA land has not been officially divested. In fact, the issue in
Angonia is representative of problems affecting the state farm sector elsewhere, for the
central government has yet to articulate a definite divestiture policy. At the same time, district
and provincial governments must find ways to promote commercial agricultural investment.
This will be impossible given the current confusion surrounding the status of the state farm
sector.
District authorities need to decide if they will support previously granted concessions or
extinguish these rights. As it stands now, the authorities have avoided making a firm decision,
thus contributing to tenure insecurity. It is not sufficient for them to say that they have not
301. Bonga and Wilson (1993); Wilson (1991b); and Nina Berg, Norwegian Refugee Council, personal
communication, November 1993.127
granted titles—and will not grant titles until the matter is resolved. The district should
immediately develop a policy to be implemented in a timely and transparent fashion.
Finally, if it is true that much of the violence against local inhabitants during the war was
committed by other local residents, the end of war may lead to yet another round of social
struggles. These conflicts will be intensified, however, in a climate of tenure uncertainty,
where the government further challenges existing land rights by granting concessions to
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V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
As noted in the introduction, the countryside in Mozambique is in a state of intense
transformation. Many facets of this change are positive, if fragile, creating economic
opportunities for individuals and leading to greater food security and to a better, more secure
way of life.
At the same time, aspects of this great metamorphosis are negative, destabilizing, and
may well erode the economic and political gains achieved since the signing of the peace
accord. The de facto land policy that is emerging undermines agricultural and other economic
investments and the development of collaborative and decentralized political relations and
institutions. Despite existing land laws, the government is facilitating a massive land-grab that
strips many smallholders of their land and tenure rights and adversely affects investment
strategies for all landholders.
Three critical problems exist. First, the statutory land law empowers the state to strip
people of their land rights and to redistribute those privileges. This often occurs at the
expense of smallholder producers, but it also stymies commercial investment: it pits
smallholders against one another as well as smallholders against larger commercial interests;
it frustrates the possible collaborative and competitive economic relationships that might
emerge between smallholders and commercial farmers; and it denies smallholders the
opportunity to compete with larger producers.
Second, individuals within government aid the process that denies smallholders land rights
through their manipulation of the law, for they believe that they are doing what is right for
both smallholders and the agricultural sector as a whole. These persons argue that
smallholders are incapable of exploiting the better lands in the country, are unproductive, and
must be protected by the state.
302 Provincial and district officials in many locations expressed
this view. Strong evidence from Maputo Province and unconfirmed reports from Gaza,
Manica, and Sofala indicate that this tactic is used more frequently against female farmers or
landholders than against males. This has been shown by both our research and the
investigations of others. Unfortunately, government officials often have a weak understanding
of smallholder production and tenure relations. Further, there are continuing biases within
government against smallholder producers, customary legal authorities, and small-scale
production; these prejudices are founded not on fact but on ideology. Although many
officials, particularly at the lower levels of government, have good intentions, they are not
achieving their objectives. In the final analysis, it is the state in its current configuration that
poses the greatest threat to smallholders and sabotages commercial investment.
302. This was stated several times at the recent Second National Land Conference in Mozambique; see
Weiss and Myers (1994); Myers and Weiss (1994).132
At the same time, we cannot deny the fact that corruption is, in part, driving this process.
Even more disturbing than the lack of resources and the contradictions and weaknesses within
the laws and regulations, there appears to be a profound disregard for land law—and
individual rights—by a few government representatives who have the responsibility for
implementing and administering these laws. Numerous cases are reported throughout the
country of government officials dispossessing others of land and redistributing it, for private
gain, to themselves, their families, or other interested parties.
Third, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively administer the land laws. It lacks the
manpower and other resources to impartially implement these laws, particularly outside of
urban areas. This situation is compounded by a weak or nonfunctioning judiciary. Justices
proclaim that they are unwilling to hear disputes involving smallholders while government
officials protest that smallholders are ignorant and do not understand the courts or the laws.
Most disturbing, executive councils and judges often decide cases in favor of commercial
interests even when evidence supports smallholder claims.
Testimony gathered by the case studies indicates that for most Mozambicans land is not
an abundant resource, free from competition or conflict. In many areas of the country, "good
land" becomes a limited commodity as it is acquired by returning (foreign and national)
private interests or is obtained and redistributed by the state to national and foreign private
parties and joint state/private enterprises. This usually occurs at the expense of small- and
medium-sized landholders. In all areas of the country and for all types of investors (especially
smallholder farmers), land tenure rights are weak. Given that most farmers in Mozambique
are women, these developments are unequally affecting one segment of the country's rural
population.
Evidence from the case studies also demonstrates that the formal system of land access
in Mozambique is perplexing: There is confusion and ignorance about how people gain rights
to land, who has authority to distribute or grant land rights, and what types of rights are
being granted or acquired. There is no structure for linking the customary and the statutory
legal systems—no courts exist to bridge the gap between the two and bind them together. No
structure exists to permit disputes heard at the local level in a customary setting, using
customary laws, to be passed to a higher, formal court of appeal.
Data indicate that the weak land-tenure system—combined with an administrative process
that lacks clarity and an uncontrolled distribution of land at central, provincial, and district
levels—is leading to conflict and insecurity. This undermines economic investment and creates
a fertile environment for unproductive land speculation. The impotent tenure system also
adversely affects agricultural production and reintegration of the more than 6 million refugees
displaced by war and drought, contributing to the emergence of a new category of postwar
refugees; it modifies the quality of life for the majority of the country's population,
particularly women, who make up most of the farming population. Above all, the ineffectual
tenure system will lead to political instability at all levels of society, from the household to
the central government.133
The frequency of reported land conflicts, often of a violent nature, is increasing
dramatically throughout the country. Conflicts have been recorded in every province; they
are occurring most often in areas where population is dense and capital investment is
prodigious. It is obvious that there is a relationship between population density, capital
investment, and official land concessions, on one hand, and the occurrence, location, and
frequency of land conflicts, on the other.
Customary authorities in Mozambique lack an officially sanctioned role in the process of
land distribution. Indeed, customary authorities are rarely encouraged by formal administra-
tors to become involved in the process of land distribution to commercial interests; more
frequently they are isolated or ignored. Efforts to bypass customary leaders, whether
successful or not, have affected power relationships at the local level, creating tensions within
many communities. It has also curtailed the power of customary authorities to protect and
defend their own positions as well as their ability to defend the resources of their communities
against acquisition by the state or private economic interests.
Smallholders and some larger commercial interests are gaining access to land in a variety
of ways, but this process is not well understood by policymakers and other government
officials in Mozambique. Farmers acquire land by reclaiming old "family land." For
smallholders, family land may include parcels to which they had rights in precolonial times,
holdings that they received or that they were forced onto during the colonial era, or areas that
were given to them after independence. Family land may be land that formerly belonged to
a private colonial farm, a colonial government-created village, a state farm, or a postindepen-
dence government-created village. Research reveals that in many areas there are multiple
conceivable claimants to the same piece of land. Many categories of people, with varying
degrees of justification, assert rights to land, though some feel that their claims have legal
basis. These beliefs that claimants' demands are legitimate make many land disputes
especially complex and acrimonious.
Smallholders are gaining access to land in other ways as well. They are clearing bush that
they consider to be unoccupied (but is usually part of their community's land). They are also
squatting on former colonial private farms and state farms, acquiring plots as tenants of new
commercial farmers, and occasionally purchasing rights to land. In a very few cases,
smallholders are receiving land through government-granted concessions (however, in most
reported cases these concessions were temporary).
The research shows that many former refugees and displaced families are leaving refugee
camps and other areas to which they were relocated, and it is clear that in many cases they
are moving to areas that do not contain home or family lands. In some instances, former
refugees and displaced people are unsure of where they should go; in others, smallholders are
choosing to move to localities that offer the best economic opportunities or the best physical
security, regardless of whether it is "where they came from." Other farmers are dividing their
time between two locations. Where or when people move—and what they do when they get
to the new locale—depends on many factors, including where they came from, how long they
were displaced, and the conditions they find in their new location. Government predictions
that refugees and displaced families will return to their areas of origin have proved134
inaccurate. Many displaced families will remain where they currently reside to maximize
opportunities and minimize risks. However, farmers who have planted crops are not
necessarily permanent settlers and may move again after the next agricultural season—again
depending on opportunities and risks. This movement has both positive and negative
consequences: It is positive because smallholders are seizing opportunities that ensure them
the best quality of life; it is negative because such flux creates economic and geographical
instability and causes openings for unscrupulous persons or for the government to confiscate
land and displace smallholders.
The research also discloses that many former refugees and displaced families have
acquired at least temporary rights to land and have cultivated for at least one agricultural
season. But smallholders in many locations are acutely aware of the transitory nature of their
rights and the possibility that they could lose them. There is tension among smallholders in
some locations. Research showed that land disputes between smallholders were positively
resolved by local customary authorities in most locations, were resolved by locality-level
government officials less frequently, and were settled by the courts in not a single case
investigated. The incidence of customary authorities' being unable to resolve disputes
involving smallholders signifies the complex social struggles reemerging in the postwar
period.
The case studies also reveal confrontations between smallholders and larger commercial
interests, between smallholders and joint-venture enterprises, and between smallholders and
the government. In many situations smallholders are being forced to abandon land in favor
of more powerful interests. Customary authorities were unable to resolve these disputes and
often refused to become involved. In most circumstances smallholders presented petitions or
complaints to government officials and in a few cases achieved an investigation and a
favorable decision. More frequently, however, government officials either did nothing or
decided in favor of the larger commercial interests. Conflicts have resulted, sometimes
leading to physical violence. In some places tension remains high.
Research revealed the emergence of a new category of postwar displaced smallholders.
These individuals and families are being uprooted as government grants land concessions and
as unscrupulous private interests—who are exploiting the relative weakness of smallholder
farmers and the lack of clarity in land laws—force people to move.
Admittedly, unexploited land exists in many locations, and smallholders say that they have
enough land in many places. Our primary focus and area of concern is land that is more
strategically located—in the former corridors; on the state farms; and near the cities,
international borders, coast, rivers, and major roads. These areas, which have the highest
population concentrations, are the most valuable and desirable. Larger commercial interests
are acquiring these lands, and smallholders are being displaced in the process. More
importantly, smallholders are being denied an opportunity to compete with the more powerful
commercial interests, thus depriving them of the opportunity to improve their economic
position.135
At the same time, laws and the administrative procedures do not foster security of title
for many commercial activities (including agricultural, mining, hunting, and forestry).
Concessions are granted and sometimes retracted with great speed. Some concessions have
been given, but when questioned, the government often fails to support or defend its actions.
Like smallholders, commercials farmers are discovering that the lands they acquired often
have multiple claimants. These protesters include colonial-era private farmers, the state, and
other claimants from the postwar period, including smallholders. Some commercial farmers
and joint-venture interests resort to private militias to support their perceived rights. This lack
of clarity and security also leads to instability, speculation, underinvestment, and abuse of
resources.
While mistakes have been made, the consequences are not irreversible. Government and
civil society need to identify priority areas in the country and address the most acute
problems. At the same time, government should participate in an open dialogue with all
segments of Mozambican society, focusing on land-law reform and land administration.
Particularly, Mozambique needs to determine who will be responsible for land management
and at what level of government decisions will be made. The role of customary rules and
authority must be made a part of this discussion. Government and civil society should
cooperate in the management of land and other natural resources, with the government
completely reconsidering its evaluation of smallholder agricultural potential. In some regions,
locality, district, and provincial officials are attempting to resolve some of the more pressing
issues by setting land aside, for example, for landless farmers. Such innovations should be
considered as part of the discussion and should be pursued where appropriate. Above all,
government must work with smallholders in an open, transparent, and cooperative manner.
There are no simple solutions to the problems identified in this report. The decisions that
appear the most obvious are often inappropriate and cost-ineffective. Some people suggest that
the best solution to land tenure problems in Mozambique is to title all land in the country—or
to title all the strategic lands. They argue that this would ensure security. Others reply that
the land law and land regulations are adequate as they stand and simply need refinement.
They state that the problem lies in the administration of the law—that is, that the law is not
administered as intended or is not administered uniformly. They suggest that favoritism and
nepotism undermine its application. Still others suggest creating reserves for smallholder
producers. This last is perhaps the most potentially disastrous solution of all.
Current land law is not appropriate for Mozambique. Key considerations for developing
a new land law include the following: It should be able to function in the prevailing economic
and social environment; it should be socially responsible and contribute to a more equitable
society; it should encourage investment and sound resource use; it must be acceptable to all
segments of society and its administrators must be viewed as legitimate; it should decentralize
control over land to the local level; and, finally, it should be framed so that it can be
successfully implemented by government and civil society. If the new land law in
Mozambique meets these criteria, the country faces a bright and promising future.137
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
1. Central government should suspend granting land concessions until the land law is revised
or clarified.
2. Government should open a public discussion concerning land law and property rights in
Mozambique at the earliest opportunity after elections. The land law should be assessed,
then revised or replaced.
3. A revised land law should legalize land transactions, including those that are already
taking place. Privatization of land markets may well give women—and other land users
with secondary rights—greater opportunities to gain control of property and hold
resources. But this should be studied carefully; this type of regime, particularly if
combined with individualization and/or registration, may lead to the concentration of all
rights in the (male) heads of household or lineage heads, stripping women and others of
their secondary user rights.
4. A revised land law should create secure, negotiable, private rights. As part of this
revision, government may consider registering property rights in selected areas of the
country, particularly those of the most economically strategic importance.
5. Provincial governments should strive to devolve land management to the district and
locality level.
6. District and locality governments should incorporate local communities and their leaders
in the process of land management. Open forums should be created in which government
representatives and local community members can exchange ideas regarding their needs
and objectives.
7. All levels of government should recognize local community political structures and their
leaders and involve them in the management of land and natural resources and the
resolution of conflicts.
8. The land tax code should be reassessed, revised as necessary, and enforced. Commercial
landholders should pay land taxes that reflect the market value of their lands. (This would
help to discourage some types of land speculation.)
9. Government should avoid entering into joint ventures, which continue to place demands
on state resources without substantial returns to the treasury, and should seriously
consider privatization of its existing joint-venture enterprises.138
10. Government should invest more resources and vest greater authority in the Ad Hoc Land
Commission to study land issues and make recommendations. Its terms of reference
should be expanded and it should report directly to the Council of Ministers or the
National Assembly.
11. Government should continue its review of the judiciary, and ways should be found to
allow interaction between statutory and customary legal regimes. As part of this process,
government should review inheritance laws and determine if they can be modified to
create more secure rights for women and others with secondary land rights.
12. Government should begin to keep records of land concessions and other government
land transactions.
13. Government and civil society should consider the creation of a civil body that has the
power to review land grants and concessions and, where they overlap, determine which
has precedence. This body should be empowered to determine who should be paid
compensation—and how much they should be paid—for the loss of land rights that were
legally acquired.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RENAMO
14. RENAMO should stop making land concessions in areas under its control.
15. RENAMO should allow the free movement of people and goods throughout the areas
under its control.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
16. Civil society should insist that government and RENAMO stop making land concessions.
17. Civil society should open a dialogue regarding land and property rights in Mozambique.
Government should be encouraged to participate in this exchange.
18. Civil society should insist that all land concessions be subject to judicial review.
19. Local communities, with the assistance of locality and district government, should
discuss the creation of local land-management boards or other institutions, empowering
them with the ability to defend community land rights and negotiate the exchange of
rights with nonlocal interests.
20. The Universidade Eduardo Mondlane should initiate research into questions relating to
property and land rights, customary authorities and political institutions, and the role of
civil society in the democratization process.139
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DONORS AND NGOS
21. Donors should encourage the government to stop making land concessions and should
tie international assistance to this action.
22. Donors should help with creating an environment in which government and civil society
can communicate and negotiate over land law and tenure reform.
23. Donors should continue to fund programs that enhance national technical capacity and
skills, particularly with regard to dispute resolution and resource administration, and that
generate information leading to more informed public debates about land and property
relations in Mozambique.
24. Donors should encourage civil society to pursue the above-noted recommendations.141
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